

THE CLERGY REVIEW

A MODERN FORM OF THOMISM

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THE historical antecedents of any view or tendency in thought are of value though of limited value. To say to a man, "Oh, you think that because you are the son of your father" may be very irritating, because it substitutes for the analysis of the truth or falsehood of the thought a reflection on the accident of its birth. On the other hand, when a new view is presented to us of which we knew nothing, it is undoubtedly useful to learn its parentage and ancestry. We are thereby put into touch with it; we can see what was in the author's mind and our criticism and appreciation are likely on this account to be more just. I should like, therefore, to make it clear from the beginning that the historical summary which is to follow has for its end neither to praise nor blame the view propounded. Before we can do either of these two things we have to examine carefully the arguments as set out by their authors and ask ourselves first whether the conclusions are true and, secondly, whether they are a correct statement of the philosophy of St. Thomas.

Many factors have contributed to the rise of this so-called school of Thomism, and I have space and time only to mention those which seem to me most significant and most easily co-ordinated. For the first we must go back as far as the Reformation. The dispute between the Catholic Church and Luther turned on the point whether the assent of faith was an intellectual act or not. Luther denied it, and so fathered on Protestantism and northern Europe a distinction between faith and reason, religion and science from which it is only now recovering. The first fruits were that Catholic theologians stressed with the greatest severity the reasonableness of belief, and in the books of apologetics the ideal

became to give as scientific an account as possible of the credibility of the Bible story, prophecies, miracles and the character and intentions of the divine founder of the Catholic Church. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the conclusions have been called the subject of scientific faith as opposed to supernatural faith. In the other camp the results were just the opposite, sci., the free gift to science and secular pursuits of reason, and the quest for a verification of faith in religious experience, in an inner light instead of the light of external evidence.

The next significant facts to be noted are the invention and success of physico-mathematical methods controlled by the clear and distinct ideas of Descartes. The ideal in science and after a time in philosophy, too, became to represent the universe in ideas which in their exactness faithfully pictured reality. All know how successful these methods were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when they were used by the scientists. It is a different story in philosophy, and a great scandal arose when Hume told the world that an empirical philosophy led inevitably to complete scepticism. This challenge could not be left unanswered, and it was taken up by Kant. Kant's solution is interesting in itself, but it is almost more so because of its influence on the nineteenth century and the period we have just left behind us. The Thomist philosophers I am about to describe would be the first to admit the great though indirect influence of his thought upon their own. His importance is religious as well as philosophic. I have already mentioned the cleavage of Protestant and Catholic in their conceptions of the part of reason in faith. In Kant the Protestant thought that he had discovered a final arbiter on this question, and on the strength of his verdict the Protestant theologians went gaily ahead, using their heart instead of their reason. In a corresponding way the philosophers dismissed religion as metaphysical, and therefore outside the range of reason, and instituted a reign of positivism, which was only another word for the efficiency of the physico-mathematical methods. Kant achieved this remarkable result by his Critique, a new method of philosophic criticism. He sought to show that if you examine the conditions—the transcendental that is, not the psychological—of thinking it is possible to justify the judgments of experience. Against Hume he showed that in

experience there is more than mere passivity to sensible impressions; the mind is also engaged exercising a synthetic function and giving a universal and valid quality to our judgments. On the other hand the mind without experience is empty, so that when it departs from experience it does nothing but beat the air. His conclusion then was that the ideal type of human knowledge is that of the physical sciences, the psychomathematical method, and that human reason was incapable of dealing with such a being as God because He lay outside the world of phenomena. If this appear a disheartening conclusion Kant did not think so. A religious man, he was glad that he had removed God beyond the attacks of the rationalists and scientists, and he felt that he could still worship God because in his theory God was necessary as a postulate for morality. Thus God who has been struck out from the writings of philosophy is brought back by the good Protestant Kant in the name of moral experience, and religion floats safely in the air too high for scientific artillery.

The effect of this teaching on the nineteenth century cannot be exaggerated. Religion grew further and further apart from science, and science settled down to possess the earth. I am, of course, simplifying the history, for there were actions and reactions, excursions and alarums. It remains true nevertheless that in the main current of thought the two most significant figures were Comte in France and Herbert Spencer in England. They both exhibit the triumph of a rationalism which took the province of knowledge to be covered by the clear and distinct ideas gained by the help of the physico-mathematical methods. As might be expected, such concepts became increasingly mechanical, and all that belonged to the world of qualities and values was said to be moonshine or reducible to physics and chemistry. Such was the state of affairs towards the end of the nineteenth century, and Kant can be held partly responsible for the crisis which now occurred. That crisis can conveniently be summed up in the name of Bergson. It was Bergson who pricked the prevailing mechanistic theory and substituted for it a dynamic principle. He denounced the hard immobile concepts which were said to represent reality as points that the memory selects in the flow of life. They are no better than a series of distinct and

discrete snapshots of a moving picture. Concepts are nothing more than symbols having an economic value. Life breaks through all these narrow partitions and frameworks at every moment and can be seized therefore not by reason but by an experience which may be called intuition to distinguish it from reason. With one gesture, therefore, Bergson swept all the scientific models and construction of reality off the table and restored all the values, æsthetic, moral and religious.

It is outside my purpose to sketch the consequences of this doctrine on later science and secular philosophy. We still hear much talk of life which cannot be held fast by thought, of experience which is vital and incommunicable, and the system of Pragmatism which followed has still a few adherents. What is worth noting is the close connection in time and outlook of Pragmatism and Modernism.

We must now return to the story of Catholic philosophy. As pointed out, after the revolt of Luther Catholic theologians laid immense stress on reason and looked with suspicion on the introduction of experience or evidence of the heart into their apologetics. A very interesting question would be the degree to which their views were influenced by the ideal of the clear and distinct idea and the physico-mathematical method. I must pass this over with the one observation that their self-denying ordinance to advance by hard and fast reasoning alone weighed heavily on certain spirits. Philosophy was not at its brightest in the Church during the eighteenth century, and, as might be expected, we find the sky rocket of Rosmini as an escape from its dullness. According to the system of Rosmini the mind has a glimpse first of God, and by that glimpse or after that glimpse judges finite objects of experience. This view appears to be so close to the interpretation of St. Thomas I am going to give that the latter has been denounced as a new form of it. It can be, however, sharply differentiated from it, as we shall see. In the nineteenth century, despite the heroic efforts of Lacordaire and others, cobwebs gathered round the scholastic philosophy, as Newman saw when he visited Rome after his conversion, and the condition of affairs and danger of contamination from the prevalent secular tendencies can be gathered from the attempt of some Catholic philosophers to found

the truths of nature and God not on reason but Fideism. The attempt was condemned, but it shows that already some Catholic groups were dissatisfied with the form of argument used in apologetics.

Then came the revival of Catholic philosophy under Leo XIII, and for a short while there were no disturbances. All had at heart the restoration of a Thomism brought abreast with modern science and thought. The school of Louvain set themselves particularly to reset the physical conceptions of St. Thomas, construing his unchanging principles in the light of modern science. In France, at the new Institut Catholique, a still more ambitious programme was undertaken by the great Mgr. d'Hulst, and it was in France that the development I am to write of began. Recall the situation; a narrow positivism which boasted of being completely rational, a reaction against it started by Bergson in his first work published in 1888, that is to say, the repudiation of the frozen concepts of the mechanical tradition, and of reason, in the name of an intuition which was not intellectual and nevertheless touched the heart of things; then think how all this is embroiled with problems about faith and reason, inner lights and evidence from external sources. Here was a dish with some dainty pickings in it!

The first attempt to incorporate what looked "naturaliter Christiana" in this confused world of thought ended in a rebuff. Instead of a reinvigorated Catholic thought there ensued the disaster of modernism. Many who set out to rescue what was good from the tendencies of the age were sucked down by the stream; some got dripping to the bank; few escaped a wetting. It is noteworthy that of the leading spirits in this adventure few if any were professional philosophers or theologians of the first order. It was not till later that the schools began seriously to examine the situation. As is known, the trouble began with the interpretation of Holy Scripture and the proposal to distinguish between the value in apologetics of history as fact and evidence, and history as the mainspring of religious and eternal values. That does not concern us. The figure which grows larger with the years in historical importance is that of Maurice Blondel. In 1893 a book appeared called *L'Action*, the work of a young Catholic professor at Lille

It was literally a call to action. He was not the first to feel a sense of dissatisfaction with the current method of apologetics. Already Ollé-Laprune had designed an argument in favour of the Catholic religion from its harmony with what are the moral ideals and intellectual conditions of man. But Blondel opened out new vistas. He shared with his contemporaries the feeling of discontent with positivism and the claims of conceptual reasoning to be fully adequate to life, and he accepted this much at least from Bergson that man was a living dynamic force as well as a thinking machine. I cannot summarise a book of five or six hundred pages which is packed with thought, nor is it necessary. His main thesis is that man must by his very nature act and take up some position. Now let him take up the most *dilettante* and inconsequential position he likes, whatever he does he will be forced by the very logic of that action to go further. Through every possible position he shows the push of this inexorable logic. On and on man goes until he is forced to see at the Ultima Thule of his soul's passage that he must decide either *vouloir indéfiniment* or *vouloir l'infini*, that is, he must choose to wander like Tithonus with his thirst for completeness unslaked or go on his knees and beg the infinite God to complete his life or act.

This apologetic aroused a great debate. Blondel, ignorant of technical terms in theology and youthful in his expressions, had walked over the ashes of many a flaming controversy. The points which we should notice are these. Is it possible to say in any sense that man is driven all unknowing from within by a desire of the supernatural? Secondly, what parts respectively do desire and reason play in this apologetic? Is not conceptual thinking or the evidence of reason underrated and the function of religious experience over emphasised, and what is the relation between this life in action and our reason? Here is a throng of importunate questions! The book *L'Action* never, though it has been stated otherwise, fell under ecclesiastical censure (for an able and reasoned defence of its orthodoxy see the article in the *Dictionnaire Apologetique*, Immanence), but the method employed in it which came to be called that of immanence was taken up by others and became another word for modernism. Modernism swept away all safeguards and restraints; it denied the competence of the reason to

defend the supernatural, faith and the Catholic religion; it rejected the historical proofs of Christianity as fact but accepted the latter because of its truth value. It substituted, therefore, experience for reason and treated concepts and dogma as symbols having only a pragmatic value.

This view was condemned by the Church. I would not have recorded it were it not that it serves as a bridge—a bridge of sighs indeed—between the old and the new. As so often happens when a heresy has met its end, Catholic thinkers begin as an aftermath to remove the false and pick out what is good; for heresies generally arise from an undue exaggeration of some aspect of the whole truth vividly realised. The false starts, the deviations from the track, the snares on the way could now be inspected without the heat of controversy. Controversy as we know is apt, like the arrows of Xerxes at Thermopylæ, to hide the shining of the sun. Those who now took up the problems which had vexed the modernists had learnt the lesson of that conflict, and besides they were trained philosophers and theologians. From the dust of the arena the dispute passed into the venerable and whitewashed schools of Catholic philosophy. They were able to see the questions involved in a clearer perspective, the old sixteenth century quarrel on the functions of the intellect and heart in faith, the Cartesian ideas, the part played by Kant and the meaning of the reaction of Bergson and his followers. If we glance at the work of these modern Thomists, we shall be able without too much difficulty to detect the influence in their writings of their meditation on these problems. Sertilanges, for instance, in his *St. Thomas d'Aquin*, goes out of his way to insist on the primary importance of the idea of the Good, and in the *Mélanges Thomistes* amazed the writers of text-books and an older generation by his development of the rich and far-reaching implications of the meaning of idea in the Thomist philosophy. Pierre Rousselot, whose death in the great war was such a loss, turned the Bergsonian distinction of concept and intuition to account by showing, in St. Thomas' words, that "intelligence is a form of living, and of all the forms of life it is the most perfect," and that consequently the distinction of Bergson has an element of truth though it has been wrongly stated. P. de Broglie

and Fr. James O'Mahony, the Franciscan, again have concentrated on the place of desire in thought and the relation of the supernatural to the natural end, and P. Maréchal, after having reflected, like many others, with a new respect on the work of Kant, has decided that the break-down of that system was due to an omission of a saving principle in St. Thomas, and that the two can be compared as the incomplete with the complete.

The work of these new investigators was assisted in another way by the dispute which preceded them. During that dispute Abbé Laberthonnière had called in as evidence the view of the great St. Augustine of Hippo, and the name and thought of Newman gradually became familiar abroad through the efforts of Bremond and others. Pascal, too, came into vogue. The temptation to link up the thought of such great thinkers as Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal and Newman was almost irresistible. In the recently published *Monument to St. Augustine* many will have read an estimate of his philosophy and a comparison of it with that of Thomism. The view expressed there is on the whole not favourable to attempts at reconciliation. In this paper I am not concerned with the truth of this criticism or the success of attempted alliances. All I have to do is to insist that one school of Thomist writers has brought them close together.

I come now to the second and more difficult part of this article, an *aperçu* of the doctrine of these Thomists. To ease the strain a little it will be well if we ask ourselves and keep in mind any possible meaning which can be attached to such consecrated or popular phrases as "the pure of heart shall see God," "life is more than logic," St. Augustine's "philosophising has no object save to give us happiness." My intention was to show the working out of this new interpretation in various departments of the Thomist philosophy, in the theory of knowledge, the ethics and the relation of the supernatural to the natural. The task is, however, too great, and I must content myself with a survey of the three with few references to St. Thomas and indications only of the argument. In beholding the general point of view readers will be able to approach the problems raised for themselves. Those who wish to acquaint themselves with the view as it touches the question of knowledge will find in P. Maréchal's fifth volume of his great work, *Le Point*

de Départ de la Metaphysique, a full and searching exposition of it.

All Catholic theologians are agreed that there are two orders, the natural and the supernatural, that by natural reason man can know God and by the supernatural enjoy the vision of God as He is in Himself. As St. Thomas says in the *De Malo*, "the superiority of a rational creature consists in this that he is capable of reaching the sovereign goodness by divine vision and enjoyment, although his strictly human powers do not suffice for this and the help of divine grace is needed." In other words we can know God in some sort by unaided human reason, but such knowledge, however high, falls far short of that knowledge which God will give us of Himself, when, so to speak, He lets us see Him with His own eyes. In order, however, that we should be able to receive this gift there must be some negative or obediential (as it is called) capacity in human nature. God could not, without a miracle, give an animal the beatific vision whereas it is without a miracle that He graces us. The question therefore arises what is the relation between our nature and this grace. We have been accustomed to hear as an answer to this that man being endowed with a mind is capable of knowing reality or being as it is technically named. All that we know falls within the capacious bosom of being. But God is a being, therefore He too can fall within our knowledge. No one says, of course, that such knowledge takes in completely what God is, for though we can know reality, we can know it only according to the kind of mind a human nature has. Nevertheless, just because it is reality and not something of our own that we know theologians generally go on to argue that it becomes possible for man, retaining the same mind, to be elevated above himself and see reality in a higher order, even, so to speak, a divine mind. Thus the possibility of the beatific vision is allowed for and at the same time it remains a pure gift.

This explanation is to be found almost always in books of apologetics, as it seems to serve as a defence of the possibility of divine Revelation to man. It has not, however, left the theologian completely happy. P. Garrigou-Lagrange, for instance, admits that as an argument its

conclusion has only probability, and P. Huguény is of the same opinion. The fulcrum in the argument is that man has a mind, but a mind essentially contains the power to know reality, therefore it contains some capacity to know God, who is the supreme reality. Reality, be it noted, comes first, God second. Suppose that we reverse the order, and say man has a capacity of knowing God, therefore he knows reality, what are the consequences? This is the answer of the new school, and we have to consider shortly their reasons for this statement and the consequences. In the order of causality the natural precedes the supernatural; man had to be created a man before he could be raised to a higher order. But it does not follow from this that in God's intention the natural man came first. We are inclined unconsciously to think this because we transfer our way and order of understanding of events to God. If we correct this too human manner of thinking we shall see that it is quite in accordance with the divine nature to believe that what was more sublime was prior in the order of events willed, that the supernatural vocation determined the creation of man as man, and not *vice versa*. If this is so, then the most real thing in man is that he can be charged with the divine nature, that it is not, so to say, an afterthought that he should be, in the Areopagite's phrase, *patiens divina*. Rather, we ought to define man as a kind of being whom it is possible to deify. If this definition scandalise us at first the reason may be that we make an image of our substance as of a compact neat little spiritual body. This Cartesian conception does in no way accord with the Thomist view of self-knowledge. We never know our substantial self directly in this life, and when we have reached our consummation and see ourselves for what we are for the first time it will be a vision of dependence, of a self living in and through the divine act, a mote illumined by the divine love and splendour and sustained by this very love. Hence it is chiefly through a false image of ourselves that we fight shy of the thought that our nature is what Tauler calls an abyss ever open, a resident capacity for the infinite, a subject which can be *quodammodo omnia* because it can be *quodammodo Deus* or *divinisata*.

If this be true we can see that the difficulty acknow-

ledged by P. Garrigou-Lagrange is overcome and at the same time the infinite distance between the two orders of nature and supernature is preserved. What is more, it explains a series of sayings of St. Thomas which otherwise might remain dark. He applies the principle, *omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem*, every intellect of its very nature desires the vision of the divine substance, to angels as well as to men, so that he cannot have in mind grace only. He tells us again that "every intellect of whatever grade can be a sharer in the divine vision," and in a long passage in the *Compendium Theologiae* he argues that the desire of creatures of reason can never be appeased until they know the first cause, not by any kind of knowing but by its essence. "Hence the final end of an intellectual creature is to see God by his essence." Fr. O'Mahony's comment on such passages as this is that when St. Thomas distinguishes a twofold end of man his division is really a co-division. "The natural end marks the term of nature's activity left to itself, but this very activity looks beyond itself to the only end, the final end, capable of saturating the intellectual nature whence it proceeds. And hence, when he speaks of natural end he has in view *the activity* of this nature, and when he speaks of the true final end, he has in mind the intellectual nature as such, source of this activity which is really only a partial expression of its own inherent tendency towards an asymptotic term. A natural end could not possibly reduce fully to act, in the sense of exhausting all its capacities, a nature whose fundamental orientation is towards the infinite of being. There is thus very properly an opposition between the infinity of its 'aspiration' and the finitude of its realisation. But the very finitude of its natural realisation reveals the infinity of its 'desire,' and shows that it tends to an end outside and beyond it, an end which, though beyond its natural powers, renders possible the very participation in beatitude which the natural end supposes." The famous text of St. Augustine therefore receives a place within the Thomist system, "Thou hast made us for Thyself." The good and the true meet, and it is because man tends by his very nature, is in fact just a living aspiration defined by the possibility of being united to God, that he has an interest in and

knowledge of all the finite reality amid which he lives and works out his fate.

I hope that it has been noticed in the above account how the earlier thesis of Blondel has been fumigated, passed through a theological sieve, tintured with some St. Augustine and put into the mould of the Thomist metaphysic. The same treatment can be observed with other questions, the same careful cleansing of the thought from any taint of the old errors of Ontologism, Fideism and Modernism. Movement, life, desire of the good, what is called a dynamic note, have been introduced into philosophy, and in the name of St. Thomas, and the introduction has been done, they claim, without prejudice to the integrity of reason. I must now try and show how this is performed. Several writers have begun to work out the implications of the view that man is a capacity for the supernatural in Ethics. Kant had tried to bring back God, who had been expunged from the pages of philosophy, in his Ethics. These modern Thomists point the true moral, that though philosophy can by its unaided efforts arrive at a knowledge of God, the metaphysical ground-reason behind the convincing evidence for that knowledge is that man's interest in finite things is due to his native aspiration for the infinite reality and supreme good. This, if true, reunites the rational and the moral which Kant had wrongly sundered, and makes of his very method a messenger of truth. I should like to show how they envisage the end and limitations of natural ethics. Clearly, if man is not definable without a relation of some sort to the supernatural, if he is an abyss ever open, or in St. Thomas' words, his final end is the vision of God, then natural ethics cannot tell the whole story; it will be like a torso, an image of God which God can finish as He thinks best.

The influence of this new interpretation can, however, be seen most clearly in the theory of knowledge and the analysis of the act of faith. As a preface to this, one or two words of caution are necessary. Catholic philosophy with St. Thomas at its head has always maintained that truth is an affair of the intellect and that the intellect judges of truth according to evidence. For this reason it has always looked with suspicion on the intrusion of

desire or experience into the domain of the reason. The will may stand for the deed but not for the reason. Outside, therefore, the one exceptional case of faith, the influence of the will is incompatible with certainty. St. Thomas distinguishes two ways in which the will may have a say in judgment, by way of *exercitium* or *specificatio*, which may be translated election and selection. I may refuse to think, to consider alternatives and the evidence for them, or I may, after considering two sides of an argument, if neither be probative, select one in preference to the other. In this second case the intervention of the will makes for opinion but never certitude, because certitude is evoked by the evidence before the mind and nothing else. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the question of the validity of knowledge can be settled independently of the relation of human nature to a supernatural end, or, shall I say, in the light of what is to come, that no factor, no new entrant into the soul of man can steal away the right of the intellect to settle for itself what is true and what is false.

With this safeguard we can proceed. On the principle laid down the mind is moved to a judgement by evidence. But there is more to be added. "I can give you an argument but I cannot give you eyes to see it." Just so! The evidence cannot be changed, but on the subjective side the will and the ability to see may be impaired or improved. As Sertillanges remarks: "To think well it is indispensable to bend to the thought not only the soul and all its various powers, but the sum total of our organic functions. How can you think well with a soul which is sick, with a heart torn by vices, enflamed by passions, distracted by violent or reprehensible affections? There is a state of clairvoyance and a blind state of the soul, said Gratry, a healthy and therefore sane state and one which is insane. The exercise of the moral virtues, says St. Thomas Aquinas, whereby the passions are controlled has a great influence on the acquisition of knowledge." The will, therefore, as the principle of *election* (*exercitium*) has its part to play; it can make us open our eyes at least, it can keep us in a good humour, keep us fair when we are irritated, and turn us in the direction whence light may come and truth shine out. This valour of mind and integrity of

purpose are especially in demand when we look up to those silent infinite spaces, which as Pascal says, frighten us, and ask ourselves the meaning not of this item of evidence, this particular experience which is ours, but of the whole universe; when we peer into the mystery which surrounds God and suffer vertigo, and, like Job, ask Him questions of His works and end, our plight and destiny. Here, though the judgment of yea and nay rest still with the intellect, the supernatural is a stay and a comfort. It is the man of faith who makes the best philosopher. Quite apart from the flood of light let in on all natural things by revelation, he has the security and the peace within to face the answer to every natural problem; he can take in within one outlook the daily Canas and the daily Calvaries, and he can set each truth in its station in the majesty hierarchy of creation.

It would be proper at this place to go on to show the place of the will in the act of faith, and the way in which the Thomists whose views I am describing unite together in an attractive reconciliation the characters which the Church has defined to belong to faith, that it is rational, supernatural, certain and free. But I must hasten on to the problem of knowledge as it has been treated by P. Maréchal and others.

The first point to be noticed is that they believe that a critique of judgment is both possible and requisite. A number of scholastic writers, however, resolutely set their faces against such an attempt, declaring that knowledge cannot be criticised by itself, that it must carry with it its own vindication, that it is a foolish question to ask, why, for instance, I judge that the principle of identity or contradiction is true. The answer given to this is that the objection rests on a misunderstanding, that it supposes that all criticism implies some kind of doubt. That is not true. In morality most would hold that we are aware of the intrinsic goodness and badness of certain actions, and that such awareness can be an act of knowledge, an act, that is, which knows in the very judging, *why* the actions are right or wrong. That does not prevent the critics from writing an account of such actions in their relation to some final good or whole. Similarly it is claimed that knowledge may carry with it its own certainty, and nevertheless become the subject of a critique in which we go behind the scenes and

show why it is that knowledge should observe certain conditions, what are the metaphysical implications, in other words, what kind of a universe is it which renders human knowledge possible at all. I call attention to this objection because it is, as I think, the central point in modern discussions outside Catholic philosophy, and amongst scholastics stands at the parting of two ways. In justification of the critical philosophy it can be urged that knowledge may be self-evident, but knowledge is the act of a subject and the subject can legitimately say, "Can you not tell me something more about myself and about my mode of knowing instead of shutting my mouth every time I ask with the monotonous reply that knowledge is knowledge; that the question has no meaning? Moreover, there are a host of problems crying for an answer. Why, for instance, do I distinguish between a judgment of existence and a judgment of validity, why do I attack reality in the way I do, relying on sensible experience, cutting up reality into two in every statement I make in order to say that my divided thought, the proposition, is one in reality; why is it that what is identical has to be reduced by a synthetic act of thought to its identity? *Divide et impera* is the motto of human thinking, and it raises a problem. If I say that this room is large, my affirmation includes in it a statement of existence, a statement that the existent thing is such and such, and that it is all one thing. Now even if you quarrel with this analysis you cannot do so in the name of St. Thomas, seeing that St. Thomas defines the judgment as a *compositio*, a declaring to be identical in the real world what has been separated in the process of knowing it. We can go further and say with him that human knowledge always comes short of the ideal, because it can never seize the nature in its unity. On the one side it has to think of it as a group of abstractions; a man, for instance, is a rational, two-footed animal, and so on; and when it wishes to think of pure forms it has always to think of them as embodied in a particular subject. We have again to think separately of a thing and its existence. We have a general conception of existence which we apply indefinitely to everything, whereas each real object has its own way of existing, and we are never able to grasp their union in one being.

Thus it is that there are plenty of problems to face.

St. Thomas provides us with the correct line of answer, though he did not work it out. That at least is the opinion of P. Roland Gosselin, O.P., one of the safest guides in the study of St. Thomas. A critique then is required not to take the place of the old criterion of knowledge, namely, objective evidence, but to display the ground plan of human thought, the ultimate reason why by its nature it is able to understand the nature of reality. *Omnis cognitio fit in cognoscente ad modum cognoscentis.* Knowledge is relative to the nature and capacity of the subject. We are the subject of knowledge, and our imperfection is a scandal. We grow to self-knowledge, we become more ourselves, and during the process we are to ourselves as much a problem as a light. Deprived of the supernatural light so far from seeing our essence as a rosy dependence on God, as a living want fulfilled by Him, we have no intuition at all of our nature. And this poor jackself it is which makes absolute affirmations about the nature of the universe, despite the fact that our knowledge is dependent on the sensible which is gone as soon as it arrives, that our experience approaches as near as possible to the relative. Nevertheless boldly and with complete assurance the spirit affirms that what it knows is, and that it is not, as Kant vainly thought, confined to the world of phenomena. There must be some secret reason for this contained in the depths of our nature. One answer of course is that such is the evident nature of reality. That is a true answer, but we can go further, for we can add, what in one way comes to the same, that such is the nature of a rational being. It belongs to a human being to make assertions about reality. But why? The answer must be that it is good for him to do so, where good means the perfection and realization of a nature. It is our own nature which guarantees the truth of what we say, and it is our own nature which makes us miss the many splendoured thing. Still dark to ourselves, nature too is dark to us, but as our goal is the absolute being, our own statements reach reality by being fastened to God's Being and Truth.

In this way it is that the critique of human thought comes to our assistance. There are some philosophers who measure reality by the rule of human thought. Their philosophy is a panlogism, a system of bloodless categories without any breath of life. There are those who

throw up the sponge and say that man's knowledge is confined to the sensible, and if there is a beyond, man at any rate is no better than an owl trying to stare the noon-day sun out of face. We know better, and it is the critique of the human understanding which enables us to proffer the complete answer. Chosen by God to be such as can be lifted to the supernatural, to see the supreme being as He is, our first act asserts being and truth in the name of the living God not yet known but contained in the *élan* of our nature, in the attitude it is bound to take up, in its forward movement to what is its life and its unseen standard of perfection. The mind says, "that is," and in that word it proclaims its destiny, the meeting place where complete actuality alone is to be found, where what exists without any comment, save a triune relation of love. Our nature which is intended for the absolute where the principle of identity is found without flaw, where essence is necessarily existent, calls down the absolute wherever it meets the work of God's hands. Or to start the other way round, the recognition of the principle of identity is implicitly the recognition of God, and points the way to the final goal towards which we are bound. This is the fundamental reason why, as against the brute beasts, our attitude towards reality is not relative to ourselves; we judge, not from a personal and private point of view, but from that of *being*, from the divine point of view. If we were without sin, and graced as the blessed are, we could no longer be free to make some relative good our own; as it is, the true and the absolute overshadow us in terms of duty or truth, and in our darkness of pilgrimage we can spurn our duty to our own detriment and even spoil our attitude to truth in so far as truth can be obscured by evil dispositions and the refusal to look and see.

It is a somewhat startling reflection, which may serve as an ironical comment on the atheist, that in every affirmation, in every mention of the word "is," the human mind unconsciously makes confession of God, the "I am who am." The principle of identity which is the law of thought justifies this assertion, but I have spared the reader a too searching and metaphysical analysis and taken him by an easier way to the conclusion. The pith of the argument from identity for those who are interested lies, as I have suggested, in this that the principle

of identity which governs all our thinking discloses an ideal immanent in our thought which is never realised in human judgment. As already indicated, we must divide to command, separate in order to unify, but the principle of identity presupposes the perfect coincidence of thought with itself, a being in whom there is no shadow of contradiction or opposition within his act, a God whose thinking and thought are identical. By looking at another aspect of human thought, its assertion of reality, we have arrived at a similar result. Every statement of ours unfolds the secret dynamism of a spirit which has been touched to life and activity by the supreme good, the truth of the soul, and in its movement to that absolute truth measures its discoveries by the law of its own direction. *Omnia cognoscunt Deum implicite in quolibet cognito*, as St. Thomas says, and again in another passage, "The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the divine truth; all other truths perfect the intellect in its movement to the divine truth," or once more in a passage which brings together St. Paul, Plato, St. Augustine and the best that is in his master Aristotle, "This contemplation (of the divine truth) will be perfect in the future life, when we shall see God face to face; wherewith He shall make us perfectly blessed. But now the contemplation of the divine truth belongs to us only imperfectly, that is to say, as in a mirror and darkly. By this we have a beginning of blessedness which begins here that it may be continued hereafter. Therefore the Philosopher places the final felicity of man in the contemplation of the highest intelligible object."

This brings us back to the formula with which we started that man is *capax entis* because he is *capax Dei*, human nature is the kind of being God created in order to divinise it. When grace therefore comes it crowns and raises what was, if I may coin the word, divinisable. A new life starts, the soul is swung into a new orbit and with the eyes of faith sees everything with new eyes. The native powers of the self remain, the old standards of truth are unimpaired, and because of the presence of the body, the old imperfections due to sensible experience continue. But the world of the believer is not the same as that of the unbeliever, for though the end is dark still, faith is assured of the direction, the way, the truth and the life, and this new outlook is bound to affect the general

survey of the world, the philosophy whereby we live.

One last word in conclusion. I hope it is clear that the distinction between the supernatural and natural remains as whole and entire in this account. I have already quoted Fr. O'Mahony. Let me confirm his words with some remarks of P. Maréchal.

"It would be inexact," he says, "to attribute to human nature (or to any nature for the matter of that) an exigence strictly so-called to be elevated to the supernatural order. On the other hand, to use the word of the Encyclical *Pascendi*, the aptitude (capacity) of human nature to receive this elevation, and even a certain positive harmony of an intellectual nature with the supernatural, can legitimately be made objects of demonstration. St. Thomas shows that the formal adequate object of the intellect and the will, which measures our radical capacity of desire (*desiderium naturale*) is not saturated by an analogical knowledge of God; the surplus of 'desirable' (which does not mean actually desired and still less requisite or called for), takes on the negative characters which allow of its being identified with the beatific vision of revealed theology."

To remove one other possible ambiguity it should be noted that these Thomists distinguish between *voluntas ut natura* and *voluntas ut voluntas*. The first defines the internal finality, the dynamism of the spirit, which has been described in these pages. As Maréchal says again, "It goes without saying that the appetitive disposition, which is a prerequisite for all knowledge of objects, cannot consist in an elicit (conscious) tendency, even indeliberate, seeing that that presupposes objective knowledge; still less can there be question of free will. . . ."

With these last few cautions I bring this article to an end. As will be seen, many modern problems and tendencies are brought under the sway of this Thomist metaphysic. There are some who say that too much has been made of these modern tendencies, that the views I have been exposing are over generous to folly and unfair to St. Thomas, and that they have availed only to clothe the Thomist lion with an ass's skin. On the other hand, if it is the function of the Thomist to reduce to order all that is good in human thought, no matter to what age it belongs, and to grow as a living system reconciling the past with the present and the present with the past, succouring the tiny fresh truths which are ever springing from the soil and adapting them to its own life, then we ought to look with favour at the attempts of these scholars, even if at the end we are obliged to turn away disappointed.

THE NESTORIAN AND CHALDAEAN CHURCHES

BY THE REV. GEORGE J. MACGILLIVRAY, M.A.

THE bodies known as the Nestorian and Chaldaean Churches are small communities of Christians scattered among the prevailing Moslem population in Mesopotamia, in the mountain district of Kurdistan to the north, and in Azerbaijan, the north-west province of Persia. They are remnants of what was once a great and flourishing Christian Church spreading all over Mesopotamia and Persia, and even into India, Afghanistan, Turkestan and China. Indeed there is still a flourishing Christian community in Malabar, which owes its origin to Nestorian missionaries, and in 1625 the Jesuit missionaries in China discovered a tablet at Singan-fu, which had been erected in 781, testifying to the existence of a Christian community there at that time, founded by the Nestorians.

Before, therefore, describing their present condition, it will be well to give a brief sketch of the history of that great Church, of which these are the few survivors.

They are people of a Semitic race, speaking Aramaic, or Syriac, and have been subjects successively of the various great powers, whose empires have ruled over that part of the world—Babylonians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Parthians, Persians again, Arabs, Mongols and Turks. Now they are partly in Iraq, partly in Turkey, and partly in Persia.

In the beginning of the Christian era their country was on the border, and on both sides of the border, of the Parthian and Roman Empires. How Christianity was first introduced among them is uncertain. It undoubtedly came in very early times to Edessa, which was then the capital of the independent Syrian kingdom of Osroene. There is a legend that Abgar, the King of Edessa, who was suffering from an incurable disease, sent an embassy to Sabinus, the Roman Governor at Eleutheropolis in Palestine. On their way back the ambassadors heard of the great Prophet, Jesus of Nazareth, who could heal the sick with a word. They reported the matter to their

master, who thereupon sent a letter to "Jesus the Good Physician," asking Him to come to Edessa and cure him. Our Lord replied that He could not do that, but that after He had returned to His Father, He would send one of His disciples, who would not only cure him but teach him and all his people the way to eternal life. And so, after Pentecost, Addai, one of the Seventy, came to Edessa, healed Abgar, and converted him and a great number of his people.

Another tradition is that St. Thomas the Apostle himself evangelised those parts. But, whatever truth there may be or not be in these stories, it is certain that Christian missionaries reached Edessa at a very early date. We are told in the Acts of the Apostles that among those who were present in Jerusalem on the Day of Pentecost there were Parthians and Medes and inhabitants of Mesopotamia. It is quite likely that some of these were among the three thousand converted on that day, and that they became the first missionaries to those parts.

Very soon the Faith spread further east, entering the Parthian Empire. The tradition is that Addai sent Mari to Nisibis, and from there he went on down the Tigris, converting many of the people, and finally arriving at Seleucia-Ctesiphon, of which he ordained the first bishop. There seems to have been little opposition on the part of the Parthians, and for a hundred years the Church spread rapidly. After that came more troubled times. In A.D. 227 the Parthian Empire fell, and was succeeded by the Persian kings of the Sassanid dynasty. Under them there was a great revival of the old Persian religion, that curious dualistic system known as Zoroastrianism or Mazdaeism. Then there was almost incessant war between the Persians and the Romans. At first that did not affect the position of the Christians. But, as soon as the Roman Empire became officially Christian, things were very different. For the Persians naturally suspected their Christian subjects of sympathizing with the enemy, who were of the same religion as themselves. The consequence was a violent persecution. The worst persecutor was Shapur II, who reigned from 309 to 379. Under him there were innumerable martyrs.

The Persian Empire lasted until the seventh century, when a new power arose, that of Islam. Mohammed died in 632, and within a very short time his followers had

conquered practically the whole of western Asia. For the next 500 years all that country was ruled by the Khalifs of Baghdad. But the Church continued to flourish. Indeed it was during the time of their rule that the great expansion began. The date of the tablet at Si-ngan-fu, as I have already said, is A.D. 781. The Arabs were never ruthless persecutors like their successors the Turks. The Turks have always been, and still are, barbarians incapable of anything but a veneer of civilisation. The Arabs, as everybody knows, developed at that time a very high civilisation and culture. And it is interesting to note that it all came to them from their Nestorian subjects. It was through them that they inherited the old Greek culture through Syriac translations of Greek books.

In the thirteenth century came the invasion of the Mongols under Jenghiz Khan. He defeated and killed the last of the Khalifs and conquered the whole country. It did not make much difference to the Christians. They had merely exchanged one set of masters for another, and the Mongols, like the Arabs, seem to have been very tolerant.

A far worse disaster was the coming of Tamerlane, who with his hordes of Mongol savages devastated the whole country. He pillaged, burned and massacred wherever he went, leaving little more than a desert behind him. The Nestorians were almost wiped out. The Patriarch fled to the north, taking refuge in the mountains of Kurdistan, and there remained only a fragment of the once flourishing Church in the northern part of Mesopotamia, in and around Mosul, and in the highlands beyond. And so it remains to this day. The Mongols were succeeded by the Osmanli Turks, who rapidly conquered the whole country. Persia became independent in the fifteenth century, and since then the Nestorians have lived as the subjects of those two Moslem powers, partly on one side of the border and partly on the other, suffering continual harassment from both sets of rulers, as well as from the Kurds. The Patriarch lived for a long time at Mosul, afterwards at Marga in Persia, and for the last two hundred years at Qudshanis, a remote and inaccessible village, 6,000 feet above the sea, in the heart of the mountains of Kurdistan.

But now let us go back to the internal history of this Christian community. Whatever may be the origin of

the See of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, it is certain that very soon the Bishop of that see was recognized as what we should now call the Primate of the Church in Persia. Owing to the political situation there was probably not very much communication between the Church in Persia and the Church in Western lands. It is clear, however, that the former recognized its dependence on Edessa, and Edessa, of course, was dependent on the Patriarch of Antioch. So that in some rather vague way they regarded themselves as under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch. For example, at a synod held at Seleucia about the year 315, when various accusations were brought against the Bishop, Papa Bar Aggai, he at once appealed to the "Western Fathers." The appeal went to Edessa. The "Western Fathers" decided in Papa's favour and quashed the acts of the synod that had deposed him.

Again, a very important synod was held at Seleucia in 410, at which about forty bishops were present. A certain Marutha, Bishop of Maiferkat, had come to Persia as the ambassador of Theodosius II. It was he who convoked the synod, presenting letters from the "Western Fathers," Porphyrius, Patriarch of Antioch, the Metropolitan of Edessa and others. He delivered to them the decrees of the Council of Nicaea, all of which, including the Creed, the synod accepted. It was this synod also which first definitely regulated the position of the Bishop of Seleucia-Ctesiphon as Primate of the Church in Persia, and he was given the title of Catholicos. They would not call him Patriarch, precisely because he was, however vaguely, under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch. And yet he must be recognized as something more than a mere metropolitan, because he had other metropolitans under him. And so they invented this new title.

There is no evidence of any direct relation between the Church in Persia at that period and the See of Rome. They were too far off for any direct communication. There is no actual evidence that they recognized the Bishop of Rome as Head of the whole Church. But that is of no great importance. The probability is that they knew very little about the Roman See. It was too far off and inaccessible to affect them directly. But they definitely acknowledged their dependence on the "Western Fathers" through Edessa. And Edessa was subject to Antioch, and Antioch certainly acknowledged the Primacy of Rome.

And so, however little their knowledge of Rome may have been, they were not, as Anglican writers have tried to maintain, an independent national Church from the first. They were definitely a part of that one undivided Church which recognized the Bishop of Rome as its Head.

But now we come to the unhappy story of the fall of the Persian Church, first into schism and then into heresy.

The first act of schism was committed at a synod held at Markabta in 424, which declared that the "Western Fathers" are no longer to have any rights in Persia. The Bishop of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, who now for the first time receives the title of Patriarch, is declared to have no earthly superior. "Easterns," the decree runs, "shall not complain of the Patriarch to the Western Patriarchs; every case that cannot be settled by him shall await the tribunal of Christ."

And so, as in so many other cases, it was an exaggerated nationalism that paved the way to schism and heresy. Although it must be said that there was a certain amount of excuse for their attitude arising out of the political situation. As I have already said, in time of war between the Persians and the Romans the Christians in Persia were always suspected of favouring Rome, and it was that that had led to persecution. Consequently it was to their advantage to have as little connection as possible with the Church in the Roman Empire, so that they could claim that, although they were Christians, as the Romans were, they had no organic connection with them, but were free and independent, and so could be loyal subjects of the Persian King.

But it is a plain fact of history that no body of Christians can separate themselves from the Rock, on which the Church is founded, without sooner or later falling into heresy. And so it was with the Church in Persia.

Nestorianism is one of two opposite errors on the subject of the Incarnation, which arose in the fifth century. No sooner was the Arian controversy settled, and the substantiality of the Son with the Father established, than speculation arose about the union of the two natures, the divine and the human. The Catholic doctrine is clear enough. When God the Son became man, He took to Himself a human nature, which He made His own, so that in Jesus Christ there is only one Person, that of God the Son, but two distinct and complete natures, the divine

and the human. Opposed to this were the two opposite errors. The Nestorians held that in Christ there were two distinct persons, the Son of God and the Son of David. In fact He was simply a man in whom God the Son dwelt, as in a temple or a garment. The Monophysites went to the other extreme, and maintained that in Christ there is only one nature, for the human nature is swallowed up in the divine like a drop of water in the ocean.

The trouble really began with the theory of Apollinaris of Laodicea, which was that in man there are three elements: the body, the soul (i.e. the animal soul) and the spirit, or rational soul, and that in Christ God the Son took the place of the spirit. Nestorianism seems to have been a reaction against Apollinarism. Its original centre was the famous theological school of Antioch which, against Apollinaris, insisted on the perfection of our Lord's human nature. But in doing so they fell into the opposite error. Especially Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia plainly taught the doctrine afterwards called Nestorianism.

Nestorius was a pupil of Theodore and a famous preacher. He became Patriarch of Constantinople in 427. Then a certain priest in the city, named Anastasius, began to say in his sermons that our Lady should not be called Theotokos, or Mother of God, because she was only the mother of the man Jesus, in whom God the Son dwelt. When people protested, Nestorius defended him. Immediately a violent controversy arose, the protagonist on the other side being Cyril of Alexandria. The doctrine of Nestorius was condemned by the Pope Celestine, who ordered him to retract, and decreed that, if he would not do so, he would be deposed, and he deputed Cyril to carry out the sentence. So widespread, however, was the controversy, that it seemed impossible to bring it to an end without a General Council. Consequently a council was summoned and met in Ephesus in 431, the result being the condemnation of Nestorius and his teaching. Nestorius himself disappeared into exile, but a group of his followers, now definitely heretical, remained. Their centre now became Edessa. About the year 457 a number of them were expelled, including their great leader Bar Soma. Bar Soma went into Persia, was made Bishop of Nisibis, and became the chief agent in spreading Nestorian doctrine in that country. Finally, in 489 the Emperor

Zeno closed the school of Edessa, and banished all the remaining Nestorians, so that henceforth Nestorianism ceased in the Roman Empire. But they took refuge in Persia, where they were unfortunately welcomed, and their teaching gradually adopted.

No doubt there were several reasons for this. The Persian Christians, being Syrian, had a natural sympathy with the teachers of Edessa, and were inclined to espouse their cause against those whom they called Westerns. Then there was probably a good deal of misunderstanding of the technical terms, especially when Greek terms had to be translated into Syriac. But above all there was the political reason. I have already pointed out that it was to the advantage of the Persian Christians to be clearly distinguished from the Christians of the Roman Empire, and that this was one of the causes that led them into schism. Now, if they adopted a form of Christianity different from the official religion of the Empire, the distinction would be still more clear. And it is a fact that after their adoption of Nestorianism they suffered very little persecution at the hands of the Persian Government.

It is impossible to assign a definite date at which the Church in Persia became heretical. But it certainly did so. They were more and more permeated with Nestorian teaching. They never accepted the Council of Ephesus. To this day they publicly invoke "St." Theodore (of Mopsuestia), "St." Diodore and "St." Nestorius, "teachers of truth," in their liturgy, denounce St. Cyril of Alexandria as the "darkness of Egypt," deny that our Lady is the Mother of God, and so forth.

As to the terms used to describe our Lord's Person and natures, there is probably a good deal of confusion of thought. Their formula is that in our Lord there are two *kyani*, two *qnumi* and one *parsopa*. Now *kyana* certainly means nature, and so they are quite right in saying two *kyani*. But what does *qnuma* mean? It is used to translate the Greek *hypostasis*. But *hypostasis* is a term of which the meaning has varied. Eventually its meaning became fixed as the equivalent of the Latin *persona*, and then it became definitely heretical to speak of two *hypostases*. But at an earlier time it was used by some writers as equivalent to substance or nature, and using it in that sense it would be quite right to speak of two *hypostases*. Therefore it is arguable that two *qnumi*

may have an orthodox sense. *Parsopa* is in itself also ambiguous. It is merely the Syriac form of the Greek *prosopon* and the Latin *persona*. And so one *parsopa* is quite correct. But the original meaning of *prosopon* or *persona* was an actor's mask, and so a part that a person plays, an appearance. And so to say one *parsopa* is not necessarily orthodox. They may be using it in the older sense, and then to speak of two *qnumi* and one *parsopa* is definitely heretical.

Arguing on these lines some Anglican writers have tried to maintain that the Nestorians are not Nestorian, because their terms are capable of an orthodox interpretation. They have even tried to show that there is some subtle distinction between the Greek *Theotokos* and the Syriac *Yaldath Alaha*. But that is a mere quibble, for the one is a quite literal translation of the other.

But further, the essence of heresy consists in obstinately rejecting the definitions of the Catholic Church and the terms definitely adopted by her, and persisting in following teachers, whom the Church has condemned as heretical. And that is what the Nestorians have done and do. As to how far the actual beliefs of the Nestorians to-day differ from ours is another question, and one that I will discuss later.

So then the Church in Persia went on, committed to Nestorianism, and almost entirely cut off from all contact with the rest of Christendom, flourishing greatly for a time, and then reduced by various disasters to the little body that now remains, as I have already described.

But I must now say something about their renewed relations with Rome in recent times, and the formation of the Chaldæan Uniate Church. The first contact was made by Dominican missionaries in the thirteenth century, who travelled along the course of the Tigris and found this almost forgotten body of Christians. The Patriarch of that time sent some sort of profession of faith to Rome, but nothing seems to have come of the negotiations. A little later a certain Bar Soma was sent on an embassy to Europe by the Prince of the Mongols. He visited Rome, and seems to have persuaded the Pope of his orthodoxy, for he was allowed to say Mass there and actually received Holy Communion from the hands of the Pope himself.

These, however, were isolated incidents. Nothing more

definite happened until the middle of the sixteenth century, when there was a dispute about the succession to the Patriarchate. By this time the Patriarchate had become hereditary. That is to say, not that it passed from father to son—for even Nestorian bishops do not marry, although of course their priests do—but it remained in a particular family. The custom was, and still is, for the Patriarch, soon after his accession, to designate his own successor, usually one of his nephews, who then receives the title of *Natir Kursi*, or Watcher of the Chair. He does not marry, and does not eat meat, for that also is forbidden to bishops. And in due time he usually succeeds, sometimes at a very early age.

In 1551, however, when Shimun Bar Mama died, his nephew, for some reason or other, was not allowed to succeed without opposition. One party accepted him and had him consecrated. But another party refused to accept him, and chose a monk named Sulaka. Now this Sulaka thought that the best means of success was to get the support of the Pope. So he went off to Rome, made an orthodox profession of faith, was consecrated and made Patriarch by Julius III, and returned. He did not, however, succeed in ousting his rival. And so there were not only two rival patriarchs, but there started two rival lines, for each party went on electing successors to their particular patriarch. We may call these the Sulaka line and the Bar Mama line.

The Sulaka line, who all took the title of Shimun (or Simon), remained Catholic for a time, each successive patriarch going to Rome for his pallium. Then their allegiance to the Pope became intermittent, some going for the pallium and others neglecting to do so, until at last they dropped all connection with Rome, and relapsed into schism and heresy. This is the line of the present Nestorian Patriarch.

The Bar Mama line, who all took the name of Eliya, also after a time entered into negotiations with Rome. Eliya VI sent an orthodox profession of faith and was received into union. And so for a time the whole people were Catholic under two Patriarchs, Mar Eliya¹ at Mosul ruling the southern section, and Mar Shimun at Urmi ruling the northern.

¹The title *Mar*, meaning Lord, is given by the Nestorians both to Bishops and to Saints.

But this did not last long. About the middle of the eighteenth century the Bar Mama line also fell away. Now there was no Catholic patriarch. And so a third line begins. A certain Yosiph, Metropolitan of Diarbekr, broke with Mar Eliya, when the latter broke with Rome, went to Rome and was consecrated. This line continued until 1826, when the Bar Mama line came back into union, and so continues to this day. So that now there is this curious situation. The present Chaldæan Patriarch represents the old line of Nestorian Patriarchs, while the Nestorian Patriarch represents that of the original Uniates who afterwards relapsed into schism and heresy.

Until 1898 the subjects of the Chaldæan and Nestorian Patriarchs were roughly divided geographically. All the Syrians living in the Mosul plain were Chaldæan, that is to say, Catholic. Mar Shimun, on the other hand, ruled over practically all the mountain district of Kurdistan, and also over those on the Persian side of the border, in Urmi and the Urmi plain, so that they were all, or nearly all, Nestorians. I say nearly all, because there were some small Catholic missions in the mountains, and a very flourishing mission, run by French Lazarists, in Urmi.

In 1898 a further change occurred, due to the coming of a Russian mission to Urmi. On the part of Russia this was a purely political move. At that time Russia was ambitious for expansion towards the south. Persia was in a very bad state, with a Government quite incapable of keeping order. This was Russia's opportunity. They began by sending a religious mission. The missionaries persuaded the Nestorians that, if only they would join the Orthodox Church, Russia would protect them. The consequence was that they did so in a body. They cheerfully renounced all their heresies, accepted the Orthodox faith, and in return they certainly did receive protection. For the Russians at once made the excuse that they must protect their co-religionists, and did so by a military occupation of northern Persia. So the Nestorian Church was reduced still further. It was now entirely limited to the mountain region of Kurdistan.

There was another upheaval during the Great War, but the account of this and its results must be left for another article, which will deal with the conditions and manner of life of the Nestorians and Chaldæans in modern times.

THE SINCERITY OF DRYDEN

BY CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS.

A MONTH or two ago I had occasion to write in a Catholic paper of Dryden, and spoke of him as one of the first of English Catholic apologists since the Reformation. I was surprised and saddened to be told that my article had been criticized by some Catholics, to whom it seemed that Dryden was a co-religionist of more than doubtful sincerity, and one whom it was an insult to put into the same class as Cardinal Newman.

I will not here discuss Dryden's merits as a poet, a craftsman, a debater in verse. It is true that I do plead impenitently guilty to the belief that he was one of the first masters of the English language who ever lived, yet when in my article I gave to him a high rank I was not so much expressing a personal opinion as repeating what I imagined to be a generally admitted judgment. Those who do not like Dryden are entitled to their distaste, yet their quarrel is with people of very much greater importance than I—with practically every important judge of English literature from Dryden's time to our own—with Pope, with Gray, with Dr. Johnson, with Byron, with Sir Walter Scott, with Walter Savage Landor, with Cardinal Newman (as an interesting letter from Professor Stockley showed), with Macaulay (to whom we shall return), with Coventry Patmore, with Mr. T. S. Eliot, with Mr. J. B. Priestley, with Father Ronald Knox—to mention only the names of such praisers of Dryden as occur immediately to mind. We will leave it at that.

What I am rather concerned with here is the question of the sincerity of his Catholicism. There are two questions which I must ask my critics to allow me to keep distinct: the question whether he was a sincere man and the question whether he was a good man. The answer to them is not necessarily the same. As Dr. Johnson said to Macaulay's grandfather, "Sir, are you so grossly ignorant of human nature as not to know that a man can be very sincere in good principles without having good practice?" It will be found, as I hope to show, that there is something to be said both for Dryden's sincerity

and for his conduct, but the two must be discussed separately.

There are three serious charges of insincerity which are brought against Dryden. First the contrast is pointed out between the adulation of Cromwell, in the poem on the death of the Lord Protector, written in 1659, and the adulation of Charles II in *Astraea Redux*, written in the subsequent year, immediately after Charles's return to England. Second, the attempt is made to show that he only changed his religion because he saw that thus alone could he make certain of keeping his pension. Third, it is argued that, had his conversion been sincere, he would have betrayed his sincerity by a marked improvement in the tone of his writings, whereas in point of fact there was no such improvement.

Let us take the first charge. It is true that in 1659 Dryden wrote a poem in praise of Cromwell, and in 1660 wrote one in praise of Charles II, nor have I any wish to prove him a nobler man than the evidence warrants, nor to deny that the poem of 1660 did contain phrases of contempt for the enemies of Charles which good taste and a sense of humour should have prevented the author of the poem of 1659 from using. Yet the political philosophies of the two poems are not nearly as contradictory as is loosely supposed. In the first Cromwell, it is true, is praised, but he is praised not as a Puritan or as a Parliamentarian; he is praised as the man who brought his country peace, and what marks the poem out from most of the political literature of the period is that, while there is praise of Cromwell, there is absolutely no abuse of his Royalist opponents. The reason for which Dryden praised Cromwell in 1659 is exactly the reason for which he praised Charles in 1660. It is the first of Charles' merits that he has been restored without the horrors of civil war. He welcomes Charles as the bringer of peace.

At home the hateful names of parties cease
And factious souls are wearied into peace.

In fact, Dryden at this period of life, at any rate, was neither Whig nor Tory nor Roundhead, but wise muggump. The greatest of all evils was anarchy. Fools could contest for the forms of government; the important thing was to have a government. Like Thiers, Dryden

believed in the form of government which would divide his countrymen the least. In 1659 it was a plausible opinion that peace could best be preserved by the preservation of the Commonwealth. In 1660, after the "foolish Ishbosheth" had displayed his incompetence, there was clearly nothing for it but to call Charles back.

It may be objected that Dryden made the discovery at a moment most convenient for himself. I can only reply that he made the discovery at exactly the same moment that it was made by the great majority of the politically-minded people of England. If it was a base thing to be for Cromwell in 1659 and for Charles in 1660, then all England was base. Dryden differed from his contemporaries not so much in his political philosophy as in his capacity for expressing his political philosophy in imperishable verse.

More important and more interesting is the second charge. Those who repeat it are repeating the conventional Whig accusation, an accusation that was stated most forcibly in a couple of extraordinary pages of Macaulay:

With the name of Haines was joined, in many libels, the name of a more illustrious renegade, John Dryden. Dryden was now approaching the decline of life. After many successes and many failures, he had at length attained, by general consent, the first place among living English poets. His claims on the gratitude of James were superior to those of any man of letters in the kingdom. But James cared little for verses and much for money. From the day of his ascension he set himself to make small economical reforms, such as bring on a government the reproach of meanness without producing any perceptible relief to the finances. One of the victims of this injudicious parsimony was Dryden. A pension of a hundred a year which had been given to him by Charles and had expired with Charles was not renewed. The demise of the Crown made it necessary that the Poet Laureate should have a new patent; and orders were given that in this patent, the annual butt of sack, originally granted to Jonson, and continued to Jonson's successors, should be omitted. This was the only notice which the King, during the first year of his reign, deigned to bestow on the mighty satirist who, in the very crisis of the great struggle of the Exclusion Bill, had spread terror through the Whig ranks. Dryden was poor and impatient of poverty. He knew little and cared little about religion. If any sentiment was deeply fixed in him, that sentiment was an aversion to priests of all persuasions, Levites,

Augurs, Muftis, Roman Catholic divines, Presbyterian divines, divines of the Church of England. He was not naturally a man of high spirit; and his pursuits had been by no means such as were likely to give elevation or delicacy to his mind. He had, during many years, earned his daily bread by pandering to the vicious taste of the pit, and by grossly flattering rich and noble patrons. Self-respect and a fine sense of the becoming were not to be expected from one who had led a life of mendicancy and adulation. Finding that, if he continued to call himself a Protestant, his services would be overlooked, he declared himself a Papist. The King's parsimony speedily relaxed. Dryden's pension was restored; the arrears paid up; and he was employed to defend his new religion both in prose and verse.

Let us pause for breath and examine. Professor Saintsbury, who would not be likely to be unduly biassed in favour of a conversion to Catholicism, has been before us in exposing Macaulay's exposure. We have but to follow in his footsteps.

1. It is not true that "the pension had expired with Charles and was not renewed." The renewal was a mere matter of form. There was never any question of it being stopped by James, and every prospect that it would be paid with less unpunctuality than it had been during the previous reign. As Bell proves, in the life of Dryden prefixed to the Aldine edition, in spite of Macaulay's denial, the pension was certainly paid by James prior to Dryden's conversion.

2. The probability is that the stopping of "the butt of sack" was a mere accidental oversight. Macaulay is right, when he says that the payment was no longer made, but there is no evidence at all that "orders were given" that it should not be made. Anyway, the proposition that Dryden became a Catholic in order that he might get an annual butt of sack hardly merits serious discussion.

3. As to the charge that he "knew little and cared little about religion," there was a time when it was true enough. As he himself freely confesses:

My thoughtless youth was winged with vain desires,
My manhood long misled by wandering fires,
Followed false lights, and, when their glimpse was gone,
My pride struck out new sparkles of her own.

He had been brought up a Puritan, and, revolting from such a theology, had for a time revolted into indifferentism.

As he says of himself in the Preface to the *Religio Laici*, he was "naturally inclined to scepticism in philosophy." Yet the *Religio Laici*, published in 1682, proved that long before he was a Catholic—at a time when he was still in many ways quite definitely anti-Catholic—he had yet earnestly given his mind to religious studies. As Professor Saintsbury truly says, the *Religio Laici* was a book that pleased no party and flattered no patron. There is no possible explanation of it save as the sincere expression of a sincere man's faith. It is a book that nobody could have written who "knew little" about religion, and nobody would have written who "cared little" about it. As for the remark that the author of *The Hind and the Panther* "knew little" about religion, this is rhetoric so silly that it cannot be pretended that it even begins to have a meaning.

4. It is quite true that Dryden had no personal fondness for priests. Yet a distaste for priests, whether it be justified or whether it be unjustified, is neither a religion nor a substitute for a religion. As Dryden himself was at pains to explain in his preface to the *Fables*, "The scandal that is given by particular priests reflects not on the sacred function. A satirical poet is the check of the layman on bad priests. When a clergyman is whipped, his gown is first taken off, by which the dignity of his order is secured."

5. As the foregoing evidence will show, the rest of the paragraph is either mere rhetoric or else it is simply untrue.

Let us continue with Macaulay.

Two eminent men, Samuel Johnson and Walter Scott, have done their best to persuade themselves and others that this memorable conversion was sincere. It was natural that they should be desirous to remove a disgraceful stain from the memory of one whose genius they justly admired, and with whose political feelings they strongly sympathized; but the impartial historian must with regret pronounce a very different judgment. There will always be a strong presumption against the sincerity of a conversion by which the convert is directly a gainer. In the case of Dryden there is nothing to countervail this presumption. His theological writings abundantly prove that he had never sought with diligence and anxiety to learn the truth, and that his knowledge both of the Church which he quitted and of the Church which he entered was of the most superficial kind.

There is something quite comically Pecksniffian about this yearning of an "impartial" author to find honesty in a political opponent, about the regret with which he is reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that Tories are not honest. And the comedy is somewhat heightened by the fact that Macaulay has quite deliberately kept from the reader the only really telling piece of evidence in Dryden's favour. Suppose that Dryden, as Macaulay supposes, was but a dishonest time-server, then time-serving, which had perhaps led him to become a Catholic in 1685, would certainly have led him to become a Protestant again in 1688. But the truth is that not only was Dryden in no direct way a gainer by his Catholicism in 1685; he was enormously a loser by it after 1688. Had he been willing to apostatise and to take the oath to William III, he could have kept pension and Laureateship (butt of sack included) for the rest of a comfortably provided life. He preferred poverty, Jacobitism and his faith. He refused in any way to recognise William III, even to dedicate to him his translation of Virgil, took once more in his old age to his pen for a living, and accepted cheerfully every disability, such as that of the exclusion of his sons from the Universities, which the Government placed upon him because of his faith. Was not this worth at least mentioning?

Macaulay, I do not question it for a moment, was a very honest Whig. Yet it was his good fortune that, at every turn of his life, his conscience always imposed upon him the obligation of giving voice to exactly those opinions which the British people were most ready to hear. Had it not been so, he might perhaps have judged more charitably of less happy men, and even have written of Dryden as Dryden wrote of Charles II.

How easy 'tis when Destiny proves kind
With full spread sails to run before the Wind,
But those that 'gainst stiff Gales laveering go
Must be at once resolved and skilful, too.

Christie, the great admirer of Shaftesbury, less brazen than Macaulay, does not venture merely to omit all mention of Dryden's conduct towards William III. He tries another vein. He argues that by 1688 Dryden's Catholicism and his Toryism were so notorious, and that *Abraham* and *Achitophel* had made so deep his breach with the

Whigs that it was too late for repentance. For a son so very notoriously prodigal there would have been no fatted calf.

There is no question of evidence for all this. It is all conjecture, and most improbable conjecture at that. The entire poetic talent of England was on the side of James; so completely so that the Government, in the search for a successor to Dryden's vacant Laureateship, could find no one better than the quite preposterous Shadwell. Is it to be believed that they would have refused a price in order to obtain the services of the first satirist of the age? Does Christie seriously argue that such men as Halifax or Russell or William of Orange would have held up their hands in holy horror at the atrocious notion that a man, who had sold himself to the Tories yesterday, should be willing to sell himself to the Whigs to-morrow, that Marlborough could never have forgiven a man for being a turn-coat, or that Danby would have been shocked at the notion of anyone compromising his principles for money? The proposition is comic. If the bargain was not struck, there can but have been one reason. It was not that the Whigs were not willing to buy, but that Dryden was not willing to sell. He had taken an oath to James II and he preferred to keep it.

We come to the third charge. Macaulay, at his worst, has in his itch for over-statement, a genius for inserting just the one word which is needed to transform truth into falsehood. So here he writes that Dryden's "rare powers of diction and versification had been *systematically* employed in spreading moral corruption." The word "*systematically*," if it is meant to mean anything, has a meaning the opposite of the truth. What harm Dryden did, he did not systematically but accidentally. It is absurd to pretend that he had any deep-laid plot for corrupting the morals of the age. He merely did at Rome as Rome does. In a free-speaking age he spoke freely. It is childish to paint him as a seventeenth century serpent, corrupting with furtive innuendo the innocent minds of the courtiers of King Charles II. He was in no way worse than his contemporaries, from whom he differed only in so far as he wrote better than they. His plays survive because they are good plays, even as his political odes survive because they are good odes. Now the whole question of what is, and what is not decent, is a large and

interesting question. I will only note here that when Macaulay accuses Dryden of "violating grossly and habitually rules which the Church (the Catholic Church) in common with every other Christian society, recognises as binding," he is confusing the issue. He is confusing loose writing and immoral conduct. There is no evidence at all that Dryden was ever guilty of immoral conduct, either before or after his conversion. Macaulay copied Burnet and Burnet copied Shadwell, but when we come to challenge Shadwell for his evidence, we find that there is none. The whole story is the libel of an unscrupulous political opponent. "Monster of impurity of all sorts," writes Burnet. "Violating grossly and habitually," chimes in Macaulay. "Dryden's life was that of a libertine," says J. R. Green, "and his marriage with a woman who was yet more dissolute than himself only gave a new spur to his debaucheries." The truth is that there is not one tittle of evidence to prove that he ever committed a single sexual sin in his life. (I do not say that he never did commit one: I should think that improbable. I say that there is no evidence that he ever committed one.)

To be precise, this is the evidence of Dryden's immoralities. Dryden married Lady Elizabeth Howard, the daughter of Lord Berkshire. Since the pair were unequal in rank, though not much unequal in fortune, Dryden's enemies, making use of a single letter to Lord Chesterfield which gives evidence of an innocent flirtation but of nothing more, have with delicious charity invented the legend that Lady Elizabeth was no better than she should have been, and that Dryden was induced by her title to take her off her family's hands. As for the charges against him, they are, as I say, based on the libels of Shadwell. Besides Shadwell's worthless word, there are two so-called pieces of evidence. First in the light-heartedly satirical play, the *Rehearsal*, there is a character called Bayes who is supposed to have been partly drawn from Dryden, and who is represented as immoral. The play was produced at Dryden's own theatre, and Dryden took its satire good-humouredly, a sufficient proof that its charges were not very seriously meant. Secondly, scandal has connected his name with a Mrs. Reeve, a beautiful actress of the time. The only contemporary piece of evidence of any relations between them is that of an anonymous letter, published in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for 1745, which

reads: "I remember plain John Dryden, before he paid his court with success to the great, in one uniform clothing of Norwich druggot. I have ate tarts with him and Madame Reeve at the Mulberry Garden, when our author advanced to a sword and a Chevreux wig." Truly a damning piece of evidence.

Yet it is certainly true that Dryden both before and after his conversion was guilty of using extremely coarse language. I draw a distinction between immoral language and Rabelaisian language; between language which advocates immoral conduct and that which uses coarse terms with a freedom which shocks the susceptibilities of some. Dryden was, it must be admitted, sometimes guilty of immoral language, and he received the rebuke of a much wiser man than Macaulay, of Dr. Johnson, for his pandering to the notion of "the romantick omnipotence of love." But where he erred thus he erred merely in a foolish obedience to a foolish convention. He never pretended sincerity, never pretended that he really believed that the impulses of love were irresistible. He was not a seriously immoral writer like, say, Milton.

Rabelaisian, on the other hand, he certainly was, nor is it possible to say more than that in that field person differs from person and generation from generation in the standard of what is pardonable. I have no wish to embark on a defence of all that Dryden wrote. Dryden himself, with characteristic good sense, in the Preface to his *Fables*, admits the partial justice of Jeremy Collier's attack on him, but we are concerned here with a discussion not of his good taste but of his sincerity. If such is your belief, you may argue that all sincere Catholics ought to avoid Rabelaisian language. To argue that, as a matter of history, all sincere Catholics have avoided Rabelaisian language, that he who indulges in Rabelaisian language thereby shows himself not a sincere Catholic, is ridiculous.

I have not spoken of the internal evidence for Dryden's sincerity, evidence which seems to me quite compelling. Were I shown the *Hind and the Panther*, the translation of Bouhour's *Life of St. Francis Xavier*, and of his *Life of St. Ignatius* (which on the whole I believe to be Dryden's though there is doubt about it), I should judge from those works themselves that all the probabilities were in favour of their being written, as they were written, by a sincere Catholic. Yet the gift of faith is, as we know, an incal-

culable and mysterious thing. It would be just conceivable that these compositions were the work of a man, like the late W. H. Mallock, who had everything of the Faith save the Faith itself. What would be quite inconceivable would be that they should be the work of an insincere Catholic, that a man who saw so enormously clearly the right reasons for being a Catholic, should himself be a Catholic for the wrong reasons; and, had Macaulay known a tenth part as much about the Catholic Faith as Dryden, he would have avoided the absurdity of such a verdict.

It may be asked why I trouble to flog again the dead horses of Macaulay and Burnet and J. R. Green. My answer is that the case of Dryden seems to me a test case. Dryden was neither a saint nor a hero, but he was an honest, straightforward Englishman who suffered in his lifetime for his faith, and who has been abominably libelled since his death because he was a Catholic, and for no other reason than that he was a Catholic. I care nothing what Macaulay thought, nor whether he was honest or dishonest, but I care very much when I find to my sorrow that there are still English Catholics who allow themselves, as it were, to be robbed of one of the greatest of their co-religionists, and who swallow an anti-Catholic legend, not recognising it for what it is.

"MEN OF LITTLE SHOWING"

The Clergy Review will produce under the above title a series of impressionist sketches of Seminary celebrities. Writers who have actually known and lived with them will describe the character and influence of such "famous men, men of little showing" as Mgr. Parkinson, Mgr. Wrennall, Bishop Weathers, Canon Burton, Provost Walmsley. All who were students of the various seminaries will be anxious to have such a permanent record, for they know of these men that "their work continueth." Also we believe that those who did not come under their particular and direct influence, whether clergy or laity, will be glad to be shown the secret of those hidden lives which were devoted to the formation of priests and which embodied and perpetuated the spirit and traditions of the places of their labours.

(1) MONSIGNOR HENRY PARKINSON

Rector of Oscott, 1893 to 1924

BY THE REV. B. V. MILLER, D.D.

DURING the thirty-one years of Mgr. Parkinson's rectorship at Oscott more than three hundred, probably nearly four hundred of those who were afterwards to serve the Church as priests in England and Wales came under his care. That means quite a large proportion of the total number of secular priests working in these two countries. And as nearly all of them are still with us, as they are to be found in every diocese in the land, and as very few could come under his influence without its effects upon them being lasting, it is not too much to say that Mgr. Parkinson's spirit is still active throughout the country; it is not extravagant to claim for him a large part in the present progress of the Church in these countries, and it is natural to suppose that the whole body of the clergy will be interested to know something of the man whose labours for the Church have been so fruitful.

Mgr. Parkinson was the embodiment of the seminary spirit. With the exception of two years when he was on the parochial staff of St. Chad's Cathedral, Birmingham, his whole priestly life was spent in the work of training seminarists for the priesthood. From his ordination in 1877 until 1887 he was vice-president and professor of philosophy at the Birmingham diocesan seminary at

Olton. Then in 1889, after two years at the cathedral, he went to Oscott as vice-rector and professor of philosophy, he became rector in 1893, and held the position until his death in 1924. Can anything be imagined more devastatingly narrowing? For forty-five years to go through the same old round of a three years' course of scholastic philosophy; to spend forty-eight weeks, and often more, out of every fifty-two, within the same walls and the same few acres of ground, to live to the same time-table enforcing the same rules for forty-five years; to pass forty-five years trying to press the same sort of human material into the same mould; to sit at the same table and eat the same sort of college food day after day for forty-five years; it would seem that such a life must needs turn its victim into a machine, sink him into the deepest of ruts, put his mind into blinkers, rob him of all elasticity.

All will agree that only a big man, a man with a big soul, could rise above the restrictive conditions of such a life, and, while always giving himself whole-heartedly to his professional work, keep his mind fresh, his outlook wide, his faculties adaptable and receptive, and even preserve something of the adventurousness of youth to the end of his more than three score years and ten. Grace raises nature but does not change it. Most of us, I suppose, have met very holy men and women, priests and religious, who, after a long life of monotonous regularity, have shown few characteristics beyond sanctity and narrowness. Their holiness has not kept them out of the rut. The love of God has expanded their souls, but withdrawal from the world has straitened their minds. Grace has raised them to the heights, but nature has not opened their eyes to see all the glories and beauties of the view.

In Mgr. Parkinson grace and nature worked together to enable him to resist and splendidly to overcome the strength of circumstance. The conditions of his life did not imprison him; the lines of his career, however straight, did not hedge in his mind; he always kept his eyes wide open all about. In all the things that mattered he never grew narrow. To the end of his seventy-two years he was receptive, he was interested in men and things and movements, he was ready to listen and learn. If a new idea or a novel project were put before him, his first, instinctive reaction to it was not "It's never been

done before," but "What will be its effect, good or bad?" He was eager to discuss it, and, if necessary, to try it.

Were it possible, it would be interesting to determine what part nature had in his perennial elasticity, and how far grace contributed to his triumph over the narrowing tendency of his life's circumstances. But any degree of accuracy in such a discrimination is obviously out of the question. The only thing to do is to give some estimate of his outstanding natural gifts and powers, and then to show how he always endeavoured to use them to the best advantage in pursuit of the supernatural end that he had away before him.

Physically he was of a sturdy constitution which, despite his unflagging work and energy and his apparent indifference in matters of health, he kept unimpaired until his fatal illness. He was untroubled by nerves and he had an iron digestion. These may seem trivial things to record, but those who have lived and suffered under a superior with jumpy nerves and feeble digestion will recognise their importance.

Yet he was of a quick, explosive temper, which he never succeeded in wholly subduing. This led to many scenes that were sometimes regrettable and even painful, though, in his later years especially, more often merely comic and amusing, but it was, I am persuaded, an element, by no means negligible, in his unfailing elasticity.

His intellectual powers were above the average, but not, I think, markedly so. He showed no particular quickness of apprehension, and in his school days at Douai it had been by hard work rather than by brilliant talents that he kept himself at the head of his class. For in the power of hard work and constant application he certainly stood out above his fellows. But to speak of his really extraordinary diligence is, without a doubt, to pass over the border line between nature and grace, for there can be no question that he worked for God, and that his determination to make the most of his talents was inspired and upheld by supernatural motives.

If his mind was not brilliant it was keenly inquisitive, yet tempered with great powers of discrimination. Once set going upon any subject, and once convinced that it was worth pursuing, he would dig and worry his way into it until he was master of facts and reasons, but (and

this is what I mean by his powers of discrimination) as soon as he was satisfied that further knowledge of the matter would serve no useful purpose, he stopped. He never sought to know for the sake of knowing, or in order to be well informed, or because he wished to have his mind well furnished and adorned, but only for the sake of being well equipped for his work. He was like a thirteenth century builder, subordinating ornament to construction, rather than an architect of the later Gothic centuries, fascinated with beauty and loving ornament for itself.

This discriminating inquisitiveness explains both his essential mastery of the subjects that he made his own, and his ignorance of, or indifference to much that a master of them would generally be expected to know; it explains also the seemingly astonishing blankness of his mind about many things as to which some degree of knowledge is generally looked for in an educated man. He had no time and no inclination for intellectual frills and vanities. He was aware of his ignorance and did not try to hide it.

Such, in the rough, was Henry Parkinson, the natural man; not a particularly striking figure, nor destined, apparently, to any special pre-eminence or remarkable success in life. Yet, by the grace of God, he gained pre-eminence and achieved success. His life-work was the training of the secular clergy and the best witness to his success is to be found in the hundreds of Oscotian priests who, up and down the whole country, are doing well the work for which he trained them, and putting into practice the lessons he taught them, and who hold his memory in affectionate veneration.

The secret of his success is to be found, I think, in his high and complete ideal of the priesthood. He had formed this ideal in the days of his youth, and all through his life he nourished, sustained and perfected it both by constant prayer and meditation and by his wide and wise reading of spiritual writers and of the ascetical works of the Fathers. In spite of his natural reticence in these matters, it was clear that he lived by this ideal, and that his one aim in his work was to impress it upon those under his rule. About the inmost core, as we may put it, of this ideal and of the way that Mgr. Parkinson lived it in the hidden depths of his soul, little falls to be said in such a sketch as this. That *Sacerdos alter Christus* was for

him much more than a motto to be looked at and admired from time to time was evident. It was a reality ever present to his mind, always inspiring and moving him, a truth by which he lived and that urged him both to noble enthusiasms in his endeavour to realize it, and to an equally noble fear lest he should fall short of all that it meant.

But in these pages we are concerned, not so much with his own personal realization of his ideal, as with the outward manifestations of his pursuit of it as seen in the exercise of his office and authority in the seminary.

The most obvious, if not the most important, of these manifestations was his faithfulness to the college rules and constitutions, and his insistence upon their strict observance by all under his charge. No monk ever kept his rule more strictly than Mgr. Parkinson observed his. He accepted it, in all simplicity, as the expression of God's will in the ordering of his life, and kept it out of obedience to God. Where it irked him, as sometimes it did, he sought no relaxation, but obeyed as cheerfully as if it were a pleasure. If ever he thought that some of its provisions were unwise he never said so; it was the rule and that was the end of it. He was as careful about small matters as about things important in themselves, for they were just as much part of the rule. Superficial observers often thought that his lifelong fidelity to rule had made him wooden and turned him into a machine. They would not have thought so had they seen him when the obligation of the rule was no longer upon him. During the holidays the children from the convent at Maryvale, or Old Oscott, used sometimes to spend an afternoon at the college. They found nothing wooden in Mgr. Parkinson. His inventiveness in finding ways of amusing them was as unlimited as his energy in carrying them out. Or see him at the Christmas party of the college domestic staff, men and maids, singing and playing for them, joining in the games, throwing himself altogether into the spirit of the affair, with complete unselfconsciousness and whole-hearted enjoyment. The rule never made him wooden, because he kept it as a series of conscious acts of obedience in order to sanctify his own soul and show others how to sanctify theirs. Apart from the college rule he had his own time-table to which, in normal times he kept strictly, and he always impressed upon his students the advis-

ability, or even necessity, of living according to some sort of time-table after ordination, if they were to avoid continual waste of time and keep abreast of their many duties. Nothing but serious illness or a higher call to duty elsewhere could keep him away from his place in chapel, refectory or lecture room, and only unavoidable accident could bring him to it late.

Being fully alive to human weakness, he did not look for the same perfection of observance in others, but he did expect from all a real effort towards it. He was always severe upon wilful and wanton disobedience to the rule, and always suspected the reality of a vocation in the persistent rule-breaker. Nothing so roused his indignation as premeditated, concerted or stubborn violation of the rule. When he was vice-rector, and in his early days as rector, before he had gained the considerable measure of control over his temper that he afterwards acquired, he was looked upon, not only as an over-strict disciplinarian, but as hasty and violent in his enforcement of discipline. Later, however, he corrected this fault, and, except for an occasional and quickly passing outburst, he kept an attitude of calmness under provocation.

His pursuit of the same ideal showed itself in all his college activities. " It was an ideal which soared above the narrow boundaries of diocesanism, and tended to cultivate the broad outlook that would fit the priest to play his part worthily in any sphere to which he should be called."¹ That is well said and aptly. The students at Oscott came from all parts of the country. Not only during the years when it was the Central Seminary for the South and Midlands, but also afterwards when, nominally, it was simply the Birmingham diocesan seminary, it was, in reality, inter-diocesan, you could almost say, national. As a rule, excluding the lean war years, twelve or thirteen English and Welsh dioceses were represented there. Naturally, the students were destined, after ordination, to undertake all sorts of work, to fill all sorts of position, to be curates for many years in busy industrial centres, to become parish priests, after but a year or two, in the poor and lonely parishes of the less Catholic dioceses, to be secretaries to Bishops, professors in colleges. Mgr. Parkinson, in his endeavour to fit all

¹ Rev. G. H. Bishop in " Oseotian," Autumn, 1924, pp. 171-2.

for whatever the future held for them, encouraged all to build such a structure of general culture upon the solid foundation of priestly virtue, as would enable them to find happiness and contentment independently of their outward circumstances, and achieve success in any field of ecclesiastical work.

He loved the Church's Liturgy and tried, by precept, explanation, and example, to excite all to love it. He gloried in the ceremonies of the Church as the dramatic expression of her faith and worship, and he saw that they were carried out with all possible splendour and perfection of detail. But, knowing well that such perfection is unattainable in the ordinary circumstances of parish life, he used to impress upon the students that it was an ideal to keep before them, that they should strive to come as near to it as they could with the means at their disposal, and that they should never allow themselves to fall into the rut of indolent indifference.

With the same end in view he strove, year in year out, and often in most discouraging circumstances, to give to every student at least a moderate knowledge of and facility in Plain Song. The material he had to deal with was sometimes very hard and intractable. He often lamented the fact that so little attention, if any, was given to this in the junior colleges. If he could have had his way, every church student, from the age of fourteen, would have been well grounded in Gregorian music, and also would have been made to acquire some measure of proficiency upon a musical instrument, preferably the organ. But no matter how unmalleable the material, he kept hammering at it, never discouraged, until it was knocked into some sort of musical shape. His perseverance was such that, even the young man who, coming to the college, could not distinguish the tune of *God save the King* from *Home, sweet Home*, or who, given the note B, echoed it first as C sharp and then as A flat, was able, after three or four years, to sing all that he was ever likely to be called upon to sing, and often to worry out for himself some of the easier parts of the Propers of Masses.

The same spirit and purpose inspired him to spend countless hours in the training of that select body of students whom, hitherto known as the Special Choir, the little world of Oscott, after Pope Pius the Tenth's *motu*

proprio on Church Music, was called upon to designate the *Schola Cantorum*. (The change of name was an illustration of his spirit of obedience.) He wished all to become imbued with a love of the best ecclesiastical music, to become familiar with as much of it as was possible, and, if equal to the task, to become qualified to take part in its performance, and this he desired, both as part of the cultural equipment of all priests, and in order to fit them as musical leaders, or at least as capable judges and censors of music in their future lives. Another feature of Oscott life under Mgr. Parkinson was the great amount of attention given to the singing of English hymns. This is a matter sometimes much neglected, I think, in seminary life. But he knew its importance in parish life, and therefore took great pains to provide his students with an extensive knowledge of the best hymns, and to teach them how to sing them well.

On the lighter side of college life his influence was well marked and always exerted in the same direction. He encouraged and, to some extent, took an active part in those societies that students keep going for their own amusement and improvement, literary societies, debating clubs, social study clubs, musical societies, C.E.G. and so forth. In this his aim was always the better equipment of the future priest for his work for souls.

I can imagine some of my readers thinking that, although I began by praising Mgr. Parkinson's breadth and elasticity of mind, I have, in fact, shown that he was narrow and wooden. The answer lies in the fact that the object at which he aimed, to which he subordinated all his activities, was the realization in himself and others of his ideal of the Catholic priesthood, and that this ideal was not only high but also complete. He used very often to point out that, though personal holiness is the first essential, it is by no means the only thing necessary to the priest. The priest is meant to be the leader of his people and the representative of God's Church before a world that is often hostile, always critical and exacting in the standards it looks for in God's ordained ministers. Hence he must be educated and cultured and fit to take his place anywhere in any society.

The scholastic year at Oscott always began with the Rector's inaugural address to the students. I heard him give twenty-one of these addresses, and in every one the

theme was the same, that the priest must be, firstly, a man of God, and secondly, a man of culture. Year in and year out he preached this, year in and year out he did his best to come nearer to perfection in his practice of it. Living according to such an ideal, even if he fell far short of its attainment, it was impossible for him to lose his freshness and breadth of view.

I have said nothing of his work outside of the college, which indeed, except for his labours in connection with the Catholic Social Guild and the Apostolic Union, was neither extensive nor important. He was before all things a seminary man, and it is thus that I have tried to depict him. I have said nothing of him in his capacity as professor of philosophy, for I have no first-hand knowledge of him as he was in the lecture hall. But I know that, to the end of his life, he was as keen and assiduous in the preparation of his lectures as he had been forty years before. And I know that, during the worst period of the war, he gave as much attention to his skeleton class of two, sometimes brought down by illness to one, as if he had been talking to twenty. Nor have I said more than a word or two of his spiritual life. But perhaps I may be allowed to end this sketch with a picture which lives in my memory, and which I think illustrates the humility which was one of his strongest characteristics, and the quality of thoroughness which distinguished all his undertakings.

One hot afternoon in June, 1916, two Sisters of Charity were walking up the college drive to call upon the Rector. An elderly man with a spade over his shoulder met them as he came out from the kitchen garden. An ancient wide brimmed rush hat covered his head; he was clothed in a grey flannel shirt, open at the throat and with the sleeves above his elbows, shabby black trousers tied, navy fashion, below the knees with string, and strong rough shoes. "Do you know if the Rector is at home?" one of the sisters asked the "gardener." "Yes, sister, he's at home," came the answer. "In fact, I'm the Rector." The call to arms had depleted the college outdoor staff; there was need of voluntary labour in the gardens. Mgr. Parkinson was one of the first to offer himself; he threw himself heart and soul into the work, and day by day, in willing obedience to the gardener's directions, he toiled until the pressing need had passed.

His end came suddenly. On the feast of Corpus Christi, 1924, he sang the High Mass and carried the Blessed Sacrament in the solemn procession through the college grounds. It was his last act as Rector of Oscott. An hour afterwards he was taken ill. An operation the next day was of no avail, and he died at midnight on the Saturday. His long rule at Oscott was over; but he had trained and moulded many generations of priests, and it will be long before his memory dies, and very long before the work he did for God loses its effect.

LATIN

BY THE REV. C. C. MARTINDALE, S.J.

WHILE we were passing through the Bechuana desert, the coloured boy came into my carriage to dust. He looked haggard and exhausted, and I said: "Do not dust. It will be the same in five minutes. Would you like a cigarette? Rest for a minute." He took the cigarette, but said he could not smoke it then. (I may say that in another train I had given a coloured railwayman two cigarettes; several days later, in quite another train, a "boy" halted and touched his cap. I asked what he wanted. He said: "You are the gentleman that gave me two cigarettes. I say thank you once more." And he passed on. In spite of all argument to the contrary, they do not forget, though their "code" as to what they should be grateful for, differs no doubt from ours.) I asked if he got decent hours, wages and accommodation. Yes, they slept (but six of them!) in a second class carriage. The wages were all right—one pound a week. But now his wife was ill and could not earn. He was anxious about his child in Cape Town; it was four. It would soon go to school. I said, "Where?" "The Catholic School of course." "Good. I am a Catholic. Are you?" "I was once." "Why do you choose the Catholic school?" "Because in the others they hide things from the children. And they come out not able to pronounce words." "What do they hide?" "Latin." I stared in amaze. "Coloured men and natives," said he, "have the right to all that the white man knows." Then he said he must go. "Just tell me," said I, "why you were 'once' a Catholic?" He said he was really a carpenter, but there was no work, so he took a railway job, and there was now no time for Mass, and he had no more any heart, and so he could not be a Catholic. We talked a little; after a while he cried, out of sheer tiredness, I think; and I gave him a blessing and he promised to return when he could. He went, leaving me to wonder about "Latin."

Just before I left England, Prof. Julian Huxley had been mocking our missionaries for teaching native candidates for the priesthood philosophy in Latin. A substan-

tial writer on "The School in the Bush," Dr. Murray, sees in this a total inability to adapt ourselves to conditions. To my delight, Prof. Brookes, of the Transvaal University College at Pretoria, declaring that in South Africa the true spiritual notion of education has disappeared or else never been born, writes that he wishes all natives in higher schools could be taught Latin. This, coming from the very "Dutch" town of Pretoria, is staggering, but most welcome. Before passing from what concerns these lands in particular, I must confess that Latin provides a separate and disturbing problem. Afrikaans is of course now necessary (to all intents and purposes) in the Union; though its propagation is far more a political affair than one, even, of true national feeling. Not for me to go into that. But, it is killing not only Latin, in education, which is in too many places at its last gasp anyhow, but French, let alone any other European language. From the purely civilizational point of view, it appals me to see whole populations throwing away an inestimable instrument of culture in favour of one which is not even useful for commerce. Afrikaans, the spelling, grammar and syntax of which are still problematical, and the history of which is uninteresting linguistically, but which corresponds to a true sentiment, has to borrow almost every word that can be called "cultural," and is, I am assured, more like German as spoken at Hamburg by operatives, or even like Flemish, than like either Dutch or English. Not that for a moment I would check the development of any national language. But my point is, that it is ousting almost everything else, and, of course, Latin. This creates a real problem for all Catholic schools, let alone seminaries, and also, for all who believe in the value of liturgy for the laity.

First, however, it is not difficult to teach Latin to natives, whose languages contain all the necessary sounds (save perhaps those of French-pronounced Latin: many missionaries here are French; but I think they have abandoned that pronunciation on the whole). Its spelling provides no difficulty: I have watched little Zulus struggling with "cough," "through," "plough," "enough," "thorough," etc. The Latin changed his spelling when the pronunciation changed; re-cap-ere became re-cep-ere and couldn't go further when it became re-cip-ere. And the work of Dr. McMurtrie at Mariannhill proves that native

boys can quite well sing not only Mass but Vespers and *understand* them. When a choir of these Zulu boys came to Durban, and sang Vespers and Benediction, I preached to them. Each sentence, of course, had to be translated by a skilful interpreter *except* when I said: *Laudate, pueri, Dominum*; and *Laudate Dominum omnes gentes*; and then there were grins, and little nudges, and the "Eh-hehh!" whispered *sotto voce*—an exclamation meaning quite as many things as "*Ach so!*" does, or the infinitely significant Italian *Ma!*

Now apart from the whole question of how far a knowledge of Latin can be made to admit a native into a whole new world of ideas and "culture" (in its proper sense), so long as the Church uses Latin in her Western Rite (and it is idle for us to speculate on her ceasing to do so), it seems to me that the more we admit people to the Latin language, the more we are admitting them to the spiritual culture of the Church. For example, I have known crowds of nuns who know in a vague way that *Dominus* means Lord; but once they have got hold of the "taste" of the word, by way of Dominion, pre-Dominant, even Dominie, they see a lot more "in" it. I hope I have not too often quoted the boy on board ship, whom I was teaching to serve Mass, and who asked why an omnibus was mentioned in the Confiteor. I asked him what a taxi was. Luckily he said it was for rich people. That is, for a few. I said that an omnibus was suited "to everyone" so "to all the Saints" became quite easy for his intelligence.

But I feel convinced that we could do more than we do, for (i) religious, (ii) altar-servers, (iii) the laity at large, if we took the pains to teach them Latin *in the proper way*, which is *not* a scholarly way. Or rather, I am not sure that it isn't. For, rules, declensions, conjugations, were the artificial arrangements of learned men long after ordinary people talked like that—rather as, to quote someone whose name I forget, but who was a professor at Rome, valid confessions were made and absolutions given, long before Moral Theologies were written. When it was my fate to teach Latin or Greek, I never dreamed of teaching declensions or conjugations. Boys very soon became able to say what the verb (which they didn't know) corresponding to a noun (which they did) *must* be. But leaving this topic of method, Miss Joyce Lowe recently proved single-

handed what an appetite there is in our laity for simple Latin. This skilful professor in the London University inaugurated classes at the Cavendish Square convent and expected to get about twenty-five pupils at most. Numbers ran up into hundreds, and classes had to be subdivided. True, as the year went on, they dwindled. But what professor at Oxford does not see his attendances dwindle? That proves nothing. You begin again. Life is selective. The fees asked were derisory; she expected barely to cover her expenses. But she was able, at the end of the year, to send a very substantial gift, in her charity, to a poor mission in London. Two or three other persons wrote (from London and Liverpool and Blackpool) asking for advice as to the classes they proposed to start: I do not know how things developed there, if at all.

But the point is this. Both Pius X and the reigning Pontiff are sincerely anxious that the Faithful should join actively in the Liturgy. I thought at first that Pius X had legislated about music chiefly because he disapproved of its prevalent worldly character. But he emphatically wished the people to have a music which made it possible for them to *join in*. Readers of this review know how the movement in favour of proper music at Mass is spreading, and the work of the Dean of the Dublin university is known, and that of our own Society of St. Gregory; and they also know how this affects not only the dignity of our services, but, the prayer of the Faithful—the collective, liturgical prayer. Now you cannot really sing the Gloria or the Credo with conviction, however well you know the tune, unless you also know a little Latin. “I will pray with the intelligence too.” It is obvious that St. Paul felt a little awkward about people who spoke “with tongues,” without knowing (or anyone else knowing) what they *meant*. Outsiders, he remarked very realistically, would think you were off your heads.

I feel convinced that without difficulty, in almost every parish, there could be formed a nucleus of people—perhaps a tiny nucleus, but a very valuable one from the point of view of prayer—who would take part actively in the liturgy, knowing well what they were talking about. A certain knowledge of symbolism would also be valuable, no doubt: *Turris Eburnea* is not what we should spontaneously call Our Lady: when it becomes, in the vernacular, “Tower made of the Teeth of Elephants,”

and is placed upon the lips of people who build no towers and never have seen an elephant and use no ivory, it certainly becomes "dead wood" in their worship, able to be lopped off without anyone's regretting it. I am desperately sorry when any item in the liturgy becomes "dead wood." How many of us priests would *mind very much* if the Pope cancelled the little ceremony of breaking the Sacred Host and putting a fragment into the Chalice? Yet once you know its history, you value it: it becomes alive, you *would* mind losing it. So, the Faithful, I am sure, would value the liturgy and use it far more than they do, far more interiorly and spiritually, if they knew a little Latin. The whole topic might be worked out by more practical heads than mine.

The problem, mentioned more and more frequently nowadays, is surely no secondary one. The Church began to use Latin, because more people understood it than Greek: she went on using it even when the romance-languages differentiated themselves, partly because most people understood it fairly well and anyhow possessed a latinised mentality: half a generation ago, higher education even in the north was still latinised. Now Latin is disappearing. It is becoming as unappealing as Sanskrit. Are there ways of helping the future race of seminarians not only to learn a new algebra, but to acquire or appreciate the Latin spirit? to initiate the would-be lover of the liturgy into our "mysteries"? to make our social worship the living reality that the Popes desire? Here certainly is a thing in which the laity could co-operate, and convert clergymen in particular, unless they too have become "mechanised" and fill their leisure with motor cycles and the wireless.

CATECHISM REVISION

BY THE RIGHT REV. MGR. CANON MYERS, M.A.

NEARLY forty years ago Fr. Michael Glancey wrote a vigorous preface to the first edition of Knecht's *Practical Commentary on Holy Scripture* (1894), and poured out a torrent of questions on the Catechism and its contents: "Are the instruments we are using adapted to the purpose for which they are intended? Are our Catechisms correctly adjusted, that is, are they set in a manner best calculated to secure their aims?" He was a stern critic of the technicalities of the Catechism, and pleaded that it should be a *religious primer*. "There is yet a third point on which we need light, and that is the disposition and order in which the material should be set. In what order should the Catechism be arranged? On a metaphysical or a practical plan? The order followed in the English Catechism is severely metaphysical, and consequently children do not learn till late many things that they require to know early."

The "Sower" scheme gets down to practical work straightway, leaves most of Fr. Glancey's questions alone and makes the best it can of the Catechism's questions and answers according to the needs of the child's period of development.

In our last number, His Grace the Archbishop of Birmingham put forward a strong "*Plea for the revision of the Catechism*." He suggests that the teaching of the Catechism at present grouped on a more or less polemical basis, due to the demands of anti-Protestant defence, should be regrouped on the basis of a simple exposition of the supernatural life of the soul united in its grace-life with God-made-Man. There is to be change of stress and emphasis, re-grouping of matter, and inevitably supplementing of points of doctrine—but substantially the Catechism is to remain, though probably increased in content.

To the many strong reasons set forth by His Grace I should like to add another very simple consideration. The dogmatic teaching of the Church and the Commandments of God have not changed indeed, but the people

to whom dogma and commandment must be taught have changed; children are not what they were, and methods of teaching and the presentation of doctrine calls for more attention than in the past.

The actual text of our Catechism was drawn up to meet the needs of an entirely different generation of children from those of the present day. It originated at a time when the Catholic home could be relied upon to use its influence from the beginning, and to supplement the letter by inculcating the spirit with the full force of a Catholic mother's zeal. The mother's ambition was to make her child Catholic through and through, to teach their Catholic duties to children whose wills had been trained from the start. The School and the Catechism had but to complete and clarify truths and practices familiar from the beginning.

To-day, unfortunately, the influence of home training cannot be relied upon as in the days when Catholic schools were less numerous. The good work done in the schools has in many cases lessened the sense of responsibility of parents, and in order to meet the needs of the case as it stands to-day there must be an intensification of the religious influence of the teacher. The time has gone when the school might teach the sound doctrine and the home would reduce it to practice, would apply it to the details of daily life. Now the child must learn at school what exactly is meant by being a good practical Catholic and what are the privileges and the duties of those who are called to be the Sons of God. That unification of doctrine and practice would certainly be rendered easier by the suggested Christo-centric formulation of the Church's teaching. The line of the teacher's appeal would be more clearly indicated.

The force of the appeal of the old home training was in the example set by father and mother; the force of the appeal of the school training will derive from a similar source: hence the all-importance of Catholic teachers in our Catholic schools—true Catholic teachers who realize the privilege that is theirs of educating unto eternity fellow-creatures who, like themselves, have received from God a never-ending life—in the grace-development of which they are commissioned by the Church to take their part.

Formal routine teaching of the most perfectly formulated Catechism will not lead to abiding results. But the teaching of a well-equipped and trained teacher who is honestly doing his best to live up to the teaching of Our Lord, who, living a Christlike life himself, is trying by God's grace to make his baptized fellow Catholics more worthy of their privileged calling, the teaching of a man who says his prayers fervently and seeks the guidance of the Holy Spirit in carrying out his duties, the teaching of such a man cannot fail to make upon his pupils an impression which by God's grace will last through life.

The suggested revision of the Catechism emphasizing the all-importance in the Catholic of his grace-life, his union in all things with Christ our Lord, will undoubtedly help to keep teacher and taught nearer to Our Lord.

In the sanctity of the teacher, lay, religious or clerical, lies the real hope of the future sanctity of the pupil. It is only the teacher who realises the absolute importance of Catholic life and practice, who can convey to the child alike by word and example, a similar but gradual realisation of the supernatural realities bound up with its daily life. To the child the sublime truths have to be interpreted in terms it can grasp: and that interpretation, if it is to appeal, must come from a mind and heart fired by a loving appreciation of the all-importance of the task in hand.

The naturalism and materialism uppermost in modern life will certainly be more directly counteracted by teaching conveyed on the lines of the suggested revision than in any other way—and for that reason alone it is to be hoped that the Archbishop's plea will be acted on.

When the practical revision takes place, and the doctrinal contents of the Catechism are supplemented, may I plead that more adequate recognition be given to Our Lord's teaching on Charity?

Our Lord made quite clear which is the great commandment of the law: "*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole soul and with thy whole mind.*" This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to this: "*Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.*" (Matt. xxii. 37-39.)

The standard of our love of our neighbour was again

clearly set forth : "A new commandment I give unto you : that you love one another AS I HAVE LOVED YOU, that you also love one another. By this shall man know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another." (John xiii. 34, 35.) The newness of Our Lord's command lies precisely in the all-embracing and Christ-like love He imposes on His followers.

In His picture of the Last Judgment He shows how apparently remote good acts appeal to Him : "As long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to me." (Matt. xxv. 40.) To-day we hear much of "service" on every side. May not one of *the* dangers besetting the Church in this country be the fact that our people do not seem to have grasped the idea of the duty of the service of their fellowman? They get as far as the idea of service of their fellow-Catholics, but too many fail to get beyond it. The failure of so many to realise the importance of a supernatural care for the material well-being of their neighbour, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, doubtless explains the relative smallness of the numbers of Catholics in local and national public life. More than ever before it is important that a larger number of men of Catholic principle, full of the widest charity, should be at hand to help their faltering neighbour and to show that, however much we may oppose wrong principles, nevertheless we are filled with a Christlike love of our religious or political or economic opponents. Weary hours of apparently wasted energy spent on committees, or boards, may be of the greatest spiritual profit to the self-sacrificing man or woman who, for the love of Christ our Lord, tries to help even the material progress of their less favoured brethren.

A revision of the Catechism would seem to be a heaven-sent opportunity of setting before the present generation the sound supernatural basis of their duty to their fellow-men.

If the revision is made with the determination to express the full teaching of Christ's Church in the simplest possible language spoken at the present day, without any undue stress on a degree of pedantic technical accuracy calculated to satisfy the most exacting theological expert, it will render a service of untold value to the cause of Christ's Church in this land.

HOMILETICS

BY THE RT. REV. MGR. PROVOST FREELAND, V.G.

The Sixth Sunday after Pentecost.

Epistle. "In Newness of Life."

The newness of life here mentioned by the Apostle is brought about by the Sacrament of Baptism. The point, however, which prompts us to consider what bearing the words of the Epistle have on our own life and conduct, is the reminder of St. Paul here and elsewhere, that, in Baptism, we have received a new life, one great condition of which the Apostle *seems* to make out to be sinlessness. Buried with Christ, the Christian is risen with Christ. Life, the cause or the fountain from which operation flows, is now different from the old one: and its works must, therefore, be different from the former works. That life, forever, is crucified with Christ; and its sinful operation is at an end. This life, the new one, the Christ Life, now, after Baptism, belongs to the Christian; and its works, just the opposite to those of the old life, are righteousness. They are sinless; for the life is sinless. Will the baptised, then, never sin again?

The matter must necessarily be put in the form of a question; for there are so many passages in St. Paul's writings which *seem* to suggest that sinlessness may be regarded as the undoubted effect of the reception of the "New Life." They are passages concerning which St. Peter considered it advisable to warn the thoughtless and unwary reader who may easily "wrest them to his own destruction." However, the great Apostle of the Gentiles leaves us in no manner of doubt as to what he means, namely this—God in Baptism gives to us the new Life, but what we are going to do with it rests to a great extent on our own Will, which remains quite free to co-operate or not. Frequently St. Paul tells the newly baptised that, though the "past is dead," yet, still, it remains with them to break with that past. "Let us cast off the works of darkness, and put on the armour of light," "Not in riotousness and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurity, but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ." And again, "These things heretofore, ye were; but ye have been enlightened (*i.e.*, baptised); walk therefore, worthy of the light." He also tells them to be imitators of Christ; if they be risen with Christ, to seek the things that are above; to imitate himself, to avoid evil, to do good, to let not certain forms of wickedness be so much as mentioned among them; and even to mortify themselves, so little certain is it that, with all the newness of life which is in them, their works will be of a nature such as may ensure final perseverance.

This teaching of St. Paul is as applicable to the Catholic to-day, as it was to those to whom he wrote his epistles when the Church commenced. We are in possession of a priceless

treasure; Catholic life is ours. We receive it at Baptism; its very breath is the Holy Spirit; its sustenance and stay is the Life, in the Blessed Sacrament, of Him who has said, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life." All manner of Graces of the supernatural order; all kinds of spiritual aids and assistances; all sorts of blessings of a quite temporary nature, the effect of which is culture in the mind and happiness in the heart, are brought into the mere everyday life of the children of the Church, if they only see to it, by the Catholic Life which first of all started on its course at Baptism. For, as Scripture says, "Thou hast given me all things together with her."

The greater the gift the more serious and weighty is the responsibility of those into whose keeping it has been consigned. Life, howsoever we may regard it, is a very sensitive thing. The least neglect may imperil it; the least risk may make its light burn low; and, should we play fast and loose with it, it will most surely die away. It is so, without any doubt with Catholic Life. As with the five foolish Virgins, so with us—the lamps of this, our Spiritual Life in the Church of God, will go out if not replenished, again and again, with the oil of our own efforts after goodness. We may indeed receive, as St. John puts it, "Life and Grace through Jesus Christ"; but this life does not go on living should we ourselves not foster it; and negligence and sin will kill many graces and send the Holy Spirit right clean away. The Epistle, when well examined, will teach us the simple lesson with regard to the spiritual life which every morning admonishes us in the matter of our natural one. We have to be always starting afresh; always beginning; always trying; always avoiding risks, even the least, and always making renewed effort and embarking on new ventures.

Sixth Sunday after Pentecost.

Gospel. They will faint by the way.

That these words are concerned with the need of Holy Communion while the follower of Christ is engaged in journeying in this "valley of tears," there can be no doubt. This *peregrinatio*, as St. Paul calls it, is a fact. We are, as he says, absent from our Lord, away from our Father who is in Heaven, journeying to the "City of the great King," going to that "Jerusalem which is above."

Yet, do not these words *deficient in via* carry the mind to quite another aspect of Holy Communion in its relationship to the human soul? The very words *in via* suggest the expression Viaticum, and this, in its turn, brings vividly before the mind a religious action in which our Lord seems to us conspicuously kind; an action, moreover, surrounded by circumstances most pathetic and serious. This, of course, is the last Sacrament, the Viaticum.

What should strike the attentive reader of the New Testament is the fact of personal contact which Our Lord deigned to be-

stow upon so many while He was here. He shows a desire of coming into touch with certain individuals without the employment of an intermediary. He communes with the soul *Himself*, as in the case of Martha, Mary and Lazarus. Himself, He comforts Magdalene, and converts the Samaritan woman, and consoles the Dying Thief.

But it was to the sick to whom He went most. Personal contact with them appears to have been His habit, His custom. The reputation clung to Him afterwards—"He went about doing good." To the centurion's son He wanted to go; to all "the parts round about," He went, "healing their sick"; to Him divers sick *were brought*, and "He healed them all." And it is noticeable that, almost without exception, it was to the sick of "His own people" that He went so as to manifest His personal concern for them. Fine as was the confession of the Canaanite woman, He did not go to her house. The Syrian who, in ecclesiastical history, is said to have written asking for the restoration of his health, meets only with the response of, "some day, I will send." The point in consideration is just this—He came "to His own" in general; but particularly He *went* "to His own" when they were sick.

The same features, in this matter of divine condescension on the part of our Lord, are observable to-day. Indeed, we should expect that such would be the case, since He is "Jesus the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." To His followers in general He certainly, in the most adorable Sacrament of the Altar, comes, but He does this only when an effort of going to Him has been made by them. His action towards the sick is very different; and His action in going to the dying assumes the nature, not merely of a voice calling them home, but of a hand leading them into Paradise. It is the Viaticum—the Lord in the way with thee.

It may be said, if we, without irreverence, may use an expression with regard to Christ which is often used about quite ordinary persons, that He appears here, in the administration of the Viaticum, at "His very best." If ever He was "meek and lowly of Heart," and He was always so, He surpasses Himself here. The reception of Him, even by the affluent, is, in all its circumstances, much less grand than that expended on even a casual acquaintance; and in the majority of cases, where affluence finds no place, the Humility assumed by Christ in the Viaticum is very much beyond description. To what places He goes; through what scenes, in a non-Catholic country like England, He passes; at what sights of negligence, and worse. He arrives; into what hearts He enters—and reckons it all as nothing, so long as He may be admitted as the Friend and Guide in the great journey now being entered on! "So long as He may be admitted"; for admission, on sufferance, are the only words which truly describe the attitude of the overwhelming majority of those who receive the Viaticum. The reason, or one great reason of this is, of course, the complete apathy with which, during life and in health, the recipient of the Viaticum has

treated the Blessed Sacrament; for if a man has lived with little devotion, or none at all, felt and manifested towards the Real Body and Blood of Christ, it is small wonder if, when he dies, "he dies and makes no sign." But this reflection only brings out the action of our Lord in the matter in a still brighter light—He *goes*; He must go; "he whom He loves is sick." He has gone before to His "own and His own received Him not"; if this one who is dying receives Him only because he cannot well get out of it, never mind—The Divine Lover of souls has arrived, and now leads, which was what He desired, the dying through death to Life Everlasting.

Seventh Sunday after Pentecost.

The Epistle.

St. Paul in this morning's Epistle mentions, among other things, the effects of sin during this life as well as the retribution which follows it after the grave; and, on the other hand, he mentions the effects of a virtuous life in the present state of existence, and the blessedness with which such virtue will be rewarded in the future.

That sinfulness, in thought, when harboured and reflected on, has a deleterious effect on the thinker there seems to be little reason to doubt. Such thoughts will form a propensity to the commission of the sin in action, and they will leave a mark on the general character of the individual which, in the estimation of genuinely righteous persons, will stereotype such individual as "undesirable." To a very great extent a man makes himself to become that on which his thoughts are mostly set. If those thoughts are consistently and perseveringly evil, the greatest probability is that he will become evil in himself. That is, if his thoughts be covetous he will be underhanded; if they be uncharitable he will be restless and suspicious; if avaricious he will be close and ungenerous; and if such thoughts be consistently and perseveringly sordid and impure he will be sordid and impure himself.

Serious and many as are the fruits of sinful thoughts, desires, and propensities, yet they are not so apparent as those of sins generally called sins of action. Of these even nature and society to some extent take cognisance. Sickness and ill health are the lot of one who gives himself up to wrongdoing. Society protects itself against manifest injustice to one's neighbour in word and deed. Often, it is true, the evildoer works in secret; often a veil of respectability covers grievous transgressions; often no one knows, no one *can* know, excepting God; but effects and fruits doing harm either to the evildoer himself or to others are sure to follow. And these effects live on. As Shakespeare says, "The evil that men do lives after them," and the saying is the expression of that which is the common experience of everyone. Evils exist now the beginning of which took place, in some cases, hundreds of years ago. "The fathers have eaten wild grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge," is one way the Scrip-

ture has of describing the malevolent effect of somebody or other's sins in the past. In so many cases, disease and poverty with the misery and wretchedness they manifest can be traced back to the unrighteous actions of others. The stone makes wider and wider rings in the water into which it is cast; and sin, in its effects, goes on to the third and fourth generation and even longer, widening, in its unhappy fruits, as it goes.

On the other hand, the fruits or the effects of a virtuous life, even in this world, cannot be better set forth than they are by St. Paul himself, when enumerating the fruits of the Spirit. These effects are: charity, joy, peace, patience, benignity, modesty, continency, chastity.

The Epistle mentions the retribution which sin entails also in the future life, and the reward which virtue receives there. "The wages of sin is death; but the Grace of God life everlasting." And our Lord Himself describes, with much dramatic detail, the condemnation of the sinner as well as the invitation into Heaven with which He will favour the righteous. The sign of the Son of Man will appear; His throne will be set in the clouds; the books will be opened; He will make the wicked manifest as His personal enemies, and the good to appear as though they had done Him a personal favour. To the former eternal misery is the retribution awarded—"depart from me ye cursed." To the latter the welcome is given—"Enter into the joy of thy Lord. Inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world."

Seventh Sunday after Pentecost.

Gospel.

Beware of False Prophets who . . . inwardly are ravening wolves.

1. Who are the False Prophets? The word itself means, of course, a person who foretells an event. In our Lord's time on earth preaching also became associated with the idea. In early Christian times Prophecy and Preaching may be said, in a general way, to be synonymous; though there were prophets that did not preach, and preachers that did not talk—they wrote. Our Lord may be said, then, to be referring to False Teachers, and, that, on religious or spiritual matters. A False Teacher does not necessarily mean one who never speaks the truth, any more than a True Teacher is one that may not in teaching, by ignorance or by inadvertence, say what is even doctrinally not right. If a man has been "sent" by the Church which is the "column and ground of Truth"; if he is in communion with the See of St. Peter, the Shepherd of the whole flock, and, since this Peter is the only true and infallible Teacher to whom Christ gave His sheep, if a man teach that which Peter teaches, then he is a True Prophet. Should a man act without this authority; without this "mission"; act on his own; say, so to speak: "Mine are the true views; mine is the right way; follow me," then, that man is a False Prophet.

2. The effect (the fruit), which such a man—the False Prophet—will have on the sheep of Christ will be, and always has been, to divide and scatter the flock; and it is just that which our Lord puts down (see Second Sunday after Easter) as a particular evil produced by the ravening wolf. Division and Confusion are the results of False teaching; and the person—the False Prophet, False Christs, as our Lord calls them—the person who wilfully sets himself up as a teacher in opposition to that Authority which Christ Himself established, may know infallibly that he is a sower of discord and a fomentor of dissension. The truth of this is attested not only by history but by the experience of all. Divisions, discords, schisms, heresies, form a part of the lamentations of St. Peter, St. Paul, St. John and St. Jude. They are rife in the early centuries of the Church; they are present in the middle ages; they break forth with renewed energy in the sixteenth century; and in our time they are, in England, the order of the day. The order of the day, yes; but that order of the day is quite different from and opposed to the order of Christ. He ordered and arranged Unity among His people.

3. Christ and unity as against the False Teacher and division. It is indeed this very plain issue which may be said to be clearly set before us by this morning's Gospel. Our Lord shows most certainly that Unity is the thing with which He started, and that He will ensure that Unity all the way along. He made and had one Church only, and still has only one. He calls it My Church; and He says that "My Church" is to go on always in spite of "the gates of Hell." He establishes His Society; He builds His Church on one Foundation—namely, Peter. He gives it one Shepherd, Teacher, Ruler—Peter, again. And as the Church and the sheep are to last until the end of time, so the Office of Peter—Foundation and Teacher—together with the Unity of the Church must continue, and is continuing, throughout the ages.

It is to our Lord Himself that we owe the very true saying that a house divided against itself cannot stand. Both history and experience attest how very true the saying is. The Catholic Church was surrounded by sects in the early ages. She alone remains; they have left behind nothing save their names and accounts of the strife and the confusion which they caused. During the past three centuries, particularly in this country, many sects have arisen. Few of them remain, though others have arisen to take the places of those quite dead and buried. And of the few that remain, there is not one that does not hold very different views from those held by the sect when it first of all started; while some of the few that remain bear marks and show signs that their career is pretty well run and the end is near. Division, dissolution, collapse—these are the results of False teaching. Unity, stability, permanence—these are, and cannot very well help being, the effects of Truth and True Doctrine.

Eighth Sunday after Pentecost.

(Unjust Steward.)

Sins of Co-operation.

The eyes of all are centred, in this Gospel, on the action of him who has come down to us under the name of the Unjust Steward. There are others mentioned in the parable who are represented as committing sins almost as great as that of the principal offender; but they are dismissed from our mind at once, and the action of the man who robbed his employer, doing the deed, moreover, with a large amount of astuteness, is, generally speaking, taken to be the only incident in the scene that matters. This is not surprising since our Lord, in the story, makes the unjust steward the great object of our attention, and draws His lesson from him and his conduct alone.

Still, does He not, at least, mention two co-operators in the crime, the commission of which He describes? There were the debtors, who we should say in the language of to-day were compounding a felony, conspiring in fraud, sharing in the spoils which accrued from the audacious Steward, the principal agent in the criminal proceeding.

That the steward, besides his other sins, was guilty also of leading others into sin is evident. There is no doubt that he was responsible for the change in the amount set down in the account. He suggested its being made; he even commands it. It is no less clear that he himself is a co-operator, as well as being a somewhat high-handed instigator and leader, with others in a sin which, so far as action is concerned, was done by them.

But the fault and the responsibility of those others are also perfectly clear. They knew that the accounts describing their debts were quite in order, perfectly correct. If they did not actually know, they had the strongest suspicions, that the steward was leading them into a serious misdemeanour. For the man and his questionable rectitude were the talk of the countryside—the Master knew of it, and when things reach the Master's ears it is a proverb that all the world has known it long before. They knew the crooked ways of the steward; and here he was quite openly leading them into fraud. And this leadership, it must be confessed, to judge from the description of their doings in the Gospel, they quite willingly, even eagerly, follow.

Strong things have been said both in Scripture and elsewhere about the principal actor who leads others into sin. Indeed, could language be too severe in reprobating such action, particularly when the sin is done by command or committed by the exercise of a powerful will over a will weak and too easily submissive? True, in some cases, so far as the world at large is concerned, it is the one led into sin who has to bear the inconveniences, sometimes very great, arising from a wicked line of conduct shared in by another or by others; but the retribution of God sometimes in this world, and always in the next, will surely dog the steps and finally run to earth the one

who began the thing by order, by counsel, by temptation, by physical force, or by moral suasion.

Yet, it is quite a different kind of person we are looking at when we are considering the "debtors" of the Gospel. Theirs was a case, surely of "human communications corrupting good manner." How common their sin is, and how prevalent—the fraternizing, that is to say, with the wicked, and, from companionship, becoming, if not as bad as they, frequenters of the "road that leadeth to destruction!" Whether such companionship is formed with the eyes open, or entered on and persisted in with simplicity, the result can be only this—co-operating in sin in the beginning, and, in the end, becoming a principal agent on one's own account.

Particularly in these days—with the young, the middle-aged, and even with the old, do we find a preference for the society of those whose ways are crooked and whose paths are full of peril. The Book of Ecclesiastes says: "Go not with them." The Apostle says: "Be ye not therefore partakers with them." And the Psalms, while describing just the opposite line of conduct, says: "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the chair of pestilence."

Ninth Sunday after Pentecost.

Gospel.

"The time of thy visitation."

The radical word from which "visitation" in Scripture is derived has many meanings. The general idea conveyed, however, seems to be, the bestowal of some great benefit in which the donor takes action himself or by some notable representative, while the object of the benefaction may or may not agree to accept the favour. In this sense God said to the Children of Israel, when in bondage in Egypt: "I will surely visit you," and then proceeds to the great act of their emancipation. In the same sense the word is made use of by our Lord in this Gospel. He had Himself come to deliver the Jews. He had "done works which no other had done," to show His divine authority, His mission. He had established the "Kingdom of God" on earth in their midst. It was God's call; God's visitation. As Zacharias, the Father of St. John the Baptist, had said: "The Orient from on High had visited" them. How many times, and in what various ways, had God tried to turn to Him this people! As St. Paul put it in the *Hebrews*, He had spoken to their fathers by the prophets, and last of all in those late times by His Son. Or, as Christ Himself describes both the mercies of God and their wicked manner of meeting them: "He sent His servants and they treated them contemptuously," whereupon He sent His Son, saying: "They will reverence My Son." And Him they put to death. History has testified that this was the last chance which the Jews as the people of God received. Nothing but disaster has happened to them since.

Nothing even in purely mundane affairs is so bitter as the reflection that the chance of a life-time has been thrown away. "Things might have been so different had I done otherwise than I did, just at that moment. The wrong decision was made; the wrong turning was taken; the thing was, as the saying goes, worse than a crime, it was a blunder." So says the world; and the world and the children of the world are clear-headed enough to see that the chance of a life-time never recurs. Occasions of this sort, unlike history, never repeat themselves. Once omitted, once neglected, once mistaken for something else, and the chance of a life-time passes on, and nothing can overtake it in its flight.

Of course, this is mere human philosophy, and the reflection may be said to assume the weight of a proverb on quite temporal matters. But, is the reflection not equally true in the affairs of God and in His dealings with us? Chances of repentance are given to us again and again. Is there no *last* chance? The mercies of God are everlasting, certainly; but is there a time, a moment, an occasion, when mercy does not cease, it is true, but when it simply will not act, and refuses to give the chance so frequently given before? There is such a sin as that of hardness of heart (it may be, it is the sin against the Holy Spirit); and it was precisely hardness of heart which was the disposition, and, according to the Scriptures, continues to be the disposition of the Jews, who knew not the time of their visitation.

Again, what about opportunities, chances and occasions for the inducement of spiritual betterment and improvement? Calls from the Holy Spirit come frequently to all, moving the mind to consider the need of self-improvement with regard to purely religious matters. They come; but are they heeded, taken notice of? In the affairs of God you cannot simply mark time, any more than you can do so in the affairs of daily life. We must either get better or worse. Self-improvement, which comes from the practice of a thing, gives way to complete loss of an art or craft, when chances of practice are absent or neglected. Nature itself will not put up with continued negligence; and things go blind that live in darkness. So is it with the call of the Spirit that we may become better and live with greater holiness. Hardness of heart and blindness of disposition become habits, and spiritual death almost always ensues. Such calls for increased sanctification and self-betterment come daily; and daily are the chances given which, if co-operated with, bring about amelioration. They are neglected; and the chance of a life-time is given; and this, if allowed to pass on and away, returns, so experience teaches us, no more. For, those that leave Christ permanently are much more those who sit in the darkness which negligence has occasioned, than those who have sinned much.

NOTES ON RECENT WORK

I. LITURGY.

BY THE REV. J. B. O'CONNELL.

THE "liturgical movement" of our day had its official beginning in the first pronouncement of Pius X, his *Motu Proprio* on Church Music, given to the world on the feast of St. Cecily 1903. In that document the great Pope laid down the fundamental principle of liturgical reform—*instaurare omnia in Christo*—the return in matters liturgical to the spirit of the early Church, the restoration of the *active* participation of the faithful in the Sacred Liturgy. That Catholics may recover the spirit of the first Christians, may come to understand that Christian worship, as the Church understands and teaches it, consists in collective prayer and in active and intimate participation in the Sacred Mysteries, they must learn something of the Church's mind on the worship of God and to do this they must study above all the great central act of Catholic worship, the Mass.

The "liturgical movement" has given birth in this century to quite a vast literature. The clergy and the people, eager to obey the command of the Pope that they should worship not according to the various individualistic systems of piety which sprang up during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but according to the "mind of the Church" are seeking information on matters liturgical with great avidity, and the demand for a truly scientific knowledge of the Sacred Liturgy has been met by the production of many excellent books.

One such book is *The Mass of the Apostles*, by Rev. Joseph Husslein, S.J. (Kenedy, New York). It is a fascinating book for those who love the Liturgy. The sources of our information on the Mass of the first three centuries—the period with which Fr. Husslein deals—are very meagre. In such works as the *Didache* (c.80), the Epistle of St. Clement to the Corinthians (end of the first century), the letters of St. Ignatius, Martyr (beginning of the second century), and in the writings of St. Justin (middle of the second century) we get glimpses of what the early Liturgy was. Fr. Husslein takes these bare bones and aided by the study of early monuments—inscriptions, paintings, etc.—reconstructs for us the Mass as it must have been celebrated by St. Peter and the other apostles and by the early Fathers. The picture is conjectural, of course, but it is based on evidence of a very definite character. No pains (the author tells us) have been spared to secure historic accuracy. "The Scriptures of the New Testament, the most primitive documents and patristic writings, ancient inscriptions and monuments, as well as the earliest catacomb paintings, were studied exhaustively in their bearing upon this subject." The conclusions are set down in a way that should prove both popular and convincing—

the story of the early Mass is beautifully told, in a very simple way, yet with constant indications of the learning of the author.

Another excellent book which takes us back in spirit to the early liturgical gatherings (*synaxes*) is *The Prayer of the Early Christians*, by Abbot Fernand Cabrol (translated by Dom. E. Graf. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 5s.). The learned author, who has laboured so long and fruitfully in the promotion of the liturgical spirit, gives us a fund of information on the liturgical practices of the early Church. As in his earlier monumental work, "Liturgical Prayer," the Abbot tells us of the forms of prayer, of the liturgical gestures, of the devotional practices of the first Christian centuries. He deals not only with the Mass but also with the Sacraments, with the liturgy of the sick and of the dead, with the early cult of our Blessed Lady, of the Martyrs and of the other saints. Dom Cabrol maintains that "the fourth century witnessed the greatest liturgical revolution the Church ever went through" and his book has as its main thesis the proposition that the liturgy of the early Church, far from being a thing of great austerity and simplicity, contains, though still not fully developed because of circumstances, the seeds of great rites which the fourth century brought to maturity. He proves that the liturgy of even the first centuries bore a striking resemblance to what takes place in our churches to-day, and possessed—even previous to the fourth century—all its constituent elements, namely, "its liturgical cycle, its feasts, its sacraments, blessings, exorcisms, gestures, even its cult of saints and martyrs, and their relics and the cult of the dead—in a word, all that belongs to what we call Christian worship." The last chapter of this book is one of peculiar interest, it deals with liturgical unity during the first three centuries. It shows that at a time when the liturgy was in process of slow formation, when it was not moulded and controlled rigidly by a central authority as it is to-day, the different rites connected with the Sacrifice and with the administration of the Sacraments were remarkable much more for the elements which they had everywhere in common than for the points in which they differed. At a later period, when greater liturgical development was possible, the Church—in the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries—gave proof of a liturgical genius that was both constructive and inventive. Then, woven around the central nucleus of the liturgy of the Last Supper, came the divergences that issued in the Ambrosian, Gallican and Mozarabic rites in the West and in the various families of liturgies in the East. All who desire to catch the liturgical spirit of the early Church, thereby participating more actively and intelligently in the worship of to-day, should read and assimilate the pages of "The Prayer of the Early Christians." Its author is a master of the art of popular liturgical teaching.

Of great importance for the due celebration of the Mass and other liturgical functions is the use of Vestments which are in accordance with the rubrics and which are beautiful in material

and design. Many of the vestments which are in use nowadays are incorrect, of poor and unsuitable material, badly cut and poorly ornamented. They are neither dignified nor beautiful, and this because the makers—whose training in this matter is very imperfect and whose outlook is purely commercial—ignore the rubrical directions concerning vestments and either do not know, or deliberately depart from, the æsthetic principles which liturgical tradition in this matter has handed down from the ages of great art. Dom E. Roulin, O.S.B., of Ampleforth Abbey, has done an inestimable service to those who make and those who purchase sacred vestments by his book *Linges, Insignes et Vêtements Liturgiques* (Lethiellieux, Paris). This work, which appeared in French last year, has just been issued in English (the translation by Dom Justin McCann) under the title *Vestments and Vesture* (Sands and Co., 1931, 15s.). It is an admirable book—indispensable to all who make, purchase or keep vestments—setting forth the rubrics which concern vestments, the history of liturgical dress and the principles, liturgical and æsthetic, which should govern the designing and making of vestments. Dom Roulin pleads powerfully and persuasively for a return to vestments which in style and ornamentation will be truly dignified and beautiful garments, worthy of the purpose for which they are used, and in keeping with the best traditions of the Catholic Liturgy. The volume is plentifully and most beautifully illustrated, and the author—evidently a very practical man—is not content with giving pictures of beautiful vestments, he adds illustrations of some of the hideous productions that to-day adorn (?) the windows of many ecclesiastical emporiums to show us what *not* to purchase. Every line of this excellent book should be carefully read and duly digested by those whose business it is to make or buy vestments. If its principles are learned and put in practice, we shall see the priest at the altar clothed in vesture which is graceful and dignified in its cut, its dimensions, its material and beautiful in its texture, colour and ornamentation. This was so at one period of the Church's history, why should it not be so again? Dom Roulin has done his part, and done it well, in helping to restore good taste in liturgical vesture.

Consequent on the desire of our present Holy Father that we of the West should become better acquainted with our brethren of the East, there has been of recent years quite an ardent revival of interest in Eastern Rites and so Mr. Donald Attwater's *Prayers from the Eastern Liturgies* (Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1931, 4s.) comes at a very opportune time. The author, who is a recognized authority on matters liturgical, and especially on Eastern Rites, has given us in this excellently produced little volume, a well-chosen collection of prayers from the Abyssinian, Armenian, Byzantine, Chaldean, Coptic, Malabar, Maronite and Syrian Rites. They are very beautiful prayers. "The warmth of their tone" (writes Abbot Cabrol in the Preface), "the loftiness of their thought, and the sureness and depth of their teaching—to say nothing of the literary quality of some of them—

put them on the same level with those of the Latin liturgies, while they have at the same time an entirely different character." The compiler has prefaced this collection of liturgical prayers with an excellent account—succinct, clear and accurate—of the Eastern Rites which are in use at the present day. Those who like to pray in the spirit of the Sacred Liturgy will appreciate and like these prayers.

The long-expected second volume of the *Liturgicæ Institutiones* of Monsignor Callewaert (the Rector of the Bruges Seminary) entitled *De Breviarii Romani Liturgia* has just been published (Beyaert, Bruges, 1931, 35frs.). The Breviary is the prayer-book of the priest, his daily companion from the time he receives major Orders until the day of his death. It is intended to be one of the chief sources of his spiritual inspiration. Hence it is of the utmost importance that a priest should not only learn to say his Office correctly, but that he should have a really intelligent appreciation of the origin and nature of the Divine Office, and understand clearly the place that it is intended to hold in the priestly life. It is to enable priests to have this more intimate knowledge of the *Opus Dei* that Monsignor Callewaert has written this book on the liturgy of the Roman Breviary. He sets forth with much erudition the idea of the Office and its general plan, and the history of the Canonical Office from the early centuries to the reform of Pius X. He deals with the constituent elements of the Office (the psalms, the hymns, the lessons, etc.) and with the various "Hours" (the origin, growth and character of each). He treats of the different kinds of Offices (dominical, ferial, festal) and with the relations that the Offices of the ecclesiastical year bear to one another (precedence, occurrence, concurrence). Finally, there is a chapter on the Offices which are outside the body of the Breviary (local Offices, the Office of the dead, the little Office of Our Lady, etc.). A point of special interest in the history of the Roman Breviary is the question as to how much of our Office we owe to the Rule of St. Benedict (which was written about 530). The common opinion is that the Breviary of the Western Church owes so much to St. Benedict that he must be regarded as its real author. This view Mgr. Callewaert more or less accepts in the body of his book, but in a *nota retractatoria* written as an appendix he tells us that he has changed his opinion, and he advances the thesis that the Roman Breviary does not owe so much to St. Benedict as is commonly thought; that before the time of his Rule the Breviary was to a large extent fixed in almost its present form and in use in the churches of Rome, and that the real author of the Office is the Roman Church or the Apostolic See, though, of course, the growth of the Breviary has been largely influenced by monastic uses. The *Liturgy of the Roman Breviary* is a most interesting, stimulating and useful book and should be read by all clerics who wish to have an intelligent appreciation of their daily prayer.

Matters Liturgical, the Collectio Rerum Liturgicarum of Fr.

Joseph Wuest, C.S.S.R., translated by Rev. T. W. Mullaney, C.S.S.R., has reached its third edition (Pustet, 1931, 3\$). This edition is practically a reprint, yet the book has been brought quite up to date by some changes (for example, the new rite of the feast of the Sacred Heart, the new proper Mass for it, and the Act of Reparation of Pius XI are dealt with) and by an appendix giving the recent (1929) Instruction of the Congregation of the Sacraments on the administration, reception and reservation of the Blessed Eucharist. *Matters Liturgical* is a very handy compendium of liturgical lore. It gives in tabloid form quite an extraordinary amount of information, and it is very accurate and very complete regarding the points with which it deals. In a few matters it might be improved: (a) the liturgical law about the use of the conopaeum or veil on the tabernacle—a law embodied in the Roman Ritual and confirmed by many decisions of the Congregation of Sacred Rites—is not sufficiently clearly set forth nor insisted upon (pp. 42 seq). (b) In dealing with the reception of converts (p. 491) the law (Codex. canon 2314, §2) is that the abjuration is to be carried out juridically, that is in the presence of the Ordinary of the place or his delegate and of at least two witnesses. (c) It would be useful to give the conditions which must be fulfilled by the recipient of the Apostolic Blessing *in articulo mortis* (p. 497). *Matters Liturgical* is quite a good book, but it is not worth its price (12s.).

II. ASCETICAL AND MYSTICAL THEOLOGY.

BY THE MOST REV. ALBAN GOODIER, S.J.

Archbishop of Hierapolis.

UNDER the title of *Bossuet Maître d'Oraison* (Bloud and Gay) the Abbé Bremond has republished an old volume on the spiritual life, by the famous Père Caussade, of the Society of Jesus. The original title of the book was *Instructions spirituelles en forme de dialogues sur les divers états d'oraison suivant la doctrine de M. Bossuet*. It was first published anonymously, in 1741, as coming from the pen of a Father of the Society of Jesus, and with the Society's approbation. Abbé Bremond has thought fit to change the title, because, as it seems to him, the book is no more nor less than an attempt to reproduce Bossuet's teaching on Prayer, showing in the course of the dialogues that it is much more akin to the teaching of Fénelon than, perhaps even Bossuet himself knew.

Whether this is the right interpretation of the dialogues, we do not care to consider. This at least is certain, that the author who, on Summervögel's authority, we take to be Caussade, is making in these dialogues a bold and an excellent attempt to defend and explain the truest mysticism; while, at the same time, he shields himself from any charge of Quietism. The book, therefore, has a deep historical as well as spiritual significance. It was written at a time when controversy was high in France between the Quietists who had been condemned, and the cham-

pions of simple prayer, represented especially by Bossuet and the Sulpician School. The Jesuit Father, in this book, seems to have in mind a desire to harmonise the best on both sides, and, by means of that harmony, to reconcile the rivals in a common doctrine on the sublimest of subjects.

In the first part of the book the dialogues take the shape rather of refuting Quietistic errors than of anything positive. On this account it is that this first part has seldom, if ever, been reprinted. But the dialogues of the second part are distinctly positive and dwell even more on the actual words of Bossuet. They teach the doctrine of simplicity, of suspense, in the presence of God, while distinguishing this from mere Quietism; and also the doctrine of the solid preparation of heart and conscience and soul for one who would even approach the higher forms of prayer. They teach, too, a submission of judgment, in all experiences of prayer, to a sage guide and confessor. As Abbot Chapman has said in a recent article in the *Dublin Review*, Caussade, in this volume, does not so much reconcile Fénelon with Bossuet as Bossuet with St. Ignatius. He calls attention to Caussade's well known word "abandon," and he shows, with excellent judgment, that the word combines both the indifference of St. Ignatius and the recollection of Bossuet.

It seems to us a pity that so excellent a work, edited by so excellent an authority, should be somewhat marred in the preface by a certain bitterness of controversy.

The mention of Abbé Bremond points to a distinct tendency in modern ascetical literature, that is the study of the great masters of the past, and an effort to recover, if we can, the mind of the eleventh to the fifteenth Centuries when, it would seem, in antithesis to the troubles of the times, mystic and ascetical writers were multiplied. For this reason we welcome the new study of St. Bernard: *The Mysticism of St. Bernard of Clairvaux*, by Mr. Watkin Williams (Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 3s. 6d.). The author has already established his reputation as a student of St. Bernard. In this volume, which discusses chiefly the *Sermons on The Song of Songs*, the treatise, *Of loving God*, and the Letter *De Consideratione*, addressed to Pope Eugenius III, the author has collected most of the results of his own studies.

Of similar importance is the new edition of *The Golden Epistle of Abbot William of St. Thierry to the Carthusians of Mont Dieu*, edited by Dom Justin McCann (Sheed and Ward, 5s.). This treatise has had a varied history, and has been attributed to several writers, among others to St. Bernard himself. But the editor shows that there can be little doubt as to the real authorship. The work itself is an excellent picture of the life and spirit of the Contemplative Religious of the eleventh Century.

In connection with this volume we would call attention to that attractive work *The Mirror of Simple Souls*, published some time ago amongst the Orchard Books of Spiritual Classics (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 5s.). This volume shows the continuity of

the writers of that time, for it hangs closely upon, and indeed in many places practically reproduces, The Golden Epistle of Abbot William.

This leads us to recall the admirable work that we have in the Orchard Books, edited by Dom Roger Hudleston, O.S.B. These little volumes are necessarily somewhat expensive; nevertheless we have little in our Catholic literature, either more excellently edited, or more valuable to ourselves if we would study the asceticism that is peculiar to England. Such volumes as *The Amending of Life*, by Richard Rolle; *The Cloud of Unknowing*; *The Revelation of Divine Love*, by Julian of Norwich; *The School of Perfection*, by Walter Hilton; *The Minor Works of Walter Hilton*, all these give us an idea of the deep asceticism and, indeed, mysticism which flourished in England during the same period that produced Tauler, Suso and Ruysbroek in Germany. The history of our English school has yet to be written, but there can be no doubt that it held a high place amongst the schools of Europe previous to the Reformation. Since we have referred to the Orchard Books, we would add that we sincerely hope their circulation will be such as to encourage Dom Roger Hudleston to carry on his undoubtedly fine work. It makes one of the best edited series that we know.

Akin to the works just mentioned is a new volume *Self-Discipline and Holiness*: the teaching of The Venerable Augustine Baker, from *Sancta Sophia*, edited by the late Dom B. Weld-Blundell of Fort Augustus Abbey (Methuen, 5s.). Father Baker is too well known to most of us to need any introduction. The editor of this volume has given us a selection of Father Baker's work dealing with Mortification, and dwelling specially upon interior as contrasted with exterior mortification.

It is pleasing to notice a likeness to the teaching of Father Baker in another recent volume: *The Love of God*, St. Francis de Sales' Treatise, abridged by The Sisters of The Visitation (Sands, 7s. 6d.). St. Francis represents in France what Baker has just been illustrating in England, namely, that new movement towards interior rather than exterior mortification and spirituality which followed closely on the Reformation. The Visitation Nuns have realized that St. Francis' treatise has fewer readers in our time than it should have, because of its inordinate length. They have, therefore, carefully reduced the volume by omitting whole sections, and indeed whole books, and we congratulate them upon the way the work has been done.

To speak of another type of literature reviving in our day, we cannot but be grateful for many recent studies of Saints which are tending to revolutionize our hagiography. Such a volume is *Saint Teresa in Her Writings*, by Abbé Rodolphe Hoornaert, D. ès L., translated by The Rev. Joseph Leonard, C.M. (Sheed and Ward, 15s.). Abbé Hoornaert is a recognized authority in Europe on St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa. In this volume he begins from the farthest circumference and gradually works to the centre. For instance, in Part I, he tells us of Sixteenth

Century Spain, political, social, intellectual, literary. On that background he studies St. Teresa not as a Saint but as a classic, her emotional faculties, her intellectual gifts, her active life; and then only her mystical state in connection with her intellect. The background of her mind and its content are wonderfully drawn out for us, and we are left with no doubt whatever that we are dealing with a master mind, endowed with marvellous common sense, whose mysticism, therefore, cannot be treated in any way as a delusion or an affectation; if ever there was a genuine person, St. Teresa was that person.

The third part studies the works of St. Teresa, and once more the author keeps himself as much as he can to establishing St. Teresa's place as a Spanish classic. What she teaches, he cannot and does not wish to set aside. We are given her great and main ideas on Prayer, on God, on the Church and on Christ, and while the author gives them we cannot help contrasting St. Teresa's solid judgment with the sentimental illuminism of her time. But, for the most part, it is the æsthetic and literary value of her work which most occupies the Abbé's attention. We may say that after we have read *Saint Teresa*, we know the woman with whom we are dealing: the Saint will come afterwards.

Lastly, we would call attention to the latest volume, published in England, from the pen of Karl Adam: *Christ our Brother* (Sheed and Ward, 7s. 6d.). English readers have already come to know the professor in the University of Tübingen from *The Spirit of Catholicism* and from *Christ and the Western Mind*. In those volumes they will have recognized the author's extraordinary gift for catching the soul of a thing, that lies beneath and inspires the outer form. In this we would say that Karl Adam shows genius.

The same characteristic marks what we would venture to think is the best of the three volumes given to us, this study of Christ in His Human Nature, and the place of that Human Nature among men. The author has little use for the school to which his University has given its name, but he has great use for the words of the Scriptures themselves. He shows us Christ in His intimate sympathy with every detail of human life and, on the other side, in His absolute devotion to the Will of God. Life and nature to Him are no more nor less than the expression and fulfilment of that Will—not a new doctrine, indeed, but it is expressed with a most extraordinary power of detail. Similarly, when the author comes to speak of the Redemption, the purpose of that Redemption expressed in terms of human life, namely, the love of man for man made perfect in the love of man for God, the doctrine is not new, but it is certainly brought home to us with great force. Through Jesus Christ, our Lord, the world is made a greater world, a happier world, a fuller world; man himself is raised to his highest standard of human perfection; the Church of God, in which the Holy Spirit dwells, is the fulfilment of humanity itself. This we may say is the teaching of

Karl Adam. He would draw the individual to a personal knowledge of the Child of Bethlehem as of more importance than the knowledge of Augustus of Rome, and with that orientation would have us readjust all our judgments of life, of faith, of progress, of ideal, in which, and in which alone, he sees the answer to our modern problems. As he says, his new perspective "from a cavilling, critical, morbid questioning has become constructive, comprehensive and brave."

III. CHURCH MUSIC.

BY HERBERT S. DEAN.

In reviewing recent work in Church Music an event of the highest significance has first to be recorded—the announcement by the Archbishop of Liverpool of the institution of a School of Music in that city "to provide for the training of choir-masters and organists who will be thoroughly equipped for their work and imbued with a true sense of fitting liturgical music." This is crucial. The difficulties in the way of securing the standard of liturgical worship proposed by Popes Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI are many and various, but one over-tops them all. It is the difficulty of obtaining leaders of the movement who are at once technically competent and formed in the requisite habit of mind. Throughout the country the movement is spreading, very slowly but solidly, but the prime difficulty is that there are so many persons charged with our musical arrangements who are liturgically minded, and so many who are reasonably well equipped musically (at least well enough to serve), but so very few who have both qualifications. And both are necessary. The ordinary musician, amateur or professional, has acquired his musical equipment for the sake of music as an art, self-contained. However willing he may be to learn, it is difficult for him to revise all his ideas. But he has got to do it, and difficulty almost becomes impossibility if there is no authoritative, living school in which he can learn. On the other hand the enthusiast for liturgical worship is useless for practical purposes on the musical side without some modest technical equipment, and for this a great part of the general musical curriculum is superfluous, while some of the essentials are absent entirely from it.

Those responsible for the Society of St. Gregory quickly found, as their work began to spread, that their first task must be to provide a body of teachers to carry the mission throughout the country. Accordingly the Summer School at Oxford, the part-time schools in Liverpool, Birmingham, Nottingham, the classes at various centres throughout the country, have had the formation of choir-masters and organists as their prime object, and they have had the advantage of securing a body of lecturers, Dom Desrocquettes, Fr. McElligott, Fr. Turner, Mr. Allen, Mr. Edeson, who are brilliant teachers as well as experts, artists and liturgists. But for permanence and completeness,

also for the production of the finer accomplishment in art, more is needed, and it was this need that brought about the foundation of the *Schola Cantorum*, at Paris, by Bordes, d'Indy and Guilmant, under the spiritual influence of César Franck—an institution in which a full musical education of professional standard is offered in combination with a formation and training in the music of the sanctuary. It is common knowledge that the establishment of such a *Schola* was part of Cardinal Vaughan's scheme for Westminster Cathedral, and the residential choir school was a beginning. Circumstances prevented the realization of this dream, and perhaps, indeed, we were not ripe for it. Anyhow, the incomparable work Sir Richard Terry actually did is monument enough for one man's life-time. For he not only re-discovered and re-created but also put into actual performance for twenty-three years the incomparable Tudor and Elizabethan church music—a feat comparable only to that of one who should have re-discovered the whole Shakespearian *corpus* after 300 years' burial and also settled its text, edited it, and staged it. But undoubtedly, the time is now ripe for a *Schola*, and the Archbishop is forming one to serve first his new Cathedral, then his diocese, and then the whole Catholicism of the country. Organized by Dom M. D. Willson, O.S.B., with the co-operation of Dr. Arthur Pollitt, F.R.C.O., it will be established at once in the Cathedral buildings on Brownlow Hill, and, like the Cathedral itself, it will be planned, one feels sure, on a scale that shall secure for the future a national institution sending its missionaries throughout the country, as well as a present practical provision for immediate needs.

Turning to publications one can record quick progress. The *Liverpool Plain-song for Schools*¹ has sold in tens of thousands—it has eleven Masses from the *Kyrie* and a variety of other pieces of the sort likely to be wanted. It has been followed by the admirable *Plain-song in Church and School*, compiled by Mr. John Brown, the Choirmaster of St. Patrick's, Leeds, and Headmaster of the School. Mr. Brown is exploring the use of the tonic sol-fa system in teaching the Chant, not as a notation to supersede the four-line stave, but as an auxiliary for method and theory. His book contains much useful matter on the subject, and he is preparing another dealing with it more fully. As one who for years used this method with boys, I can testify to its high value; indeed, it is sheer waste not to use it with boys who already use it for their general music. Mr. Brown in developing it is a benefactor to the whole teaching profession. I take it that he would reprobate as strongly as I any suggestion to translate the melodies themselves into the alphabetic notation. Thirdly, we have had a perfect example of editing and annotation in the *Compline* of Fr. John Burke, Dean of University College, Dublin, whose work in popularizing the Chant in Ireland, while

¹ The books mentioned in this paragraph cost only a few pence each and are all either published by or obtainable from Desclée of Tournai, Rushworth and Dreaper, of 11, Islington, Liverpool, and J. and W. Chester, of 11, Great Marlborough Street, London, W.

still maintaining the highest ideals in its regard, is so well known.

Mention must be made of that invaluable aid to study, the gramophone. The records of portions of the Chant done by Ampleforth monks under Fr. McElligott are admirable and have the advantage of costing only 4s. 6d. each.² They have been followed by an Album of twelve large records done by the monks of Solesmes,³ with a booklet containing the melodies and an introduction and annotations. It is altogether a masterly production, as fine artistically as it is authoritative in its expertise. It should be in every choir library. Another set of high scholarly value is the first volume of the *Columbia History of Music*,⁴ with records of the "Organum" and of Polyphony from its embryonic stages to its fulness, rendered under the direction of Sir Richard Terry. There are pieces, such as the examples of early descant, in which the gramophone enables us to hear what we shall probably never have the chance of hearing otherwise.

Turning to the question of accompaniment, the ideal from every point of view is to have none. A very minor motive for holding this view is that we should be spared the lengthy, difficult and troublesome discussions that have come to surround the subject. Those who want to imbibe the true milk of the word must get and study the accompaniments of Dom J. H. Desroquettes and Monsieur Henri Potiron, and the essays prefixed to their works.⁵ Anyone who can master the subtleties there set forth may consider himself well equipped indeed. Mr. H. P. Allen would certainly come within that category, but in his accompaniments for the Liverpool book⁶ he confines himself to the simplest application of them. Accompaniments to Mr. Brown's book by Dom Desroquettes and to Fr. Burke's by himself are promised for an early date. Some of the practical troubles, too lengthy to be investigated here, were discussed between Dom Desroquettes and the present writer in the *Universe* of November 8th and 22nd, 1929.

At this point those who know will scent from afar the approach of arsis and thesis and that "little tear-drop" the ictus. But one whose acquaintance with these phenomena began practically with their own birth (or re-birth if this must be conceded), and has continued ever since, will not be so foolish as to attempt to resume their discussion in the space of a few hundred words. I will be content to note a point of general principle which the present revival has brought to the front.

² H.M.V. C2087-8.

³ H.M.V. D1971-82. In album with book £3 18s. od. Records separately at 6s. 6d., book 1s. 6d.

⁴ Columbia Co. in conjunction with Oxford University Press. D5710-7. In album with book £1 8s. od. Records separately at 3s., book 1s. 6d.

⁵ *Accompagnement du Kyrie Vatican*, Desclée, Tournai. *Vingt-neuf Pièces Grégoriennes Harmonisées*, and a volume of *Commentaires* on the same. Hérelle, Paris.

⁶ *Accompagnement to Plainsong for Schools*. Desclée, and Rushworth and Dreaper, 5s., in cloth 7s.

Let it be premised that no one with any qualification to speak denies—rather they strenuously maintain—that the Solesmes reconstruction of the Chant, in its broad lines, is a definitely settled thing. The question is of the refinements due to the successors of the pioneer-scholar Dom Pothier. And out of that arises the further question of the popular singing of the Chant—which after all is crucial, for it is a fundamental of the Pian reform that the Chant (in its simpler forms, of course) be restored to the use of the people. *Expertise* is manifestly needed for the melismatic chants. If it is to be held necessary for all the chants—if, for instance, it is to be demanded that a long half-verse of a psalm requiring the flex, or two lines together of a hymn, be sung in one rhythmical unit and in one breath, then we may as well put up the shutters so far as any congregational singing of the Chant is concerned. For a great deal that is wise and suggestive on this, and on half a dozen other practical topics, the reader is referred to two articles by that admirable expert and artist, Fr. Archibald McDonald, which appeared in the *Sower* of January and April this year. How expert opinion differs upon these rhythmical problems may be seen from the *Religious Music* of Dr. Aigrain, of which the English translation by Canon Mulcahy of Maynooth has lately appeared, and is reviewed on another page.⁷

A further matter of importance next arises, which is very judiciously discussed in Fr. McDonald's second article. Obviously the first task of the reform, and the most important, is the revival of the Chant; so quite rightly this has almost entirely monopolized the early activities of the Society of St. Gregory and the published works of the revival. But the traditional polyphony, and modern compositions of the right style and spirit, have their place in Church music, and are specifically designated in that sense by the Supreme Pontiffs. A protest must be entered against any language that seems to disparage them in theory or discourage them in practice. The scope of the Society of St. Gregory expressly includes all music approved by the Papal legislation, and the Archbishop of Liverpool has announced that the same will be the case with his *Schola*. In recent publications Messrs. Chester are continuing the excellent editions of polyphonic motets for which Mr. H. B. Collins is responsible, and this high authority has a practical article on the subject in the current number of *Music and Liturgy*.⁸ Also for choirs of moderate attainments the editions of Sir R. Terry are obtainable from Messrs. Cary & Co., 13, Mortimer Street, W.1. Of modern Church Music of any consequence there is still a complete dearth—the natural result of the absence of demand. But there is some being written, and one hopes that the revival will enable it to be profitably published and to increase in volume. In very simple music, the Very Rev. Fr. Standish, O.S.B., has issued a good Short

⁷ See pp. 84-9 of the English translation.

⁸ From the Hon. Sec. of the Society of St. Gregory, Mr. D. J. S. Edeson, B.Mus. (Oxon.), F.R.C.O., 49, Cromwell Avenue, London, N.6. By post 1s. 1d.

Mass, obtainable from him at The Priory, Workington; and Mr. Guy Weitz has issued with Novello & Co. an *Ave Verum*, inspired by the traditional melody, which is worthy of a disciple of Franck and d'Indy. In non-liturgical music a new *Requiem* for *sol*i, chorus and full orchestra, by Baron Frédéric d'Erlanger, has been published by Schott and was broadcast by the B.B.C. in February. It is Verdi in miniature, but rather more symphonic in structure. Those who heard it over the wireless had some thrilling moments.

A few final words about the organ. Those who want a full account of the huge Compton Unit Organ just opened at Downside will find it in the April issue of *The Organ*.⁹ This instrument, with its four manuals and fifth "floating" Bombarde, its 142 stops, its 26 couplers and its 51 pistons and balanced pedals, represents the last word in electrical construction, and Mons. Joseph Bonnet, who played the opening recital, finds it as beautiful in tone as it is complex in resources.

In organ music there is little to report from this country save a *Christmas Rhapsody* and a beautiful meditation *In Paradisum*, by Mr. Guy Weitz,¹⁰ both within the competence of the good amateur player. The composer's virtuosity is to be found in his gramophone records of the Franck Chorales,¹¹ which at once took their place as classics of organ-playing, and in his first Bach record, the great E-flat Prelude,¹² which has just come out. There have been a lot of records of French Cathedral organs, but in many cases the reeds are so abominably out of tune and the acoustics of the building so bad that they are only of use to those who want to see how much noise can be got out of a gramophone. The one real organ innovation has come from France with the publication of *L'Orgue Mystique*¹³ of M. Charles Tournemire, the present incumbent of Franck's office at Ste. Clotilde. This great collection of complete incidental music for the Liturgical Year exploits every resource of modern music and musical modernism as a mystical background for the melodies of the Chant, which inspire the whole. A lot of it is enormously difficult to play, much of it is quite as difficult to listen to; the whole thing bears much the same relationship to ordinary organ music as the poetry of St. John of the Cross to the Penny Prayer Book. Whether this big effort has a future or not, it is well worth the attention of serious organ-students, who should get some specimen fascicules and try and plumb their depths. Karg-Elert in his Catholic mood may perhaps serve as a stepping-stone between the normal and M. Tournemire.

⁹ Office of *Musical Opinion*, 13, Chichester Rents, London, W.C.2. 2s.

¹⁰ Novello, 2s. each.

¹¹ No. 1, H.M.V., C1825-6. No. 3, H.M.V., C1378-9.

¹² H.M.V., C2050.

¹³ *Au Ménestrel*, 2 bis, Rue Vivienne, Paris, from which House a full prospectus can be obtained.

ROMAN DOCUMENTS

BY THE REV. A. BENTLEY, Ph.D., M.A.

SEX EDUCATION AND EUGENICS.

Modern theories of "sex education" and "eugenics" are condemned in a recent decree of the Holy Office. In place of the former, the Church demands, first of all, satisfactory and uninterrupted religious instruction, and secondly such particular safeguards as a high esteem for, and cultivation of the angelical virtue, a frequent use of prayer and the sacraments, filial devotion to Our Lady, and the avoidance of dangerous occasions of sin. The decree recalls the fact that some Catholic writers have been found to advocate the methods here condemned.

I. An probari queat methodus, quam vocant, "educationis sexualis," vel etiam "initiationis sexualis"?

II. Quid sentiendum de theoria sic dicta "eugenica," sive "positiva" sive "negativa," deque indicatis ab ea methodis ad humanam progeniem in melius provehendam, posthabitis legibus seu naturalibus, seu divinis, seu ecclesiasticis ad matrimonium singulorumque iura spectantibus?

Emi. ac Revmi. DD. Cardinales . . . respondendum decreverunt:

Ad I. Negative: et servandam omnino in educatione iuventutis methodum ab Ecclesia sanctisque viris hactenus adhibitam et a Sanctissimo Domino Nostro in Encyclicis Litteris "De christiana iuventutis educatione" datis sub die 31 Decembris 1929 commendatam. Curandam scilicet imprimis plenam, firmam, nunquam intermissam iuventutis utriusque sexus religiosam institutionem; excitanda in ea angelicae virtutis aestimationem, desiderium, amorem; eique summopere inculcandum ut instet orationi, Sacramentis Poenitentiae et Sanctissimae Eucharistiae sit assidua, Beatam Virginem, sanctae puritatis Matrem filiali devotione prosequatur eiusque protectioni totam se committat; periculosas lectiones, obscena spectacula, improborum conversationem et quaslibet peccandi occasiones sedulo devitet.

Proinde nullo modo probari possunt quae ad novae methodi propugnationem, postremis hisce praesertim temporibus, etiam a nonnullis catholicis auctoribus, scripta sunt et in lucem edita.

Ad II. Eam esse omnino improbandam et habendam pro falsa et damnata, ut in Encyclicis Litteris de matrimonio christiano "Casti connubii" datis sub die 31 Decembris 1930.

. . . Datum Romae, ex aedibus Sancti Officii, die 21 Martii 1931. (A.A.S., XXIII, p. 118.)

THE SEVENTH CENTENARY OF THE DEATH AND CANONIZATION OF SAINT
ANTONY OF PADUA.

On June 13th, 1931, seven hundred years will have passed since the death of Saint Antony in Padua. The centenary celebrations, staged in Padua and in the Saint's birthplace, Lisbon, will extend over twelve months, to include the seventh centenary of the canonization on May 30th, 1232. The co-operation of the two cities is praised in an *Apostolic Epistle*, addressed to the Bishop of Padua on March 1st; and in this document the Holy Father proceeds to bring into relief the main facts of the saint's life, and the virtues which marked him as a hero of sanctity. Since the knowledge of Antony as a saint is often obscured by admiration of him as a wonder-worker, the Epistle recalls how, in the flower of his youth, he surrendered wealth and noble rank, worldly prospects and pleasure for the simple dress of an Augustinian canon. Soon afterwards, in search of greater perfection, he entered the Order of St. Francis, and in this new life strove each day to climb to higher peaks. Brightest already among his other virtues was the splendour of his absolute chastity, the complete self-control and spotless purity which drew down the Divine Infant to rest in his arms.

The Holy Father emphasizes the means by which the saint preserved this virtue: the striking humility and retirement of one who nevertheless was so far from being a coward that he did not shrink from confronting the tyrant Ezzelino da Romano; his attachment to poverty; his custody and control of the senses; his constant, fervent prayers, doubly fervent and continual when death was at hand; finally, that consuming zeal which was the keynote of his missionary enterprises in Africa, Italy, France and Portugal.

A hammer of heretics in the presence of Albigenses, Cathari and Patarenes, he was always ready at the same time to show his love and sympathy for the blind, the wayward and the penitent. His preaching was simple and unostentatious, free from any taint of self-advertisement. It was from a profound knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures that he drew an unfailing store of divine wisdom, so that Gregory IX spoke of him as a living Ark of the Covenant.

Clearly a model of purity and unworldliness for Christian youth, and of courage, humility and zeal for all engaged in the work of missions, St. Antony teaches those whose duty it is to preach to seek wisdom from the Sacred Scriptures, and prepare themselves after the example and precepts of Jesus; while a noble rivalry of his virtues is offered as an ideal to all who have entered the religious state, within or outside the Franciscan family.

The Holy Father concludes with words of blessing and encouragement for all who are taking part in the celebrations, the pilgrimages, the Missionary and Social Conferences in

September, or the Eucharistic Congress towards the close of the centenary year. (A.A.S., XXIII, p. 71.)

CHURCH BELLS.

The Code lays it down as something fitting, that all churches should have bells to announce the time of divine service (*convenit*, c. 1169, 1). To use them for purposes which are merely profane is forbidden "*nisi ex causa necessitatis aut ex licentia Ordinarii aut denique ex legitima consuetudine*" (c. 1169, 4).

A decree of the S.C. of the Council, dated March 20th, 1931, urges the strict observance of these provisions of the Code. The permission of the Ordinary must be sought and obtained in good time, if, *gravi ex causa*, there is a reason for using the bells on other occasions than those which are strictly religious. The bishop should have recourse to canonical penalties against offenders in this matter, even, where necessary, referring particular cases to the Sacred Congregation itself. (A.A.S., XXIII, p. 129.)

THE FIRST PAPAL MESSAGE BY WIRELESS.

The text of the Pope's address at the inauguration of the Vatican wireless station on February 12th, 1931, was published in the *Acta* of March 5th under sectional headings: *Ad universam creaturam—Ad Deum—Ad catholicos—Ad hierarchiam—Ad religiosos—Ad missionarios—Ad fideles universos—Ad infideles et dissidentes—Iis qui praesunt—Iis qui subsunt—Divitibus—Pauperibus—Operariis et datoribus operum—Infirmis et afflictis*. (A.A.S., XXIII, p. 65.)

There is also an illustrated booklet, published by the *Osservatore Romano*, which gives the full text in eight languages: Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, English, German and Polish.

THE INDEX OF PROHIBITED BOOKS.

By decrees of March 6th and March 14th, 1931, the Holy Office condemned the following works and ordered them to be placed upon the *Index*.

1. P. Martial Lekeux: "*L' Ami*." Paris, Editions Saint-Michel.

2. Doctor Th. H. Van de Velde: "*Het volkomen huwelijk*" (latine: *matrimonium perfectum*). The S.C. adds a reminder that translations, no less than the original, are *everywhere* forbidden by canon 1396. Doctor Van de Velde was formerly director of the gynæcological clinic in Haarlem. (A.A.S., XXIII, p. 117.)

BOOK REVIEWS

The Vision of God. By the Rev. K. E. Kirk, D.D. pp. xxviii. and 582. Longmans. 25s.

We are made for the vision of God. In his every act man is striving, often blindly and in error, for happiness, and that happiness can never be complete but in the enjoyment of God. His efforts are to be directed to the achievement of a supreme good which he recognizes as unattainable here. The final end of man, the *summum bonum*, is to be found in the face to face vision of God. This is the doctrine which is the basis of Dr. Kirk's recently published Bampton Lectures for 1928. He does not set about any formal proof of this thesis: that is too familiar. The fact is accepted. But granted the meaning of the promise in the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart for they shall see God," many questions immediately arise: Who are the clean of heart? Where, when and how shall they see God? And subsidiary to these: What is the history of the idea? How is cleanness of heart to be attained? Is it open to all men to attain the vision, or is the monastic state a necessary preparation? What is the function of the Church here? Are formalism, discipline, laws an aid or a hindrance? Is the vision attainable by human effort alone, or how far is the supernatural involved? What is the relation between worship and service? What is the meaning of contemplation?

Here are some of the questions, obviously brimful of interest, debated through the centuries, dividing men into two camps from our Lord's day down to our own, which with consummate skill Dr. Kirk has co-ordinated into one line of enquiry, has studied in the evidence of Jewish and Christian and Pagan Greek literature, in philosophers, prophets and evangelists, in Fathers and Schoolmen, in saints and sinners and heretics. His erudition is equal to his craftsmanship, and the mass of notes and references which appear on almost every page bears witness to his diligence and conscientiousness.

But one can simplify more completely. One fundamental practical question is discovered in the book: What is a plain man to do in order to fulfil God's designs and to achieve the *summum bonum*? Interwoven with the answer to that is the discussion of a speculative question: What is the nature of the promised reward, and is any measure of the Vision of God attainable in this life?

In answer to the first question Dr. Kirk would say that there is no need to become a monk (though he contends that the contrary opinion prevailed for a long time); legalism and self-centredness are to be minimized or avoided, and attention is to be focussed on God; but there must be service of the

brethren, and above all things (and in order to serve effectively) there must be worship. For Dr. Kirk is no "naturalist," though he is a "humanist." The book's outstanding merit, which in spite of much questionable matter makes it eminently worth while, is its insistence on the supernatural. Dr. Kirk exposes the hollowness of the fashionable Christianity which thinks that if one "helps a lame dog over a stile" one has fulfilled all justice. He insists, in a way so admirably bold as almost to be liable to misinterpretation, on the inpouring of the grace of God into the empty vessel as the way of advance in virtue. "We may cast out the beam from the eye of the soul; we may (in Augustine's phrase) 'cleanse' it by all the actions of a virtuous life; we may direct it towards God by the processes of prayer and meditation; but all that will be as nothing, unless God of His own free beneficence presents Himself to the clarified vision and supplies the light wherewith He may be seen." (p. 467.)

Nor does he despise law though he condemns an excess of legalism and is apt to find that excess too soon. And a place must be found for asceticism, though he has no sympathy with the extreme renunciation which characterized the Eastern solitaries of the early Church, and which indeed is found in the lives of many saints down to our own times. "Renunciation, detachment, self-denial, must have their permanent place in every Christian life, however much at the same time we set ourselves to live in the joyous fellowship of human society, and as the beneficiaries of God in things both great and small." (p. 471.) He realizes that there is a sterner side to the teaching of Jesus, and if he finds this a difficulty he none the less loyally accepts it. But in codification he sees a constant menace. Even the *Corpus Juris Canonici* he describes as "a monument of industry indeed, but a monument alike in conception and execution almost wholly of this world."

Another illustration of his insistence on the supernatural is his teaching about "vocation." In St. Paul, I Cor. vii. 20, 24 he finds (justifiably or not) the revelation of the universality of a divine call, not merely to holiness, but to a particular state of life as the indicated path of holiness for each individual: "This 'Oriental,' this 'ascetic,' this Puritan who stands aloof from the every-day life of the world—it is to him we owe the great Christian truth that the most ordinary secular employment can and should be regarded as a mission laid upon us by the Omnipotent God Himself." (p. 82.)

This doctrine falls in exactly with the author's purpose. It is an argument in favour of his own solution of the insistent problem of the "Double Standard" or "The Two Ways," which is pivotal to the book. Is a sharp line of demarcation to be drawn between those who follow the evangelical counsels and those who do not, a line which separates them as higher and lower in present perfection and grade of future reward? In particular is fullness of contemplation possibly only to him

who has forsaken all things to follow Christ? The antithesis is discovered in the New Testament (and in the discussion of it Dr. Kirk's exegesis is so liberal that however we might agree with some of his conclusions we could never follow his lines of interpretation); it is clear in the Didache, in Hermas and the Fathers; and it is supposed to be the *raison d'être* of early monasticism.

In the history of the problem he discovers what he calls the "valid theory," the "invalid theory," and an unsatisfactory compromise. "The invalid theory," he writes, "finally supplanted the valid one, to the despair of all sane moralists" (p. 243) and was "stereotyped by the Council of Trent." (p. 256.) If that last statement were exact we should dismiss the question summarily by reversing Dr. Kirk's descriptive epithets. But I do not think that it is exact. I suspect that here as in many other passages Dr. Kirk is the victim of his own logical tendency to extreme schematization. His "valid theory" makes the "active" life a stage on the road towards contemplation, and it "involves three great principles."

The principles are briefly these: (1) The vision of God is open to all men—adequately; a secular environment or vocation is no barrier to it; (2) all men are called to it; (3) there is room for progress from the life of the precepts to ulterior aims which are "counsels" now and may become precepts or immediate duties by and by. Allowing for a certain lack of definiteness in the wording, and a little over-statement ("precepts" "duties" in the last principle, any Catholic before or after Trent could accept those propositions, although Dr. Kirk has found many statements in the early Church which, he considers, conflict with them. But what says the Council of Trent to overthrow such doctrine? "*Si quis dixerit statum conjugalem anteponendum esse statui virginitatis vel coelibatus, et non esse melius ac beatius manere in virginitate aut coelibatu quam jungi matrimonio, A.S.*" Now, if that contradicts the "valid theory" then there is more in the valid theory than is contained in the three great principles. And indeed there is. For by "Vision of God open at all events adequately" Dr. Kirk means to include the summits of contemplation; and he does not approve of the exaltation of the state of virginity over that of marriage.

Marriage is no absolute bar to supreme contemplation, and the religious state is not an essential condition of it. So much is clear from the lives of the saints. But the life of the counsels in religion is a "state of perfection," and it is obvious that monasticism is a great aid to perfection in general and to contemplation in particular. All are called to be holy, and fidelity to present grace is rewarded by further graces. There is room for progress always. The Tridentine canon does not clash with any of this teaching. The author himself points out that if the invalid theory was stereotyped at Trent an extreme expression of it was condemned at Constance.

But what is the nature of the promised Vision of God? Essentially, and above all else it is the face-to-face vision of God made possible by the *lumen gloriae* in Heaven. And never was that denied by the Church to him who obeyed the precepts, and the long array of facts collected to illustrate the history of "rigorism" and the "penal" discipline of the Church does not prove that it was. But throughout history runs a thread of belief in another conception of the vision of God as a temporal religious experience. It is contemplation. Platonism was full of it. The early Christian writers were full of it. St. Paul claimed it for himself. Many Christians and Pagans seem to have set out deliberately to attain it in ecstasy and rapture. Is such contemplation set before all men as a possibility? In various places Dr. Kirk deals with the question, and in a valuable appendix sets out the teaching of the two schools which divide Catholic opinion to-day. From his discussion certain facts emerge:

(1) Since the time of St. John of the Cross it is the common teaching that the miraculous states of vision, ecstasy, rapture, etc., are not to be sought for their own sake, and that manifestations suggesting them are rather to be feared. But it does not follow, as Dr. Kirk implies, that these experiences are to be lumped together as "pathological" and to be dismissed as worthless. No Catholic familiar with the writings of St. Theresa could subscribe to such a notion for a moment. St. John's warnings are to the point and are to be borne in mind when we are dealing with a doubtful case. But St. John himself would have been the last to deny that God does sometimes deal with His elect after this fashion, and, of course, such miraculous intervention is not lightly to be esteemed.

(2) It is also the commonest doctrine to-day that some degree of contemplation is possible for all and that it is to be expected as the result of fidelity to prayer.

(3) Whether or not there is continuity between the lowest and the highest grades is a debated point. But even those who deny that there is would not insist that either virginity or religious profession is a *sine qua non* of the most advanced mystic prayer. Dr. Kirk's own position seems to water down mysticism to a degree that does away with any special virtue in it.

Even at such length I have not been able to give a complete account of the contents of this very valuable book. It is a store-house of information on the history of monasticism, discipline, penance, and prayer. As such we may well be grateful for it. If at times we resent his criticism of saints and the Church, if we disagree with some of his conclusions, we can still recognize the great service he has done in insisting on the supernatural influence in the life of every man and on the universal and primal obligation of worship.

T. E. FLYNN.

The Psychology of Character By Rudolf Allers, translated with introduction by E. B. Strauss. pp. 333. Sheed & Ward. 16s. net.

Much, if not all, that has appeared during the past quarter of a century on experimental psychology has been so motived and coloured by the materialistic and deterministic opinions of its authors, that it has been viewed with suspicion by Catholics generally, and, as a consequence, much that is of service for educational purposes, and which has been established by modern research as valuable and true, has been lost to us. To all then, who, interested in the training of youth and the development of what is called "character," have in the past looked askance upon up-to-date treatises on these matters, this book will come as a revelation, an education and a joy. For it will enable them to become acquainted with many of the valid and valuable facts which the industry of non-catholic explorers in the labyrinthal workings of the human mind, normal and abnormal, have laid bare. At the same time, it will evidence to them how correct the old scholastics were in their metaphysical and psychological principles, even though their biological and physical knowledge left much to be desired.

Dr. Allers brings to his subject qualifications which guarantee that it will be treated not only in an all round and up-to-date manner, but also in one consonant with Catholic philosophy and ethics. He is a Doctor of Medicine of the modern school, a Professor of Psychiatry in the University of Vienna, and also is evidently conversant with neo-scholasticism and the works of the great masters of the spiritual life.

The book divides broadly into two sections, the one metaphysical, the other practical. Though based admittedly upon a modification of the principles of the Adlerian School of Psychology, there runs through it the steadying influence of the scholastic teaching, that a man is one nature, one substance, that there is in his nature one permanent inherent principle, which conducts all man's operations to the ends proper to his rational life. The author thus steers clear of those mistakes, contradictions and logical pitfalls, which encumber the path of the "Psychology without soul," and the dividing up of man's personality into independent principles of "body, mind and spirit."

Rejecting as metaphysically unsound and untrue in fact the Freudian contention that "libido," sexual or hedonistic, is the primary urge of human action, as also that "mythical theory" of Jung, who sees in all moral conduct a sublimation or a repression of primitive myths, Dr. Allers accepts as a basic thesis, which he endeavours to substantiate by close reasoning and examples, the three principles on which the Adlerian school is founded, namely, the instinct of "self-assertion," "the will to power" and "the will to community."

The collection of moral habits acquired by man in the course of the relations of the ego to the non-ego under the urge of

the above primitive forces, constitutes, when grafted into his hereditary temperament, his character. In pursuit of this thesis the author considers at large the nature, the genesis and the ideals of character, then the various problems which arise in the years of childhood and adolescence, those which are originated by the difference of the sexes, and those which accompany the treatment of abnormal and neurotic individuals. Though to the scholastic mind the metaphysics of the chapters on character, and on values, may have their parallel and justification if not their inspiration in the teachings of St. Thomas on the "*bonum utile delectabile et honestum*," and in Aristotle's definition of man as "*animal sociabile*," their elaboration and application to the matter the author has in hand, will not fail to delight students, both of the old and the new psychology.

From the practical point of view, the chapters on the "*psychic life of early childhood*," the difficulties in the upbringing of children, their adolescence, etc., will prove of immense value to all who are interested or occupied in education, primary or otherwise.

There is one chapter on women, their rights, their duties and their place in the community life which, in these days of what is called "*the emancipation of women*," will materially assist the student in the placing of this question in its true orientation and Catholic aspect.

As is well pointed out though the treatment of abnormalities in children and adults, which arise from neurosis or physical undevelopment, should at least, in the first instance, be placed in the hands of a competent medical man, and one versed in the new methods of psychical science, there is still much work to be done afterwards, which only the priest can supply. "*The physician has no title to speak authoritatively on religious questions, and he has not at his command the supernatural means of which the priest makes use*," the "*ego te absolvo*" and "*the sacramental power in general can never be replaced by any psychotherapeutic technique*." It does not appear, however, that the author in treating of neurosis has taken sufficiently into account, the hereditary and temperamental features, which influence character; nor again has he given proper credit to the workings of the "*unconscious mind*." For when stripped of its false accretions there is much left in this theory which will find support in the teachings and practices of the Saints and the masters of the science of the spiritual life, and which should find place in a treatise of this nature.

Dr. Allers is instant, and in this we think he is wise, in warning confessors and medical men against falling back on theories of the menace to health and sanity which secret vice is supposed to engender. "*These threats and prophecies are a survival from an antiquated period of medical knowledge, and the time has arrived to remove all such false teaching from educational literature, and to stamp out the various popular writings on the subject*." They do not help, they discourage,

and when the prophecies do not prove true, the confidence of the penitent is gone.

There can be no safe treatment of the difficult question of conduct by anyone who is ignorant of or forgetful of the Christian doctrines on original sin and grace, the strife engendered by the one, the weapons of defence supplied by the other. With St. Paul we must remember the law of our members by which we do not the good that we would, "the grace of God by which we can do all things," and the fact that we are "not unclothed but clothed upon." The confidence then with which we read this book is strengthened by the knowledge that its author is not unmindful of these Catholic and revealed truths, which are absolutely necessary to the unravelling of human conduct, and its many mysteries.

The translator, himself a medical man and a Catholic, has grappled very successfully with the many difficulties which the German thought and terminology of the original create, and has given us a work which is pleasant to read and idiomatic in style, though to the lay-mind and to others not conversant with the technicalities of the subject, a glossary is not merely useful but necessary. However, even as it is, it is a work which should be in the hands of all engaged in pastoral and educational activities, and who wish to be abreast of modern ideas and research.

Addressed to a wide circle and not merely to the "illuminati" of the psychic schools, this book, while it has from its very subject-matter not been able altogether to avoid a technical treatment, has we think so far successfully avoided the discussion of controverted points between the three schools of modern psychology, as to give us a treatise, which those who have no more than a nodding acquaintance with the new ideas on mind and mind healing, may with diligence and application digest to their profit.

A. CANON VILLIERS.

Hebrewisms of West Africa. By Joseph J. Williams, S.J., Ph.D., Litt. D. pp. vii, 443. London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 30s.

Jamaica was matter for the ethnologist long before it exercised the fancy of the novelist, and long after it began to make the fortunes of the white. The chief concern has been with the black side of Jamaica, and there is a side of Jamaican affairs which is very black indeed, so that often we are obliged to call white black but black white. The first African slaves were imported into Jamaica during the sixteenth century, a date happily coincident with the new-born freedom in Europe. The slave trade grew with the growth of that freedom. In the eighteenth century 700,000 slaves were imported. "If two in ten lived through the horrors of the middle passage, the trade paid." It happens that this year, 1931, is the centenary of

a great slave rising which destroyed about £700,000 of property. Freedom was granted to the slaves in 1834.

The Cross was set up in Jamaica early; and where better? *formam servi accipiens*. Later, in the nineteenth century, Jamaica came formally under the spiritual control of the Jesuits, and it is fitting that the author of the book under review is a member of that Society.

Fr. Williams was for five years resident in Jamaica. He "was impressed by the striking differences, physical and mental, between the Jamaican black and all other negro types that he had encountered." They are the real peasantry of the island. Whence do they derive? The Jamaican black was shipped from the Gold Coast of West Africa, and the theory, based on observed similarities of physique and of customs, is that they are Coromantyns, a generic term for Gold Coast negroes, and specifically are descendants of the Ashanti. The area of research, therefore, is shifted from the West Indies to West Africa, and the thirteen chapters of the book embody the results of that research which occupied Fr. Williams for six years, and may be divided into two parts: Hebrewisms in West Africa; and From Nile to Niger with the Jews.

The list of cultural elements common to the Ashantis and the Hebrews is impressive. "The Ob cult, religious dances, use of Amen, vowel value, patriarchal system, parallel symbol of authority in 'stool' and 'chair,' endogamy, cross-cousin marriages, family names, exogamy, simplicity of the marriage rite and the part that wine plays in the ceremony, uncleanness after childbirth, purification ceremony, menstrual seclusion, and ceremonial ablutions, besides Ashanti loan words of apparent Hebrew origin." Further, "the remarkable similarity of the Ashanti Nyame and the Hebrew Yahweh, not only as regards verbal signification and derivation ($\sqrt{=to\ be}$, in Hebrew and in Ashanti), but especially in their attributes (e.g., 'Creator' in Ashanti and Hebrew is expressed by the same \sqrt{br}) and their relations to the created channels of the Divine influence, according to the accepted tribal concepts. All this is supported by such parallelisms as mixed or divided service, the adoption of fetishism or its equivalent without any apostasy from monotheism; the subtle reference to a Redeemer; *Ta Kora*, the 'son of the supreme God'; the 'Altar to Nyame' preserved in the stamp patterns of the Ashanti cloth; the High priest; sterility as a curse; the traditional twelve-tribe theory; the raven story of Elias and its counterpart; New Year festivals and their ceremonies; legitimate violations of a taboo; and reference to the Natural Law."

If, as the author contends, the Hebrewisms are there, how did they get there? What, if any, "historic contacts" between the Jew and West African tribes are known or are possible? First, it is essential to define what is being sought. What is a Jew? "There is no such thing as a Jewish race." There is a Jewish "social and religious community" racially "as complex as

many of our best Americans." So that nor language, nor noses, nor heads, but "spirit and practices of ancestors descended from one of the sons of Jacob" are the criterion of the Jew, and with this guide the author looks for Jewish traces in Africa.

It is common knowledge that the Jews have been long in Africa: in Egypt whence they were led by Moses, and to which refugees returned; in Abyssinia, where the Falashas are of distinctively Jewish descent; and in North Africa, from Tunis to Morocco, not only since the second century B.C., but at an earlier date when they joined in the Phœnician adventures in the Mediterranean, at first as individuals and later in small independent groups. From which of these centres was Hebraic culture diffused? Not from the Falashas, because, compared with Ashanti Hebrewisms, the Falasha culture is young and impure. Not from North Africa. It is probable that the flourishing Jewish colonies at Carthage, in Morocco, at Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Alexandria sent out colonists into all the adjacent districts for trade or for refuge. We know that Berber tribes were converted so thoroughly that it is practically impossible to distinguish Berber Jews from true Jews. We know too, that these Jewish or Berber-Jewish colonists penetrated into the interior of the continent, across the Sahara and beyond to the neighbourhood of the river Niger, where Jewish groups were in contact and intermarried with Negro tribes of the interior. But the author decides that the corruption of language and of religious practices among North African Jews could not have produced the purer Hebrewisms of the Ashanti. He argues that the African source is Egypt.

From the time of the Babylonian exile the Jews in Egypt became increasingly powerful in matters of State and commerce. Commerce led out along the coasts of the Mediterranean and into the utmost recesses of Africa. But the flesh-pots of Egypt corrupted Jewish faith and spirit, and the schismatical temple at Leontopolis, the idolatry and corruption of Yahweh worship at Elephantine, the hellenistic spirit of the Alexandrian Jews, signs of gross materialism and lax compromise, prepared the way for absorption of Jews by the Negro tribes of the Niger.

Actually, one interior negro tribe at least—the Songhois, seems to derive from Upper Egypt. Its tradition is that it evolved not far from the Nile banks; the theory is that the result was an ethnic complex: a negro majority, and a distinctively light complexioned aristocracy including a strong influx of Jewish refugees who gradually dominate the whole mass. The two earliest recorded dynasties of the Songhois were white.

The Songhois left Upper Egypt much before the Christian era. The road from Nile to Niger was long: it was determined by the route of commerce following the well-watered section with plentiful pasturage and ample supply of animal food that extended between the dense tropical forests on the South and the desert wastes on the North, via Khartum, Kordofan, Darfur.

Wadai and Chad, around to the Lake of that name and then along the Yobe and Hadeija rivers to Kano and so on to Niger: a journey of thousands of miles over a period of many centuries, during which the Songhois developed and, on arrival at the Niger, built an empire—first capital, A.D. 300—which dominated West Africa, and was not annihilated until the Moors of Spain retreated through Morocco and took vengeance on the thriving Negro kingdoms of the interior until only a struggling remnant of Songhois culture remained. The Ashanti came under Songhois influence before Islam attacked and drove them into the great tropical forests.

Such is the thesis of the book, which Fr. Williams describes as a "personal conviction," for which "we cannot postulate any degree of certitude" as yet. Summarily, the thesis is "that a Jewish element is to be found in the parent stock of the Ashanti. . . . This element has every indication of being lineally connected with the Hebrews of pre-Babylonian days, presumably through the refugees in Egypt."

By way of criticism. It is clear that the foundation of the thesis is "Hebrewisms, real or apparent, among the Ashanti." But why "Hebrewisms"? Fr. Williams admits that "the cultural traits noted, are for the most part widespread throughout the world," so that whilst admitting a moderate surprise that they should be found together, we think linguistic affinities, of structure and vocabulary, are more important than the presence of very widespread and common customs. The chief of these linguistic affinities (vowel value)—the others seem to us less apparent—would link up Ashanti with the generic Semitic rather than the specific Hebrew. The Ashanti supreme God is (*O*)nyame, which is Hebrew *Yahweh*. The evidence quoted for the interchange of *m* and *w* is Babylonian. Also, (*O*)nyame is the Sky God. If this is Semitic in origin, why not derive it from *Anum* the Sky God of the Sumero-Babylonian pantheon? Further, Fr. Williams' attempt to find Hebrew origins for Ashanti words might have been more successful. For example, on p. 83 he suggests that the Ashanti words *sene* (Crier, Herald), *okyerema* (drummer) and *obrafo* (executioner) are connected with the Hebrew words for bush, Horeb (transliterated wrongly in the text) and covenant. It is a pleasant sport and I suggest, but don't believe, that the Ashanti for Crier, Herald is from Semitic $\sqrt{sn'}$, to repeat, to tell, and for Executioner is from $\sqrt{br'}$, cp. Phœnician *hbr'*, incisor, cutter.

Fr. Williams in his astonishingly large bibliography refers to W. H. Worrell's "*The Races of the Near East*" (1927). He will recall that the author states the theory that Semitic appears rather a development of the Hamitic, and that the Hamites once occupied the Sahara, then fruitful and life-supporting, and the coastal lands, but with the desiccation of the east-central Sahara the Hamites became divided and that their descendants are decidedly negroid. We would on this theory

expect Hamitic-Semitic elements in the language and need not invoke the Jews specifically.

The book is very interesting and collects useful information covering a wider field than, perhaps, the immediate problem demands. Footnotes swarm the pages and some of these are irrelevant. Hebrew characters are printed in the footnotes; the vowel points are not clear and often look like vowels other than the correct ones. There are several maps. The bibliography is very exhaustive, but an Englishman may be pardoned his scepticism when he read a quotation from the *Daily Dispatch*! We congratulate and thank Fr. Williams for his book and amazing labour.

T. FISH.

Religious Music. By René Aigrain, D.D. Translated by the Very Rev. Canon Mulcahy.—Sands & Co. 5s.

One scarcely expects to find in a volume of less than three hundred pages an exhaustive study even of religious music, yet readers will be agreeably surprised at the amount of information contained in René Aigrain's "Religious Music."

To our mind the chief value of the book lies in the first part, which is devoted exclusively to Gregorian Chant, for the author has given not only an historical but also a critical survey of this important branch of music. Beginning with the Jewish ritual and the Greek modal system, we are led on to St. Gregory and his "schola cantorum" with its famous antiphony—a compilation of chants arranged and revised by Gregory himself. During the Middle Ages this official collection of Roman melodies suffers from numerous changes. Re-arrangements and adaptations are clumsily made, and new additions of unequal merit are inserted for the Ordinary of the Mass.

With the multiplication of manuscripts we find different systems of notation, though the melodic tradition was never actually lost. During the Renaissance period polyphony reigns supreme, and the situation is aggravated by the liturgical innovations of the Gallicans who abandoned most of the Roman rite and with it the official Gregorian melodies. The restoration is delayed until the middle of the nineteenth century, when Dom Guéranger leads an active campaign for the return to Roman liturgy and the traditional chants. From that time onwards the monks of Solesmes have devoted themselves with unwearying patience to the study of Gregorian music, and thanks to their scholarly research, carried out in a rigorously scientific manner, we now possess an authentic edition of the chant, and even if the complicated laws of rhythm have not been completely solved to the satisfaction of everyone, the success of the work of restoration is already guaranteed.

The second part of the volume deals with figured religious music, and includes not only Church music strictly so called, but also concert music of a religious nature. This is a wide

subject and the author is necessarily brief in his sketches of the various schools. The arrangement is somewhat haphazard, and he has completely overlooked our many English composers, but this serious deficiency proves to be a blessing in disguise, for the translator, Canon Mulcahy of Maynooth, has contributed a valuable additional section of some thirty-six pages on "English and Irish Religious Music." Dunstable, Fayrfax, Taverner, Merbecke, Tye, Byrd and others whose names have so often appeared in the musical programmes of Westminster Cathedral, must surely find a place in any history of religious music, whilst Elgar, Vaughan-Williams and Sir Richard Terry cannot be passed over in silence. We regret the omission of Stainer from this additional section, and of Verdi from the original work. The former's "Crucifixion" and cantatas, as also Verdi's "Requiem" and "Stabat Mater" are well known to all students of music.

J. HAMPSON.

Accompaniments to Plainsong for Schools. By H. P. Allen.—Rushworth & Dreaper, Ltd., Islington, Liverpool. Paper, 5s.; cloth, 7s. 6d.

Plainsong enthusiasts will agree that the ideal is to sing the Chant unaccompanied, but most of them will also admit that ideal conditions are seldom, if ever, realized in our churches and schools. Hence some kind of accompaniment becomes a necessity, and as very few organists or teachers can be expected to accompany Gregorian music at sight, they naturally look for such a volume as Mr. Allen has prepared.

Some of the recent Solesmes writers have in our opinion been too artistic and elaborate, with a tendency to multiply discords and exaggerate the use of passing notes and suspensions. By contrast Mr. Allen's style is simple, easy and natural, though it conforms with the Solesmes principles of changing the chord upon the ictus and aiming at a smoothly-flowing progression in four-part harmony. The simplicity of this accompaniment does not interfere with the melodic rhythm, which is preserved throughout, and even in the syllabic chant of the Gloria and Credo. In choosing the pitch Mr. Allen has been mindful of the average range in congregational singing, and the melody rarely soars beyond D, and never beyond E.

J. HAMPSON, Ph.D.

Life of St. Malachy. By Ailbe J. Luddy, O. Cist.—Dublin, Gill & Son, Ltd. 5s.

This work supplies a need, since previous lives of St. Malachy in English have gone out of print. The chief authority used is St. Bernard; he is, indeed, practically the only source available, but he is also, as the Bollandists point out, an authority "omni exceptione maior." St. Malachy was the greatest of the band of reformers given by Providence to the Church in Ireland to restore her spirit after three harassing

centuries of foreign invasion and intestine strife. His greatest achievement, because fraught with most hazard, was the re-establishment of religion in Armagh, grown lax during a succession of intruded lay-abbots. Fr. Luddy has produced a good popular life of the saint. The appendices give St. Bernard's two panegyrics, and the so-called prophecies of St. Malachy concerning the succession of Popes and the future of Ireland. Both prophecies are shown to be spurious.

J. CARTMELL.

Short History of the Christian Church. By C. P. S. Clarke.—Longmans.—10s. 6d.

Priests or students in search of an interesting summary of Ecclesiastical History may easily be attracted by this single volume of some 500 pages, which is sufficiently up to date to include the Lateran Treaty. The author is lecturer in Church History at the Salisbury Theological College, and has written other books of scholarly reputation. For a summary, this *Short History* is remarkably well written; in places it is even gripping. The handling of its vast material is masterly. The divisions really make for clearness and do not supersede illuminating generalizations, as do the over-specialized divisions of such text books as *Funk*, *Albers* and *Marron*. Church History is grouped in six periods, the Age of Persecution, the Age of the Councils, the Dark Ages, the Papal Monarchy, the Age of the Reformation, and the Church in the Modern World. As an example of the sub-divisions, the second period runs as follows: Church and State, Monasticism, Three Eastern Bishops, the Councils, the Papacy, Three Great Men, St. Augustine and the Celtic Church. Such division is an aid, not a hindrance, to a general view of the period, because it is vital to realize the dangers of Caesaro-Papism, the force of ascetic ideals in the past and the types of great Churchmen (St. John Chrysostom, Synesius and St. Cyril of Alexandria are an admirable choice) before studying the history of the actual Councils. The Three Great Men are SS. Martin, Jerome and Ambrose, showing the part played by worthy Ordinaries, scholars and ecclesiastical statesmen outside the direct sphere of theological controversy. St. Augustine provides a convenient unity for the histories of Donatism and Pelagianism, nor is the *De Civitate Dei* forgotten. Above all, if anyone were to see this book in a shop, and, tempted to buy it, were to dip into its pages, he would find no bitter controversial tone. Such obvious test cases as Liberius, Honorius and Alexander VI are treated with objective calm; indeed, in the last two cases almost with reticence.

But it is impossible to recommend this work, however admirably written and arranged. Though the tone of controversy be lacking, the matter is very unsatisfactory. To take only one subject—on the evidence for Papal Primacy in the early centuries the author's omissions cumulatively considered amount

to *suppressio veri*. For the tradition of St. Peter's episcopate in Rome we have nothing but two oblique references. The jurisdictional importance of the letter of St. Clement to the Corinthians, the unique expressions of St. Ignatius in referring to Rome, the Corinthians' respect for the letter of St. Soter, the attitude of St. Irenaeus in the Paschal Controversy—all are slurred over. In view of their moment in establishing the Papal Primacy, no considerations of space can justify this treatment. Then there are definitely false statements on the same subject. The Council of Sardica is said not to have recognized as already existing, but to have conferred, the right of appeal to Rome: when the very existence of the Council, intent on re-trying the case of Athanasius, showed that the Pope could reopen a cause already judged in a provincial Council. Milman is quoted, apparently with approval, as dating the dawn of "the vast conception of Rome's universal ecclesiastical supremacy" from Innocent I (402-417), as if Victor and Julius, to mention only two, had never existed. The twenty-eighth Canon of Chalcedon is wrongly stated to have conferred upon Constantinople equal primacy with Rome. It was a question of Patriarchal rights only. This is clear from the actual text—*τὰ ἴσα πρεσβεία*—and the reference to the Churches of Asia, Pontus and Thrace. The Acts reserve the word "Primacy," *πρωτεία*, for Rome alone; and if the "Bishop of New Rome had equal primacy with the Bishop of Old Rome," what need was there for the Council to apply to Pope Leo for his confirmation of this very Canon before it could be applied to the Eastern Church?

It must be unnecessary, now, to enumerate other unsatisfactory statements. This *Short History* is not the book we are looking for. But when that comes, it will have to challenge comparison with this summary in the liveliness of its writing and the arrangement of its material. And may it come quickly!

RICHARD L. SMITH.

REVIEW OF REVIEWS

In the May number of the *AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW* Fr. McCarthy establishes *The Obligation of Priests to foster Vocations*: the substance of his solidly reasoned article is that: "First, every priest is bound, *sub gravi*, to avail of his particular opportunities, in a reasonable way, to foster the desire of the priesthood in boys who come under his influence, provided he sees in them the physical, intellectual and moral qualities, coupled with a pure intention and such goodwill as gives solid hope that the boy will make a good priest. The guilt which he incurs through neglect is to be judged on the ordinary principles governing responsibility for sins of omission in the case of divine or ecclesiastical law. Secondly, a priest who diverts the expressed desire of a boy, otherwise suitable and acceptable for the foreign missions, and advises him to study for a home diocese, sins gravely, inasmuch as he prevents the boy from fulfilling the highest form of charity to his fellowmen according to the teaching of Pius XI, and is indirectly responsible for grave loss to souls in grave necessity."

A point of view in Preaching: preparation for sin, by Dr. Kerby, works out very thoughtfully an important element in the psychology of sin: *nemo fit repente pessimus*. Every serious sin has a history. If the Preacher confines his attention to the abstract explanation of sin offered to abstract individuals in abstract circumstances many of his hearers will remain unassisted, because of this lack of insight into the processes of concrete sin in concrete conditions in which concrete individuals live. Evasions, excuses, manipulation of knowledge, gradual and unperceived, surrender to temptation as these appear in the actual history of sins, ought to be the object of immediate practical concern for everyone who undertakes the guidance of souls through preaching, instruction, or the confessional.

Attention is drawn to the November-December number of *BIBLICA*, of the Biblical Institute, Rome, in which Professor Herkenne gives a translation of the Psalm *Dixit Dominus Domino Meo*, in which is preserved uniformity and logical sequence in the thought of the Psalm.

An article by Dom J. B. Monnoyer, O.S.B., in the *ETUDES FRANCISCAINES* for January-February, defends his attribution of "the Imitation" to Gerson as against Thomas à Kempis on the ground that there is open contradiction in teaching between (1) the mystical theology of Gerson and the first three books of the Imitation and (2) the germanic mystical theology of Thomas à Kempis. The writer brings much personal feeling into a discussion in which calm reasoning might well be expected. However, he promises another article on *Gerson théologien mystique et auteur de l'Imitation*.

In the *REVUE D'ASCETIQUE ET DE MYSTIQUE* for April 1931

(Quarterly, 35 francs a year, 9, rue Montplaisir, Toulouse). Pierre Debongie, C.S.S.R., sheds some light on the same problem: the manuscript of the Imitation, dated 1456, attributing the work to Thomas, which is now in the library of Troyes, formerly belonged to the Abbey of Clairvaux. Very strong reasons show that the text derives from the Flemish Abbey des Dunes which was in close historical relation with Clairvaux, and that as early as 1450 Thomas à Kempis (+ 1471) was considered in Flanders to be the author of the Imitation.

REVUE DES SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES (Strasbourg, April, 1931), *Une église tchèque au Moyen-âge*, by Victor L. Tapié, is a long and very interesting account of the beginnings of the *Unitas Fratrum* from whom the later Moravian Brethren derive. The Chronicle of the History of Religions, by A. Vincent, is particularly well done.

The February RECHERCHES DE SCIENCE RELIGIEUSE (every two months, 32 francs a year. Paris (VII), 15, rue Monsieur), has a similar Bulletin d'histoire des Religions, by Gabriel Horn, who also gives us a useful analysis of Fr. W. Schmidt's great work on the *Origin of the idea of God*, vol. II: "The Religions of the Primitive Peoples of Armenia."

The NOUVELLE REVUE THEOLOGIQUE (May, 1931) has two useful articles on St. Robert Bellamin in his relation to the currents of Theological thought in his day, and as an apologist. Recent Theological work in Spain, in 1929-1930, is set out by A. Perez Goyens.

The CORRESPONDANT for May 10, 1931, gives an account of the *Root causes of the Spanish Revolution*, going back to the disaster of Annoual in the summer of 1921. The suggestion is made that the King went behind the back of General Berenguer then commanding in Morocco and urged General Silvestre to take the bold step which led to the practical annihilation of the Expeditionary Force. The demand for a full investigation of the responsibility concentrated the forces of the Opposition and the two years' agitation seemed on the point of succeeding when in September, 1923, took place Primo de Rivera's coup d'état with its resultant Dictatorship. Again the suggestion is made that the initiative was not that of the General but of the King. When after political unrest and indecision, economic trouble made itself felt and military discontent was shown, the Dictatorship fell and the King was made the scapegoat, the fact being that throughout his reign he had had to deal with self-seeking groups of political mediocrities without a single outstanding leader. No wonder that under such circumstances he was led to the assertion of personal authority in the higher interests of Spain, although he cannot have been blind to the risks involved. When political passions have calmed down the greatness of the work he did for Spain will certainly be recognized.

The CORRESPONDANT also gives us a literary article of exceptional interest by a young American writer, Bravig Imbs, on the *Life of Chatterton*: a sympathetic and solid piece of work in

which no pains have been spared to gather relevant details. He is presented to us as the fore-runner of the Romantic Movement.

Père Llande in *ETUDES* (May 5) gives his view of *Le changement de régime en Espagne*. Primo de Rivera alienated the political personalities of all parties, and surrounded himself by his own creatures; he alienated the old aristocracy and rendered their access to the King very difficult, he alienated the Universities, the Army and the Clergy: at the end he was absolutely isolated. Meanwhile the democratic spirit grew. The King insisted that the elections should be left really free, and the result was unexpected. The fact that no suitable heir to the Throne was available in the Royal Family had long familiarized thoughtful Spaniards with the idea that after Alphonso XIII there would no longer be a Spanish King. Events have precipitated popular expectations.

The grievances of the village Clergy are very serious. They are considered state functionaries and receive a starvation salary. Many of them only get 700 pesetas a year, and where offerings are rare—in very poor districts or places where faith is weak—they have to turn to other occupations or to work on the land. Moreover the vast majority of these priests were only in charge of parishes (*ecónomos*) not canonical Parish-Priests, consequently they were paid by the *apoderado* of their Bishop not in inalienable *honoraria* (*nóminas*) but in bounties (*con-signaciones*) of which a certain proportion was deducted for diocesan expenses, church-building, seminaries, etc. Under the Dictatorship new hopes arose: time and again the legitimate grievances were formulated, asking for a change in the manner of payment or for an increase. The Dictator either completely ignored the complaints or contented himself with giving fair words. The disappointment was bitter and has not been forgotten.

The IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD (May, 1931) gives an important reasoned answer by Dr. O'Neill to the query of a Parish-Priest as to the authority underlying Génicot's statement, accepted by Vermeersch, that while the administration of Holy Viaticum is, by canon 462, reserved to the Parish-Priest, the repeated administration of Holy Viaticum is not so reserved.

The writer declares "To us it seems to be devoid of foundation and of probability" and he sums up his conclusions in these terms:

1. The administration of Holy Viaticum, whether of devotion or of obligation, is reserved to the Parish Priest, clerical religious superior, or ordinary confessor of nuns (can. 850).
2. In case of necessity the law does not bind, and any priest may lawfully administer Holy Viaticum. In fact, there is an obligation in Charity to do so.
3. In case of great utility, when express permission cannot conveniently be obtained, it may lawfully be presumed.

Many of our readers will be glad to know that the February

(1931) number of *PERIODICA* (30 francs a year. Bruges, Beyaert) contains some twenty-six pages of useful notes on the Pope's Encyclical on Marriage, by Father A. Vermeersch, S.J.

BLACKFRIARS (May, 1931) opens with a thoughtful article on the trend of modern legislation. Our legislators being without any formal allegiance to well-defined moral principles are falling back upon mere expediency : this is, or may be, a way of doing whatever is wanted to be done, therefore it must be done this way. It is not asked, Is this way just? but, Will this way work? Two instances are analysed : the Education (School Attendance) Bill, the Agricultural (Marketing) Bill; and two others are cited : the Trades Disputes Bill and the Agricultural (Land Utilization) Bill. A timely article, *St. Joan and the Dominicans*, by Miss Carter, brings out the mitigating circumstances of their share in the condemnation, in 1431, and the great part they played in the Rehabilitation trial in 1455. Father Hilary Carpenter, O.P., sets out clearly *the meaning of Conscience*.

In *ANGELICUM* for April (Quarterly, 30 lire a year, 15, Via S. Vitale. Rome 5) Father Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., gives an affirmative answer to the question : *Le désir naturel de bonheur prouve-t-il l'existence de Dieu?* Father Tuyaerts, O.P., sets out to prove that St. Thomas never taught the doctrine of the mere dispositive causality in his sacramental teaching. He holds that by doing so he can cut the ground from under the feet of Father Billots dispositive intentional causality. He labours with great industry and brings together a wide range of gleanings, but when he comes to formulate his findings it is clear that their acceptance must depend more on the good will of the reader than on the conclusive character of the reasoning.

Fr. J. M. Vosté, O.P., publishes a translation of three Syrian poems written about 1555 giving an account of the life, journey to Rome, consecration and martyrdom of *Mar Iohannan Soulaqa*, who is spoken of by Fr. MacGillivray in his article on *The Nestorian and Chaldaean Churches* in this issue.

CORRESPONDENCE

MONIALES AND SOLEMN VOWS.

It is commonly asserted that within the region of the British Isles moniales do not take solemn vows. We know that such is the case, *e.g.*, in France and Belgium by virtue of the Concordat with Napoleon. But is this true of these countries? If so, by virtue of what prescription of the Holy See?

REPLY

Moniales are defined in Canon 488. 7. "Veniunt nomine monialium, religiosae votorum solemnium aut, nisi ex rei natura vel ex contextu sermonis aliud constet, religiosae quarum vota ex instituto sunt solemnna, sed pro aliquibus locis ex Apostolicae Sedis praescripto sunt simplicia."

Many of our Institutes of "moniales" derive their origin from France and Belgium, in which countries, for over a century, the vows taken were simple according to the terms of the latter part of the canon cited. Since the appearance of the Code a series of instructions from the Holy See has somewhat modified their condition, and a comparison of these texts may help to elucidate the position of "moniales" in this country.

(1) *S.C. de Relig.*, May 22nd, 1919. "Nihil innovandum esse in dependentia Monialium praedictarum ab Ordinariis locorum in Gallia et Belgio, prout post restaurationem ab uno saeculo et amplius hucusque observatum est." (A.A.S., 1919, XI., p. 240.)

(2) *Commissio Codicis*, March 1st, 1921, ad III (Can. 597-600). "An lege clausurae papalis, de qua in Cann. 597-600, comprehendantur etiam moniales, quarum vota, quamvis ex Instituto deberent esse solemnna, tamen in aliquibus locis, ex praescripto Sedis Apostolicae sunt simplicia. Resp. NEGATIVE, ratione indulti apostolici adhuc in vigore manentis." (A.A.S., 1921, XIII, 177; Periodica X, p. 327.)

(3) *S.C. de Relig.*, October 11th, 1922. "Contingit aliquando ut monasteria monialium, ex instituto quidem votorum solemnium, in quibus tamen ex praescripto Apostolicae Sedis pro aliquibus locis vota non nisi simplicia emittuntur, procedant ad fundandum novum monasterium eiusdem ordinis, missis aliquibus monialibus in locum eidem praescripto minime obnoxium. Hinc quaeritur:

I. An vota emissa aut emittenda, in novo monasterio, ut supra fundato aut fundando, habenda sint solemnna ad normam juris communis.

Resp. AFFIRMATIVE, dummodo accedat beneplacitum Apostolicae Sedis.

II. An moniales de quibus in Can. 488. 7, possint alibi fundare monasteria absque beneplacito Sedis Apostolicae.

Resp. NEGATIVE, et supplicandum Sanctissimo ut fundationes huiusmodi hactenus absque Sedis Apostolicae interventione peractas sanare dignetur.

III. An monasterium monialium cum votis solemnibus et clausura papali, quando in alium locum transfertur, pergat esse clausurae papalis et votorum solemnium. IV. Quid juris quando monasterium monialium, de quibus in Can. 488, n.7, transfertur in locum ubi non viget praescriptum S. Sedis de quo in dicto canone.

Resp. ad III and IV. Recurrendum in singulis casibus ad Apostolicam Sedem. (A.A.S., 1922, XIV, p. 554.)

(4) *S.C. De Relig.*, June 23rd, 1923. This decree, after recalling the decision of May 22nd, 1919 notes that the position of these French and Belgian moniales calls for further definition and decides:

i. . . . Esse vere moniales juris pontificii ad sensum Can. 488. 7, prout ceterae moniales in Ecclesia universa.

ii. . . . ad normam canon. 615 exemptione non gaudere, sed esse Ordinariorum locorum jurisdictioni subjectas in iis quae canones Ordinariis ipsis circa moniales attribuunt.

iii. Nihil vero obstandi in praesenti quominus, si quod monasterium id postulaverit, vota solemnia, servata clausurae papalis lege, moniales emittere queant, dummodo id ab Apostolica Sede obtineant. (A.A.S., 1923, XV, p. 357.) Many monasteries in France and Belgium, as a result of this Instruction, elected to request the Holy See to recognize their vows as "solemn," and there was a general desire for more precise instruction concerning the meaning of the Papal enclosure. This was given in great detail in an Instruction *S.C. De Relig.*, February 6th, 1924. (Cf. Cance, *Le Code de Droit Canonique*, pages 117 and 532.)

The question, therefore, regarding English monasteries seems to be one of discovering whether "de facto" a given monastery, derived from a Belgian or French foundation, has secured the papal ratification for solemn vows, in accordance with the terms of document (3) ad II, III, IV. Those which are not of French or Belgian origin are under the common law which, in the absence of a Papal Indult to the contrary, regards their vows as solemn, *ceteris paribus*. In both these categories an exact answer can be given only by the superiors of the monastery.

E. J. MAHONEY.

TWO WILLS AND A BEQUEST.

Titius inherits the estate of his father in virtue of a will dated October 1st, 1928. Now in 1931 he finds a later will of his father in an envelope hidden away in the drawer of his desk. In this later will £100 legacy was assigned to a Church, i.e., to the parish priest of a certain church. Is Titius bound to pay this legacy?

REPLY

I. With regard to his obligations arising from civil law I

write with a certain reserve, since there may be some legal interpretation of the case of which I am ignorant. But, as far as I am able to discover, a will of later date has the effect of revoking that of an earlier date. There lies an action to secure the revocation of the grant of probate of the first will. "The object of an action for revocation of probate is to compel the party who has obtained probate to propound the will; and in the result the suit becomes an action for proving the will in solemn form, or for pronouncing against it, or for proving in solemn form another will set up in opposition to that of which probate has been granted." (Stephens' *Commentaries*, Vol. III, p. 637.) It would seem evident, again I write with reserve, that a person who has knowledge of a later will, after the first has been proved, is bound by the civil law to secure probate of this later will. If this is the law, the person is bound in conscience to observe it. (Prümmer *Theol. Moralis*, I, §287.) It appears that the only difference between the terms of the two wills is the pious bequest of the second. In conscience, therefore, it would be sufficient for Titius to pay £100 to the priest named, though conceivably he may be liable to some civil penalties on the score of not producing the second will for probate.

II. If we suppose, for the sake of more precise argument, that the first will is legally valid and the second invalid, we have the old problem concerning the obligation in conscience to observe the certain wishes of a testator expressed in a document which has no legal force. (a) In the case of *secular* bequests, it is the common doctrine that there is no obligation in conscience to observe the terms of a will judicially declared invalid owing to the lack of legal formalities. (St. Alphonsus III, n. 927.) (b) In the case of *pious* bequests the question is a controverted one. Before the Code a respectable minority, including Cardinal d'Annibale, taught that there was no certain obligation in conscience, *i.e.*, they drew no distinction between secular and pious bequests. The majority, however, held that pious bequests must always be executed according to the certain wishes of the testator, even though the will was civilly invalid and judicially declared so. (Tanquerey, *Theol. Moralis*, III, §698.) Since the Code this majority view has been considerably strengthened from the terms of Canon 1513, §2. "In ultimis voluntatibus in bonum Ecclesiae servantur, si fieri potest, solemnitates juris civilis; hae si omissae fuerint haeredes moneantur ut testatoris voluntatem adimpleant." A decision of the Codex Commission, February 17th, 1931, is to the effect that "moneantur" is preceptive and not merely exhortatory. Fr. Prümmer has, since the Code, continued to defend the minority view (*Theol. Moralis*, II, 277), but I imagine that, after the interpretation officially given by the Commission, this view is no longer tenable. (Cf. *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 1928, p. 418; *Clergy Review*, 1931, p. 202.) Hence the general dispositions of Canon 1529 which sanction the civil law on contracts "*nisi aliud jure canonico caveatur*," admits of an exception in favour of pious bequests in a will civilly invalid.

III. It is not quite clear, on a question of fact, whether the bequest is certainly a "pious" one, *e.g.*, for Masses, but it seems from the words "assigned to a Church, *i.e.*, to the parish priest," that it is a pious bequest. It may be noted that the common interpretation draws no distinction between bequests to "a moral person" (*e.g.*, a religious order) and bequests to a "private person" (*e.g.*, a parish priest) in interpreting the words "in bonum Ecclesiae" of Canon 1513, §2. (Vromant, in *Jus Pontificium*, 1930, p. 122.) On the supposition, therefore, that it is a pious bequest, and not merely a secular bequest to the priest as a friend, Titius is bound to pay £100 to the parish priest, for the reasons given in II, as well as in I *supra*. If, however, it is a secular bequest, Titius is bound to pay the money for the reasons given in I only, and these, as I have mentioned, depend entirely on what his legal obligations really are in the civil law of this country.

E. J. M.

PRAYERS WITH PLENARY INDULGENCES.

Most plenary Indulgences require some prayers to be said for the intention of the Holy Father. Is there any certain ruling specifying more accurately what prayers are to be said?

REPLY

(i) Can. 934 states the general principle "Si ad lucrandas indulgentias oratio in genere ad mentem Summi Pontificis praescribatur, mentalis tantum oratio non sufficit; oratio autem vocalis poterit arbitrio fidelium deligi, nisi peculiaris aliqua assignetur." Prescribed prayers, the canon proceeds to explain, may be in any authorised version, and it suffices to say the prayers alternately with others, or even to follow them mentally while they are being recited publicly. The point to notice, therefore, is that the prayer must be vocal, not mental, except on occasions in which a congregation follows mentally the vocal recitation by one person.

(ii) Usually it will be found that no specified form of prayer is prescribed, for the intention of the Holy Father, and the authors try to determine what is the minimum of vocal prayer necessary. For, if a person prefers to pray mentally, the condition requiring vocal prayer will be fulfilled provided the minimum is observed. Some few authors, basing their interpretation on "oratio vocalis" being in the singular, in the canon cited, have held that one *Pater Noster* suffices. The ordinary teaching, so common as to be practically universal, required as the minimum a recitation of *Pater, Ave et Gloria Patri* five times. This received the sanction of the Sacred Penitentiary in the *Monita* issued for the Jubilee Indulgence in 1925. (A.A.S., 1924, p. 342.) It should be remembered, as the Canon states, that any other vocal prayer suffices, unless a specified prayer is indicated. Prayers left to the choice of the faithful should be the equivalent of *Pater, Ave et Gloria Patri* five times. Since the Instruction

of 1925 it is commonly held that this is the minimum for all Indulgences which require vocal prayer among the conditions. (*Tractatus De Indulgentiis*, p. 49. *Mechlin*, 1926.)

(iii) With regard to the Portiuncula Indulgence, *Pater, Ave et Gloria Patri* must be recited *six* times (A.A.S., XVI, 1924, p. 345, ad IX), and a further instruction determined that these specified prayers must be recited and not some other equivalent vocal prayer. (A.A.S., XXII, 1930, p. 43.) Now, there are a number of Indulgences which resemble the Portiuncula in this respect, that the Indulgence is gained "*toties quoties*" by visiting a Church and reciting prayers therein. For the sake of simplicity and uniformity in the conditions for gaining these Indulgences, it has been decided that the six-fold recitation of these particular prayers applies to them all: "S.D.N. Pius Papa XI, uniformitatis gratia atque ad omnem hac in re dubitationis rationem auferendam . . . id de omnibus indulgentiis plenariis *toties quoties* lucrandis, pro quibus alicuius ecclesiae visitatio est injuncta, benigne decernere dignatus est, ita ut in posterum oporteat et sufficiat eiusmodi preces in singulis visitationibus in omnibus hisce casibus recitare." (A.A.S., XXII, 1930, p. 363; *Jus Pontificium*, 1930, p. 242.) It is true that this instruction must not be held as applying to every form of Indulgence, in which prayer for the Holy Father's intention is one of the conditions, but only to those which resemble the Portiuncula. But, for the same reason of simplicity and uniformity, it might be taken as a useful rule for them all, and will, perhaps, be imposed in some future instruction.

E. J. M.

THE SANCTUS CANDLE.

Is there any obligation to observe the rubric of the Missal which directs a third candle to be lighted during the elevation?

REPLY

The rubrics on the point are as follows: *Rub. Gen. Tit. XX*. "*. . . ab eadem parte Epistolae paretur cereus ad elevationem Sacramenti accendendus.*" *Ritus Celeb. Tit. VIII, ad 6*. "*. . . accenso prius intorticio (quod non extinguatur, nisi postquam sacerdos Sanguinem sumpserit, vel alios communicaverit, si qui erunt communicandi in Missa) minister manu sinistra elevat fimbrias, etc.*" *Ibid, ad 8*. "*In Missa Solemni ad finem Praefationis accenduntur duo saltem intorticia ab Acolythis, quae extinguuntur post elevationem calicis.*"

(i) In some few Churches the rubric is faithfully observed, not only in solemn Masses, but in every low Mass as well. The rubrics clearly distinguish between solemn and low Mass, and it is clearly incorrect to light the third candle during Solemn Mass, in addition to the two torches already prescribed. (*L'Ami du Clergé*, 1921, p. 193.) If the rubric for low Mass is followed, the candle should be in a candelabrum fastened to the wall, or

placed on the altar steps; it should never be placed on the altar. There is no direction as to the size of this third candle and its candelabrum; some suggest it should be the same size as the Paschal candle, in order to be seen easily from the body of the Church, but it would seem more fitting if it approximates to the size of the two candles already lighted on the altar. (*Ecclesiastical Review*, 1914, Vol. 51, p. 488.) It should be lit before the elevation and extinguished after the Communion.

(ii) Unfortunately the rubric is almost universally disregarded, and St. Alphonsus noted the fact even in his time. (*Theol. Moralis VI*, n. 304.) With regard to all rubrics, the principle is that *preceptive* rubrics bind under sin, *directive* rubrics do not. This would be an illuminating distinction if it were always clearly indicated to which category a rubric belongs. In the present case, it is certain that the rubric is merely *directive*. A reply of the Congregation of Rites, December 20th, 1881, ad XI, decided that the custom of not observing this rubric could be continued. (Many, *De Missa*, §127.) This answer, ad XI, was omitted from the decree as published in *Decreta Authentica S.C.R.*, n. 3535, but a later reply, June 9th, 1899, answered in the affirmative to the query "Utrum alia consuetudo servari possit non accendendi tertium cereum in Missis lectis a consecratione ad consummationem." (*Decreta Authentica*, n. 4029.) The authors writing before the Code unanimously taught that there was no obligation to observe this rubric. It has been questioned whether the Code has not abolished this custom (*Adoremus*, 1930, pp. 25, 51), which is clearly contrary to the Rubrics, but the post-Code authors continue to teach that the custom may continue, e.g., Capello, *De Sacramentis*, §774, n. 15. The teaching is correct, with the qualification that follows.

(iii) In view of the reply of the S.C.R. quoted above, the following decision is, perhaps, a little surprising. It is an answer given to the Friars Minor of the English Province, July 29th, 1904 (*Decreta Authentica*, n. 4141, ad. VI), "Num Ordinarius praecipere possit, ut Sacerdotes, tam Saeculares quam Regulares, in Missis lectis cereum accendant in Canone apud eam Dioecesim, ubi sicut in universa regione mos illum accendendi in oblivionem ac desuetudinem iamdudum abierit? Resp. Affirmative, ex Rubrica Generali Missalis, tit. XX, et accedente auctoritate Ordinarii, non obstat Decretum, n. 4029, Resolutionis dubiorum, 9 Junii, 1899, ad II." The situation is, I think, covered by Canon 5 of the Code, for the custom we are considering is among those reckoned "*centenariae et immemorabiles*" which may be tolerated if it seems prudent in the judgment of the Ordinary. The Ordinary may, therefore, direct, the observance of the rubric, even in Churches served by Regulars, in which case the matter is of obligation. But if no episcopal direction is given, there is no obligation to observe the rubric, although it is, of course, praiseworthy to do so.

E. J. M.

THE COMMUNION PLATE, AN AMENDMENT.

On page 452 of the April issue it was stated, in answer to the question of a correspondent, that the Communion Plate should be held by each communicant. This is the plain meaning of the Instruction *Dominus Salvator*, and it is the interpretation commonly given by the current commentators. This interpretation is, nevertheless, too strict. *L'Ami du Clergé*, April 16th, 1931, printed the following text of an answer by the Congregation of the Sacraments to the Bishop of Rodez, which was first published in the Diocesan Chronicle. "Dubio Sacra Congregatio respondit quod usus ut patina apponatur sub mento fidelium ab Acolytho seu Missae inserviente, nullimode prohibetur ab Instructione huius S. Congregationis *Dominus Salvator*, dummodo tamen hic in usu patinae requisitam servet diligentiam, eandem sursum ac deorsum non flectens, ne fragmenta disperdantur."

This private reply is not yet, of course, a law since it has not been promulgated universally. Two things may be said about it. In the first place, according to the rule of canon 17 §3 "vim legis non habet et ligat tantum personas atque afficit res pro quibus data est." But, in the second place, it is an interpretation of the law which is of the highest authority and is, therefore, to be preferred to any interpretation which may have been given by private writers. "Judicia Dicasteriorum Romanorum et rescripta Sanctae Sedis juris interpretativa normam tutam agendi praebent in causis similibus et valent ut normae prudentiales" (Van Hove, *De Legibus*, §246). The interpretation of the law in the sense that the plate must not be held by the server is no longer correct.

In practice, therefore, either method may be followed in the use of the Communion Plate. For example, in communicating a number of young children it would usually be safer to allow the plate to be held by an experienced server. On the other hand, if the server is young and inexperienced, it might be judged safer to allow the plate to be held, as the Instruction says "ab ipsis fidelibus."

E. J. M.

